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Preface
This is a book about five years that rocked Curaçao. From 1795 
through 1800, a combination of internal and external factors pro-
duced a series of revolts in which free and enslaved islanders par-
ticipated with a range of objectives. The opening salvo for these 
tumultuous five years was provided by a major slave revolt that 
broke out in August 1795. While this revolt is a well-known episode 
in Curaçaoan history, its wider Caribbean and Atlantic context is 
much less known. Nor have past historians sketched a clear picture 
of the turbulent five years that followed. It is in these dark corners 
that this volume aims to shed light.
The  events  fall  squarely  within  the  Age  of  Revolutions,  the 
period that began with the onset of the American Revolution in 
1775, was punctuated by the demise of the ancien régime in France, 
saw the establishment of a black republic in Haiti, and witnessed 
the collapse of Spanish rule in mainland America. Some consider 
this age to have ceased with the defeat of the Spanish armies in 
Peru (1824); others see 1848 as a bookend. Nor were revolutionary 
changes confined to the Atlantic world. A growing number of histo-
rians portray the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries as 
a transition that was global in scale. This ‘World Crisis’ was not just 
political and ideological in nature, but also economic and cultural 
(Armitage and Subrahmanyam 2010; Bayly 1989). 
Gert Oostindie’s introduction establishes the parameters for the 
essays that follow, synthesizing the salient elements of eighteenth-
century Curaçao’s social and political history. Oostindie argues that 
Curaçao’s commercial character left its imprint on both the resi-
dent and the floating population. The port of Willemstad offered 
free and enslaved workers access to news and ideas from afar and 
enabled sailors direct contacts with numerous parts of the Carib-
bean and coastal North and South America. It was therefore no 
surprise that the Age of Revolutions also touched on Curaçao. But 
while the Age of Revolutions was a major watershed elsewhere in 
the Atlantic world, the long-term impact of Curaçao’s riotous fin 
de siècle was modest – even if unlike previous slave revolts, the 1795 
insurrection had a clear ideological dimension.|  Preface
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These previous slave rebellions had been much smaller in scope 
and scale. In his contribution, David Geggus focuses on both the 
1795 revolt and the events that transpired in 1800, when many 
Curaçaoan slaves sided with French invaders from Guadeloupe. 
What set these two rebellions apart from most slave revolts in the 
Americas, Geggus contends, was the large number of participants. 
Having assembled information on as many as 180 revolts, Geggus is 
on solid ground with his assertion that black Curaçaoans staged two 
of the eight largest revolts during the Age of Revolutions. 
Based  on  his  database,  Geggus  reveals  to  what  extent  slaves 
throughout the Americas were influenced by the three great upris-
ings that occurred in the last quarter of the century. If the Ameri-
can, French, and Haitian revolutions all left their traces, the French 
may have had the largest impact, and not only because of its liber-
tarian message. It also enabled slaves in many parts of the Americas 
to rebel by weakening colonial power structures that created divi-
sions among the free populations. Geggus notes that the Haitian 
Revolution may have been a source of inspiration, but practical aid 
from the Haitians was hard to come by. Its divided leadership shied 
away from exporting the revolution.
Apart from the shockwaves that these revolutions sent, Geggus 
stresses another factor that explains slave revolts during the Age of 
Revolutions. Many reflected an awareness of the antislavery move-
ment in Britain and of reformism in various imperial centres. Wim 
Klooster takes up this point in his essay, arguing that slaves appro-
priated texts and ideas emanating from Europe, in particular as 
they interpreted news about colonial reforms as confirmation of 
a ‘monarchist’ rumor. According to this rumor, the king had set 
them free, but local slave owners and authorities refused to honor 
the royal decree. Klooster maintains that the revolutions also had 
a more direct influence in the Greater Caribbean on free people 
of color than on enslaved blacks. In many places, free blacks and 
mulattoes openly embraced the message of the Declaration of the 
Rights of Man adopted by the French National Assembly in 1789, a 
seminal manifesto defining fundamental human rights. 
Linda Rupert zooms in on the close historical relations between 
Curaçao and Tierra Firme. She notes that Curaçao remained in 
Tierra Firme’s religious realm after the Dutch conquest, with Span-
ish Catholic priests administering to the spiritual needs of Cura-
çao’s population, especially its black majority. At the same time, 
Curaçaoans made Tierra Firme into their economic hinterland by 
establishing intensive and often illegal commercial ties with the 
mainland. As these ties expanded and were consolidated, runaway 
slaves increasingly availed themselves of the smuggling routes to Preface  |
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seek  freedom  in  Tierra  Firme.  Their  preferred  destination  was 
Coro, where, as in Curaçao, a large slave revolt took place in 1795.
One of Coro’s rebel leaders, Ramón Aizpurua tells us, was a 
former slave from Curaçao who had earlier obtained his freedom 
by fleeing to the Spanish Main. Aizpurua investigates the politi-
cal links between the two areas in the period 1795-1799, when two 
major republican conspiracies were set up in Venezuela, featuring 
motley crews indeed. White officials, merchants, and soldiers, as 
well as mulatto militiamen, were involved in the 1797 conspiracy, 
while alongside privateers from Guadeloupe, sailors from Curaçao 
took part in the 1799 Venezuelan plot.
While these conspiracies fizzled, a genuine coup d’état was car-
ried out on Curaçao in late 1796. Karwan Fatah-Black shows that 
the Military Committee behind this coup could count on popular 
support. In the previous months, Curaçaoans had begun to recruit 
leaders and catalog demands without consulting the authorities 
across the Atlantic. Once the take-over had succeeded, the new 
leaders issued a declaration that started, tellingly, with the words 
‘Freedom, Equality, Fraternity’. The coup prompted a naval retali-
ation from the so-called Batavian Republic, the Dutch metropolis 
that ironically was a de facto vassal state of France.
The final essay in this volume, by Han Jordaan, analyzes the 
impact of international politics on Curaçao in the final three years 
of the century. In these years, France and the United States fought 
an  undeclared  maritime  war  (the  ‘Quasi-War’).  As  leaders  of  a 
colony of the Batavian Republic, Curaçao’s authorities had little 
room for manoeuvre in their relationship with the French. From 
their headquarters in Guadeloupe, the French engaged in a pri-
vateering war against U.S. ships, for which they used Curaçao as a 
base. Jordaan shows that the Curaçaoan government was caught in 
the middle, trying to remain on good terms with North American 
traders while not alienating the French. In 1800, the French took 
their war to the shores of Curaçao, as soldiers disembarked from 
a fleet of five ships to pre-empt an attack on the island by their 
other enemy, the British. After a British frigate broke the French 
blockade, Curaçao ended up in British hands. Not until the end of 
the Napoleonic period did the island return to Dutch rule. Jordaan 
argues that conventional geopolitical strife rather than ideology 
made the day.
This volume is the result of a two-day seminar held at the KITLV/
Royal  Netherlands  Institute  of  Southeast  Asian  and  Caribbean 
Studies in Leiden, June 2010. The seminar was organized as part 
of the research programme ‘Dutch Atlantic Connections: The Cir-|  Preface
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culation of People, Goods and Ideas, 1670-1800’, sponsored by the 
Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO) and con-
ducted by historians of the VU University of Amsterdam, Leiden 
University,  and  KITLV.  This  particular  seminar  was  financed  by 
KITLV.
We thank the various participants in the seminar for their con-
tributions as presenters of papers or as discussants. In the process 
of re-writing the papers, the authors were very forthcoming and 
patient with the editors. We should also acknowledge our heartfelt 
appreciation to the once anonymous outside reviewers for KITLV 
Press, who turned out to be Pieter Emmer and James Walvin – both 
their support for this publication and their careful suggestions for 
improvements are well-appreciated. Finally, we thank the staff at 
KITLV Press for seeing this book to the press and to the Internet, 
open access that is.
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Slave resistance, colour lines, and the impact  
of the French and Haitian revolutions in Curaçao
Gert Oostindie
On 17 August 1795 a slave revolt erupted in Curaçao. Inspired 
by the Haitian Revolution, the uprising on the Dutch Caribbean 
island would be brutally suppressed within a few weeks. As had 
happened  on  previous  occasions,  colonial  authorities  called 
upon the local militias recruited among the free coloured and 
black population as well as upon loyal slaves to fight and arrest 
the rebels. The leaders of the revolt were brutally executed, a 
horrendous warning to slave rebels, let alone aspiring revolution-
aries. Today, the 1795 slave revolt is commemorated as a seminal 
event in the island’s history, a courageous if doomed rejection 
of slavery and colonial rule. Curaçaoans prefer 17 August as the 
day to remember slavery and slave resistance over 1 July, Eman-
cipation  Day  as  proclaimed  in  1863  from  the  metropolis.  In 
1984, 17 August was officially designated ‘Dia di lucha pa liber-
tat’, the annual day to commemorate the struggle for freedom. 
The revolt’s main leader Tula was proclaimed a national hero in 
2009.1
The  background,  process,  and  outcome  of  the  1795  revolt 
are fairly well-known, although much of the literature consists of 
rehashing the descriptions and conclusions of a few older texts 
based on limited archival sources. At its height the revolt com-
prised 2,000 slaves out of a total slave population of some 12,000. 
The sheer number of insurgents and their proportion of the total 
population make this revolt of significance in the wider histori-
ography of slave revolts inspired by the French and particularly 
Haitian revolutions. So far, however, the Curaçao revolt has been 
brushed over in most of the pertinent historiography, even if its 
1  Allen 1996:7. Fundashon Rehabilitashon Tula, http://tulalives.org/. |  Gert Oostindie
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scale was remarkable by regional standards.2 It is time, therefore, 
to set the record straight. 
But there is more. The 1795 revolt was not the first one in 
Curaçaoan history. We now know of minor ones in 1716, 1750, and 
1774, and further research might disclose other upheavals. More 
interestingly, there is hard evidence of continued unrest among 
both the slave population and free coloured and black population 
in the years after the crushing of the 1795 revolt. In 1796, a coup 
d’état involved the participation of free coloureds. The influence 
of the Haitian Revolution and ideas of racial equality and antislav-
ery were to surface again in another little-known series of upheav-
als in 1799-1800. Dutch Patriots, mainly black troops from French 
Guadeloupe,  and  hundreds  of  local  blacks,  both  enslaved  and 
free, were part of this turmoil. In the end, British and American 
military intervention restored order, secured that slavery would 
persist, and paradoxically guaranteed the long-term survival of the 
Dutch colonial order by returning the island to the Dutch after the 
Napoleonic Wars.
There are several ways to explain slave resistance and general 
unrest in fin de siècle Curaçao. We may focus on the island’s social 
structure and demography. We should take into account the pecu-
liar political situation of a colony whose metropolis was occupied 
by one European competitor (revolutionary France) while its local 
elite were heavily divided over issues of loyalty to the old or the new 
order and over their preferences for competing European states. 
Finally, we need to be aware of the island’s embedding in wider 
regional networks. The contributions to the present volume indeed 
identify both local and international factors underlying the remark-
able turbulence of late-eighteenth-century Curaçao. This introduc-
tory chapter aims to review some salient characteristics of society 
and politics, slavery and slave resistance in Curaçao, as well as the 
place of the island in a wider regional and Atlantic framework.
a free trade zone
After the loss of Dutch Brazil (1630-1654) to the Portuguese and 
of New Netherland (1624-1664) to the English, the Dutch Atlan-
2  Geggus (1997:7, 11-5, 46, 48) briefly includes the 1795 and 1800 Curaçao revolts in his 
discussion of slave revolts between 1789 and 1815. Curaçao is not discussed in the recent reader 
The World of the Haitian Revolution (Geggus and Fiering 2007). See, however, the contribution of 
Geggus to the present volume.1  Slave resistance  |
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tic empire would shrink to Elmina and a few minor trading posts 
in West Africa, four plantation colonies in the Guianas – Berbice, 
Demerara, Essequibo, and the most important one, Suriname – and 
six tiny islands in the Caribbean sea. Similar to the Dutch island of 
St. Eustatius in the north-eastern Caribbean, Curaçao functioned 
as a hub for people (Europeans of many nationalities and enslaved 
Africans),  goods  (seldom  produced  on  the  island  itself),  and 
ideas. The quest for deepening our understanding of the turmoil 
between 1795 and 1800 is at the same time an attempt to establish 
more fully the truly global character of this tiny island off the coast 
of Tierra Firme, where people of many nationalities and political 
convictions, whites, blacks, and ‘coloureds’, free and enslaved, con-
fronted one another on a daily basis, often remarkably peacefully, 
sometimes in heated disputes, and on rare occasions in bloody con-
frontations. 
Curaçao had been a Dutch colony since 1634. As no precious 
metals were found, the Spanish had categorized Curaçao and the 
neighbouring islands Aruba and Bonaire as islas inútiles. Neither 
did plantation agriculture seem rewarding, as the ecology did not 
match the requisites. The Dutch West India Company had colo-
nized Curaçao for strategic reasons – its location and the excep-
tionally good natural harbour. Over the next centuries, the island’s 
development was mainly based on trade, both legal and illegal, with 
the Spanish Main, North America, and the rest of the Caribbean. 
The manifold maritime connections soon gave the island an eco-
nomic significance well beyond its size.
Trade  was  in  commodities  as  well  as  enslaved  Africans.  The 
great majority of the slaves disembarked on the island were sub-
sequently re-exported to the Spanish Main or to plantation colo-
nies in the Eastern Caribbean. The minority retained on the island 
was employed on hacienda-style plantations catering mainly to local 
consumption or in and around the port. The proportion of urban 
slaves was relatively high. So was the number of manumissions and, 
as a result, the proportion of free coloureds and blacks, some of 
them slave owners themselves, in the total population. As early as 
the 1730s, there were separate local armed units of free coloureds 
and blacks in addition to the white militia dating from the seven-
teenth century.
Clearly then, non-whites had more room for upward social 
mobility in Curaçao than in typical Caribbean plantation colo-
nies. This need not reflect a humanitarian regime. Some con-
temporaries suggested that the high rate of manumission was 
inspired  by  cold  calculation:  in  times  of  economic  hardship, |  Gert Oostindie
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drought and hence food crisis, setting unproductive slaves free 
to fend for themselves was a better deal for the owners than hav-
ing to feed and shelter them. Yet most likely a good proportion of 
those manumitted were slaves who had managed to make money 
of their own in the urban labour market to buy their own free-
dom. 
The island’s white citizenry, presided over by the West India 
Company’s governor, was divided by religion and class. A 1789 
census  subdivided  the  4,420  whites  into  2,469  Protestants, 
1,095 Sephardic Jews, and 846 servants of unspecified religion 
(table  1).  The  free  population  of  (part)  African  origins  was 
mainly Catholic and segmented by colour and class. The slave 
population creolized as the eighteenth century progressed. The 
total of slave imports in Curaçao during the Dutch period was 
roughly 100,000, mainly arriving between 1667 and 1730; the 
last imports of enslaved Africans date from the 1770s (Jordaan 
2003:219-20;  Van  Welie  2008:179).  It  is  therefore  likely  that 
long before the end of the century the majority of slaves was 
born locally.
The first reliable population figures date from 1789, when the 
total population was calculated at nearly 21,000 (table 1). Shortly 
after the Napoleonic Wars, this figure was down to 14,000. Since 
the first census, the number and proportion of slaves declined. The 
share of the free population of (partly) African origins in contrast 
increased considerably right up to Emancipation in 1863, when the 
total population was just over 19,000.
By the early nineteenth century, then, slave labour in Cura-
çao was of decreasing importance and certainly not of the same 
significance  as  elsewhere  in  the  Caribbean,  including  in  the 
Dutch colony of Suriname. In the debates preceding the (late) 
abolition of slavery in the Dutch West Indies in 1863, the main 
concern  regarding  Suriname  was  an  immediate  shortage  of 
labour for the plantations, as land was freely available in abun-
dance; a solution was sought in a ten-year period of apprentice-
ship. The major apprehension for Curaçao, in contrast, was the 
rise of the number of unemployed who were at risk of becoming 
vagabonds. There was stark hypocrisy here, as the problem of 
land shortage was augmented by the monopolisation of agrarian 
land and wells by the former slaveholders. On the eve of Eman-
cipation, local experts and Dutch politicians discussed emigra-
tion as the best way to solve the alleged problem of landlessness 
and  oversupply  of  labour  (Renkema  1981a:144-59;  Oostindie 
1996:167).1  Slave resistance  |
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Table 1. Population figures, Curaçao 1789-1863
*In 1863, the number of free inhabitants was 13,629 in total; colour distinctions 
have not been listed since 1841.
Sources: Klooster 1994:331 (1789), Renkema 1981a:336-7 (1816, 1840, 1863).
Its small scale, the absence of a plantation sector producing 
tropical export staples, its function as a free trade zone, and its 
large non-white free population combined to make Curaçao an 
atypical Caribbean colony. Contemporaries often observed what 
they thought to be one of the pernicious features of this colony: 
the ‘insolence’ of the slaves and free non-white population. While 
the maintenance of slave labour as such might have been less of a 
priority here than in genuine plantation colonies, the concern for 
public order was equally strong. Overt slave resistance therefore 
was repressed on Curaçao no less brutally than elsewhere in planta-
tion America, and white concerns about the free coloureds were 
hardly less acute.3
The island’s commercial character made for a remarkably open 
society. This applies not only to its resident population, but also to 
the fact that a significant proportion of the urban male population 
consisted of sailors with direct access to the neighbouring colonies 
and of free and enslaved townsmen working in the harbour and 
therefore having regular contacts with sailors from foreign places. 
By definition the openness also extended to the many sailors dis-
embarking in the Willemstad port. Curaçao was a vital hub in trans-
atlantic, but even more so in regional trade carried out with both 
the Spanish Main and the islands to the North. 
Figures for trade connections in the late eighteenth century 
underline  the  island’s  regional  connectedness  in  no  uncertain 
terms. Roughly half of all ships entering or clearing the port at 
Willemstad were Spanish, followed by ships from a wide variety of 
other nations. After 1795, contacts with the British Isles were tem-
porarily cut off because the French occupation of the Netherlands 
3  For example, just a few years before the 1795 revolt, the Dutch commissioners Grovestins 
and Boey (1791, reprint 1998). Cf. Jordaan 2010, Klooster 1994. 
  1789   1816   1840   1863
Whites 4,410 2,780 2,734         *
Free citizens ‘of colour’ 3,714 4,549 6,432         *
Slaves 12,864 6,741 5,750   5,498
Total 20,988 14,070 14,916 19,127|  Gert Oostindie
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had automatically turned the British into enemies. The share of 
French ships was modest, yet the few dozen ships visiting Curaçao 
annually originated predominantly from Les Cayes and Jacmel in 
southern Saint-Domingue and therefore their crews must have car-
ried the news from the emerging Haitian Revolution with them.4 
Seen from this perspective, the frequent allusions of the leaders of 
the 1795 slave revolt to ‘French liberty’ come as no surprise.
slave revolts up to 1795
Dutch slavery in the Caribbean, and particularly in Suriname, has 
often been depicted as exceptionally harsh. The historical validity 
of the reputation of exceptionality is dubious, at least in a com-
parative perspective – it is difficult to think of slavery, wherever in 
the Atlantic, as anything but dehumanising and cruel (Oostindie 
1993). But certainly we have many indications of slave resistance 
in the Dutch colonies. Faced with continuous marronage and the 
creation of powerful maroon communities, colonial authorities in 
Suriname had no choice but to conclude peace treaties. Berbice 
had a major slave revolt in 1763. No doubt less conspicuous acts of 
resistance took place with great frequency throughout the Dutch 
Caribbean. Curaçao was no exception to this rule. While much of 
the early history of slavery of the island remains to be written, we 
may well assume that slave resistance ran the usual gamut from 
covert to full-fledged armed rebellion. As for the latter, revolts have 
4  Identified ships entering and clearing Willemstad, Curaçao, 20 September 1796-16 May 1798 
Flag entered % cleared %
Spanish 265 45.6 292 49.0
Danish* 122 21.0 128 21.5
French 31 5.3 26 4.4
American 129 22.2 117 19.6
Curaçaoan 24 4.1 26 4.4
Swedish 3 0.5 7 1.2
British 7 1.2 – –
Total 581 100 596 100
Source: Nationaal Archief, West-Indisch Comité 1795-1800, Curaçao, 141. Figures compiled by 
Pham Van Thuy.
*The Danish ships were officially from St. Thomas, a free harbor like Curaçao. Most likely, the 
majority of these ‘Danish’ ships were Dutch and used the Danish flag only because Denmark 
had remained neutral in the war.1  Slave resistance  |
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been recorded for 1716, 1750, and 1774, culminating in the 1795 
uprising and its aftermath up to 1800.5 While the type and signifi-
cance of slavery may have been atypical by regional standards, slave 
resistance was as engrained in Curaçaoan slavery as it was elsewhere.
Both  the  1716  and  1750  revolts  were  led  by  first-generation 
enslaved  Africans,  most  likely  recent  arrivals.  The  one  in  1716 
involved only a dozen insurgents. As far as the documents suggest, 
there was no master plan, no encompassing strategy, but certainly a 
longing for freedom. In the subsequent interrogations, one of the 
slaves who had revolted spoke explicitly of a link to Elmina where 
reportedly the Africans had set the good example of killing all 
whites in and around the Dutch fort, while another had urged the 
killing of all the whites in Curaçao and next moving on to another 
land ‘where we will be happier’.6
In  1750  one  hundred  slaves  revolted.  The  insurgency  was 
crushed the same day after the rebels killed 59 slaves of the West 
India Company’s plantation; only one white was killed. Some of the 
rebels committed suicide; of the 52 captured, 13 were sold off the 
island and no less than 39 executed. Contemporaries blamed newly 
arrived Africans for the bloody revolt, which seemed directed more 
against other (seasoned or creole?) slaves than against the whites.7
Presumably, since the earliest years of the colony, enslaved Afri-
cans attempted to escape the system of slavery. While maroons in 
the major Dutch Caribbean colony of Suriname escaped to free-
dom in the tropical rain forest in the interior, internal marronage 
was virtually impossible on the small and mainly arid island. Most 
runaway slaves therefore opted to canoe or sail to Tierra Firme, 
a risky but navigable forty miles away. Archives mention the pres-
ence  of  marooned  Africans  from  Curaçao  in  Coro,  present-day 
Venezuela, at least by the end of the seventeenth century. Reliable 
figures are hard to come by, but between 1759 and 1766 alone, 
380 slaves were recorded as having escaped to the Spanish Main.8 
Wim Klooster, in this book, mentions 140 slaves escaping to the 
Spanish Main in 1774 alone, a year in which Curaçao faced a severe 
food crisis. And in her contribution, Linda Rupert demonstrates 
how this migratory tradition drew the Coro region and Curaçao 
close to each other throughout the eighteenth century.
5  Klooster 1999:507 mentions three aborted conspiracies in the 1760s. There was also a 
minor slave revolt in January 1795 (De Rego and Janga 2009:43).
6  See Jordaan 1999:490-8 on the 1716 revolt; citation from p. 493.
7  On the 1750 revolt, see Hartog 1973:20-57, De Hoog 1983:38-44, 61-3, Goslinga 1985:546.
8  Goslinga 1985:248. Another source has a number of 585 marooned slaves for the entire 
period 1729-74, but this is most likely an underestimate as this list was drawn up in retrospect in 
1775 (Rupert 2006:43-5, 2009). |  Gert Oostindie
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The third recorded revolt, in 1774, indeed started as a mass 
marronage. All 72 slaves of plantation De Fuijk attempted to board 
a large canoe heading for Coro. The escape failed and only five 
slaves managed to cross in a smaller canoe. The others withdrew 
in the kunuku (countryside), but eventually surrendered or were 
captured by free blacks. This time, there were no mass executions, 
but the plantation’s owner sold off some twenty-five slaves to Saint-
Domingue.  Commercial  connections  with  this  booming  French 
colony were intense. Two decades later, it transpired that these con-
nections were not only about the transfer of peoples and goods, but 
equally of revolutionary ideas (Dalhuisen et al. 2009:60).
The 1795 revolt started on 17 August as some fifty slaves of plan-
tation De Knip, in apparent protest against a specific infringement 
on the usual daily routines, refused to work and marched off to 
neighbouring plantations.9 This strike soon became an attempt to 
launch an island-wide revolution inspired by the ideals and exam-
ple of the Haitian revolt. Perhaps the fact that a treaty between the 
Dutch and Spanish had effectively sealed off the opportunity for 
slaves to take refuge in the Coro area added to a general ferment 
among the island’s slave population.10 Perhaps the island experi-
enced another period of drought and food shortage. We simply 
cannot be sure. Neither do the available archival sources allow us 
to establish whether the eventual slave revolt resulted from a revo-
lutionary conspiracy from the start or developed in a more sponta-
neous manner.
Either  way,  within  two  days  some  2,000  of  the  island’s 
12,000 slaves were in revolt. The slaves won the first fights against 
the white, coloured, and black militias, but then the tide started 
to  turn.  Negotiations  in  late  August  failed,  one  of  the  leaders, 
aptly named Toussaint, affirming in French, ‘We are here to win 
or die’.11 The next day the colonial troops prevailed and dozens 
of slaves were executed on the spot. Thereafter the majority of the 
rebellious slaves capitulated, discouraged by military defeat and 
the spectre of more mass executions and lured by the promise that 
they would not be punished. In the next week the remaining rebels 
9  First documented, without references to archival or other sources, by Senior and Schinck 
1795, and Poel in 1825 (reproduced in Rutgers 2001:111-25), next Bosch 1829, I:321-34. First 
publications of relevant archival sources in Paula 1974. Hartog 1973 is the first monograph, 
Goslinga 1990:1-20 and De Rego and Janga 2009 provide useful summaries in English. There 
are many subsequent publications in Dutch on the 1795 revolt that do not use new sources and 
therefore have little to offer but repetitions based on the Dutch-language archival sources pub-
lished in extenso by Paula almost four decades ago.
10  The treaty was concluded in 1790; see the chapter by Rupert in this volume.
11  ‘Nous sommes ici pour vaincre ou mourir’.1  Slave resistance  |
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and their leadership were caught, both by the militia and by fellow 
slaves. Some thirty slaves were executed, the leaders in an extraor-
dinarily cruel manner.
Contemporary accounts of the revolt have left dramatic testi-
monies of the revolt’s foremost leader, a slave called Tula, who may 
have been born outside of Curaçao and most likely had spent time 
in the French Caribbean; he was also known as ‘Rigaud’. In con-
versations with the Catholic priest Jacobus Schinck, who had been 
commissioned to convince the slaves to capitulate, Tula report-
edly made several statements demonstrating his knowledge of the 
French and Haitian revolutions. ‘We have been badly treated for 
too long, we do not want to do anybody harm, but we seek our free-
dom, the French [Caribbean] blacks have been given their free-
dom, Holland has been taken over by the French, hence we too 
must be free’. Drawing on Christian rhetoric as well, Tula told the 
priest that all people share the same parents, Adam and Eve. Talk-
ing about the abuse intrinsic to slavery, Tula added that animals 
were treated better than slaves – hence the right to revolt.
The 1795 revolt was inspired not simply by the abstract ideals of 
the Haitian Revolution, but most likely by individuals with an inti-
mate acquaintance with developments both in Europe and in the 
Caribbean. In the French Caribbean, the metropolitan revolution 
had fueled hopes for change of the status quo and had exacerbated 
social tensions, eventually leading to the start of the revolution in 
Saint-Domingue in 1791. Other French Caribbean colonies seemed 
on the verge of following this example – between 1789 and 1794, 
there was a series of revolts in Guadeloupe, Martinique, St. Lucia, 
and Dominica. From 1795 onwards, the circle widened with revolts 
and conspiracies in the Spanish Caribbean and Tierra Firme, in 
particular the Coro region, as well as in the British colonies and 
in Dutch Demerara and, indeed, Curaçao (Geggus 1997:46-50). In 
Europe, revolutionary France had proclaimed a law for the Eman-
cipation of slavery in 1794. Moreover, in 1795 French troops had 
invaded the Republic of the United Provinces and turned it into 
a vassal state, the Batavian Republic. This news was officially pub-
lished in Curaçao in May 1795. There was no mention of a French 
takeover, but rather of the signing of a pact of friendship and alli-
ance between France and the new Batavian Republic (Schiltkamp 
and De Smidt 1978:508).
As the chapter by Wim Klooster attests, revolutionary ideas 
circulated  widely  in  the  Caribbean,  no  matter  what  measures 
authorities took to stop the flow of information and rumours. 
In  his  contribution  Han  Jordaan  indeed  demonstrates  that 
the Curaçao government was worried about slaves from Saint-|  Gert Oostindie
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Domingue  being  sold  on  the  island  under  the  pretence  that 
they were directly imported from Africa. Certainly because of 
these direct links with Saint-Domingue and the island’s inten-
sive connections to nearby colonies, the Curaçaoan insurgents 
were well aware of what was going on in the French Caribbean. 
Priest Schinck heard them singing French revolutionary songs, 
and one of Tula’s main men, a slave named Mercier, had chosen 
the nickname Toussaint. The insurgents repeatedly claimed that 
support from revolutionary Saint-Domingue would be forthcom-
ing – either a strategic boasting or a tragic miscalculation (Do 
Rego and Janga 2009:66).
By late September, the 1795 revolt was brutally suppressed. At the 
end of the day, two whites had been killed, as opposed to 100 slaves. 
The proceedings of the hearings and the subsequent executions of 
the revolt’s leaders testify to nauseatingly cruel retributions, in stark 
contrast to the courteous way Tula and his fellow insurgents treated 
men such as the priest Jacobus Schinck. The ‘exemplary’ brutal 
punishments tell us much about the agony of the colonial elites in 
these revolutionary times. The public prosecutor’s justifications are 
well worth quoting. After having proclaimed himself ‘an enemy, 
yes, a mortal enemy of the horrendous monstrosity called the rack’, 
an instrument of torture ‘abolished in all civilised states’ includ-
ing the Netherlands, and professing himself ‘opposed to anything 
akin to cruelty [and] maiming’, he proceeded by advocating pre-
cisely such uncivilized punishments to the leaders of the revolt.12 
And indeed the rebellious slaves were broken on the rack, burnt 
in the face, dismembered, and so on, in an unprecedented orgy of 
state violence, which failed to provoke any subsequent protest in 
the metropolis – the news possibly reached only a few there in the 
first place.
the 1796-1800 turbulence
One may well wonder whether the outrageous public executions in 
1795 really served to pacify the slave population, and even more if 
the justice meted out convinced the free population of the legiti-
macy of colonial rule. The following years were certainly not char-
acterized by an absence of attempts to subvert the extant order. 
The picture, however, becomes blurred with many objectives and 
12  Prosecutor  Pieter  van  Teylingen  quoted  in  Paula  1974:175  (my  translation);  see  Paula 
1974:166-7 for the verdicts.1  Slave resistance  |
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rivalries surfacing at the same time beyond the issue of slavery – 
Dutch colonial Orangists against the local pro-French Patriot party, 
increasing tensions within this Patriot party, the strategic interests 
of both France, Britain, and the United States in Curaçao, perhaps 
a Haitian drive to export revolution, and Venezuelan revolutionar-
ies taking refuge in Curaçao. The way all these elements converged 
in Curaçao only underlines how much the island was embedded 
in a wider Atlantic network, precisely because of its long-standing 
status as a free trade zone and the ties its inhabitants had developed 
around the region.
Metropolitan developments mattered too, as they had in Saint-
Domingue before. The Netherlands, a republic since its inception 
in sixteenth century, had oscillated between periods of genuine 
republicanism and periods in which Stadholders of the House of 
Orange enjoyed near-royal powers. In the 1780s, liberal protest 
against Stadholder Willem V ushered in deep conflicts between 
Orangists  and  liberal  ‘Patriots’.  When  a  liberal  revolution  was 
aborted in 1787, several protagonists were forced to go into exile 
to France and other countries. The smouldering divisions came 
to the fore again after the French Revolution and particularly the 
French occupation of the Netherlands and the establishment of 
the Batavian Republic in 1795, making the tides turn in favour of 
the Patriots. In colonial affairs, the Patriots did not demonstrate 
much revolutionary fervour. In the debates on colonial matters in 
1796-1797, the National Convention discussed the legitimacy of the 
slave trade and slavery, but the assembly did not support the aboli-
tion of the Atlantic slave trade, and the ending of slavery as such 
was explicitly rejected.13
Between  1795  and  the  British  take-over  in  1800,  therefore, 
Curaçao was governed by a Dutch governor representing a French 
puppet state, a Batavian Republic with no revolutionary intentions 
in  the  Caribbean.  Its  local  representative  since  1796,  Governor 
Johann Rudolf Lauffer, had even fewer such inclinations. The local 
elites were divided among themselves as to their loyalty towards 
France or the exiled House of Orange. This was the case in 1795 
and even more so in the following years, a division which continu-
ously undermined colonial rule. Indeed, the absence of harsh ret-
ribution to Patriots after the 1800 British take-over might reflect an 
awareness that more internal rivalry within elite circles might elicit 
another round of unrest among the free coloureds and slaves. Pos-
sibly the ranks simply closed again to establish order and guarantee 
13  Schutte  1974:147-9.  Schutte  mentions  that  the  specter  of  the  Haitian  Revolution  was 
invoked, but makes no reference to the revolt in Curaçao.|  Gert Oostindie
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the continued existence of slavery. One of the leading Patriots in 
the 1795-1800 years, the Dutch naval officer Albert Kikkert – who 
would be appointed the first governor of Curaçao after Dutch rule 
was reinstalled in 1816 – now found himself serving Willem I, the 
first Dutch monarch of the newly-established Kingdom of the Neth-
erlands.
The turbulence of 1796-1800 was therefore more complicated 
than the slave revolt of 1795. At first, there was the 1796 coup 
d’état analysed by Karwan Fatah-Black in this volume. News of the 
French take-over of the Dutch Republic and the creation of the 
Batavian Republic had been part of the arguments used by Tula 
and his fellow insurgents. First ancien regime Governor Johannes de 
Veer retreated and was replaced by a politically non-descript local 
bureaucrat, Jan Jacob Beaujon, who was substituted by a seemingly 
more  outspoken  pro-French,  ‘Patriot’  governor,  Johann  Rudolf 
Lauffer – all in the same year of 1796. As Karwan Fatah-Black argues 
in this volume, Lauffer’s appointment reflected complex dynamics 
within the white elites, not just between Orangists and Patriots, but 
equally within Patriot circles, over issues that ultimately centred on 
trade and economic interest.
It is evident that sectors of the free coloured population had 
their own stakes in the 1796 power games, mainly with a view 
to  improving  their  own  representation  in  local  politics.  Both 
Jordaan and Fatah-Black provide ample evidence of white con-
cern  that  political  instability  would  lead  to  another  round  of 
social unrest and ultimately revolutionary upheaval and, there-
fore, anxiety about free black and coloured agency. As it turned 
out, free coloureds did indeed engage in manifestations of open 
and sometimes violent protest. But there is no indication what-
soever of organized cross-class and cross-colour activity in 1796 
aiming at radical political change, let alone the abolition of slav-
ery. Free coloured and black militias had not demonstrated any 
revolutionary zeal to this end during the 1795 slave revolt, help-
ing to crush the revolt instead. One year later, antislavery was not 
an issue.
So  what  about  the  turbulence  in  1799-1800?14  In  December 
1799, three Frenchmen were ousted from the colony, suspected 
of a revolutionary conspiracy directed from Saint-Domingue and 
aimed  at  starting  a  massive  revolt  that  would  eradicate  slavery 
throughout  the  Caribbean,  beginning  with  Curaçao.  The  story 
does not end here. From July through September 1800, Curaçao 
14  First documented, without references to archival or other sources, by Bosch 1829, I:334-53, 
next by others including Palacios 1983 and Goslinga 1990:21-32.1  Slave resistance  |
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was first visited then partly occupied by predominantly black troops 
from revolutionary France’s colony Guadeloupe. There was appar-
ently widespread local support among the slaves, but not from the 
free black and coloured population. The participation of several 
French,  Haitian,  and  Guadeloupean  military  leaders,  including 
the revolutionary French commander Bresseau and future Haitian 
President Alexandre Pétion, is well-documented. So is the partici-
pation of members of the local criollo elite, including the future 
admiral serving under Simón Bolívar, Luis Brión. At the height of 
the affair, early September 1800, some 1,200 French Caribbean 
troops were beleaguering Willemstad, while apparently many rural 
slaves had joined the cause, having been promised liberté and égalité. 
In Willemstad the slaves refused to work, adding to the panic of the 
governor and his entourage.
Governor Lauffer desperately tried to keep the self-proclaimed 
protectors out, in particular the majority of black troops. Unable to 
defeat his adversaries, Lauffer decided to request British assistance, 
a request readily honoured by the nearby frigate Nereide. A few days 
later, two North American frigates joined the British, for the same 
cause.  On  23  September  the  colonial  French  troops  evacuated 
hastily, leaving many prisoners behind. It remains a puzzle why the 
French ‘revolutionaries’ backed down so easily against what was not 
an overwhelming British majority. In any case, most foreigners were 
quickly banished from the island, local white participants were for-
given, and there was apparently no strong repression of either the 
black and coloured free population or of the slave population. In 
stark contrast to the aftermath of the 1795 revolt, there were few 
executions and not the type of exemplary state terrorism displayed 
five years earlier.
The  British  would  continue  to  occupy  Curaçao  throughout 
most of the Napoleonic Wars (1800-1803, 1807-1816), returning 
the island to the Dutch only in 1816. Trade with the turbulent 
French colonies came to an immediate halt.15 In the subsequent 
period Curaçao experienced no more slave revolts or international 
conspiracies linked to either the Haitian Revolution or to the inde-
pendence wars of Spanish America. Slavery was only abolished in 
1863, by metropolitan legislation. 
The 1799-1800 events have been glorified as a worthy sequel 
of both the Haitian Revolution and the 1795 revolt on Curaçao, 
15  From November 1800 to mid-August 1802, 669 ships entered and 708 cleared the Cura-
çao harbour. This included only one ship under French flag and no Dutch ships at all. Over 
half were Spanish ships, over a quarter British, and some fifteen per cent American (Hughes 
1998:145).|  Gert Oostindie
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as an inspiring story of local cross-class and cross-colour solidarity 
supported by the revolutionary zeal of Jacobin France and Saint-
Domingue. Thus, Venezuelan historian Roberto Palacios honoured 
the  alleged  protagonist  in  Curaçao,  Frenchman  Jean  Baptiste 
Tierce Cadet, for his Jacobin ideals and his firm belief in the ulti-
mate consequences of the revolutionary ideals of liberty, equality, 
and fraternity: the instalment of a ‘genuine revolutionary govern-
ment’ in Curaçao, which would legislate ‘absolute racial equality’ 
and the abolition of slavery (Palacios 1983:22).
Archival research does not support this heroic reading of the 
fin de siècle turmoil. Earlier on, David Geggus and Anne Pérotin-
Dumon had questioned the idea that Toussaint Louverture was 
seriously working on a pan-Caribbean revolution: even if he had 
the will and the means to do so, it would have run against his own 
domestic interests and priorities and his strategy to appease the 
British (Geggus 1987:287-8; Pérotin-Dumon 1988). On the basis of 
fresh archival research, Jordaan in this volume demonstrates that 
the very idea of a region-wide revolutionary conspiracy starting in 
Curaçao was most likely fabricated by Curaçaoan Governor Lauffer 
for reasons of personal and political interest.
This is not to say that there was no revolutionary conspiracy 
at all. Tierce Cadet, a representative of the French government 
who had lived on the island since 1784, had indeed been at the 
centre of a revolutionary circle on Curaçao, entertaining direct 
contacts with Venezuelan revolutionaries as well as French agita-
tors. And indeed attempts may have been made to attract Gov-
ernor Lauffer to this camp. Lauffer, however, had no interest 
whatsoever in either becoming involved in Haitian rivalries or in 
jeopardising his relations with Britain – much less was he inter-
ested  in  slave  emancipation.  His  pro-French  leanings,  which 
had helped him stage a coup against his Orangist predecessor 
in  1796,  had  clearly  withered  after  his  appointment  (Schutte 
1974:207-9).
The central issue, however, is that whatever hopes the free blacks 
and coloureds and, even more, the slaves in Curaçao may have nur-
tured in this period, there was no real concerted French and/or 
Haitian effort to bring about a social revolution on the island. As 
Jordaan  concludes,  France  was  the  significant  player,  not  Haiti. 
And revolutionary France was still primarily a colonial power inter-
ested in maximising its regional role. Hence, the 1800 invasion was 
not so much a question of spreading the ideals of the revolution, 
but rather simple (and, as it would turn out, failing) geopolitics: a 
pre-emptive take-over of the island before the British or even the 
Americans would attempt to do so.1  Slave resistance  |
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imperfect solidarity
If 1796 was not much more than a coup d’état, and if the debunk-
ing of the 1799-1800 turbulence is indeed justified, then we are 
back to the 1795 slave revolt as the most dramatic landmark of slave 
agency on Curaçao. This uprising seems a textbook example of the 
thesis forwarded by Eugene D. Genovese in his classic From rebel-
lion to revolution (1979). The French and hence Haitian revolutions, 
Genovese affirmed, were turning points in the history of slavery 
and slave revolts in the Americas. Before, mainly first-generation 
African slaves rebelled, without a clear political strategy in mind; 
afterwards, there was an increasing number of slave revolts domi-
nated by Creole slaves throughout the Americas, all aiming at end-
ing slavery and using the rhetoric of universal human rights.
In various publications and again in this volume, David Geggus 
has convincingly questioned the validity of Genovese’s thesis. Ironi-
cally it seems that precisely Curaçao, not mentioned at all in From 
rebellion to revolution, would have provided a strong supporting argu-
ment for an otherwise untenable thesis.16 First-generation Africans 
revolted in 1716 and 1750 with, it appears, no determined strat-
egy or links to revolts elsewhere. Most likely Creole slaves formed a 
majority in the aborted massive slave marronage in 1774, but again 
there is no evidence of explicit ideological underpinnings.
The  context  of  the  series  of  conspiracies  and  revolts  in  the 
period 1795-1800 is dramatically different. The most likely mainly 
Creole leadership of the 1795 revolt was explicitly inspired by the 
ideals of the French and Haitian revolutions, and within days a 
wider enslaved constituency was built up to this end. There are 
some indications that support was not entirely limited to the slave 
population. On the other hand, the suppression of the revolt was 
partly the work of the black and coloured militias and even slaves – 
though of course the great majority of the island’s slaves were no 
party at all in either the revolt or its repression.
The  1799-1800  events  involved  a  remarkable  ensemble  of 
‘revolutionary’ actors: enslaved and free residents of the island; 
whites,  blacks  and  coloureds;  French  and  French  Caribbean 
agents, some members of the local criollo elites, a few Dutch mili-
tary men. Inspiration may have come not only from Haiti and 
Guadeloupe, but equally from Tierra Firme, where similar revolts 
had occurred or were in the making as Ramón Aizpurua demon-
16  The influence of the preceding American Revolution may have been considerable for the 
Americas as such, but had no direct impact on Curaçao (Klooster 2009:11-44).|  Gert Oostindie
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strates in his contribution to this book – and to some extent it may 
also have worked the other way around, with ideas being transmit-
ted from Curaçao to Coro on the Spanish Main to neighbouring 
Aruba. This was a world of strong interconnections indeed. There 
is ample archival evidence for revolutionary interaction between 
Coro and Curaçao in the late eighteenth century, and of slave 
leaders who had spent time in Coro, Curaçao, and even Haiti.17 
One objective, however, never surfaced in Curaçao, not during 
the times of the Haitian and subsequent Spanish American inde-
pendence wars nor, for that matter, in the following two centu-
ries: a struggle for sovereignty. The island was, and is, simply too 
small and without (post)colonial tutelage too much at the mercy 
of Venezuela to nurture such ambitions (Oostindie and Klinkers 
2003:57-63, 217-33).
The evidence of any long-term impact of the 1795-1800 revolu-
tionary upheaval is mixed. We may assume that the spirit of 1795 
continued to live among the enslaved population and possibly sec-
tions of the free coloured citizens for the next five years, partic-
ularly into the 1799-1800 rising. But at the same time we should 
account for the absence of any slave revolts in the nineteenth cen-
tury. There are some possible explanations. Shortly after the 1795 
revolt, colonial authorities proclaimed the first encompassing set 
of decrees stipulating ‘reasonable’ treatment of slaves (Schiltkamp 
and De Smidt 1978:514-6). This was not enough to keep slaves from 
again demanding full freedom a few years later. But perhaps the 
absence of a new round of extraordinarily cruel retribution in 1800 
as well as these new laws may have kept the enslaved from fighting 
their bondage once more.
Other  factors  may  have  served  to  pacify  the  enslaved  Cura-
çaoans. While the hope for freedom raised in 1799-1800 may not 
have waned, the cold truth was that the revolutionary auxiliaries 
from Haiti and Guadeloupe did not stand up to fight the British, 
but  hastily  evacuated  the  island.  Under  the  British  occupation, 
links with Haiti and the remaining French colonies were proba-
bly severed. We have no indications of any new outside interest in 
igniting slave resistance in Curaçao. Moreover, as Geggus indicates, 
throughout the region revolutionary fervour faded as Napoleonic 
France  re-instated  slavery  in  its  remaining  colonies,  while  Haiti 
became increasingly isolated.
17  Paula 1976, Rupert 2007:46-7, Phaf-Rheinberger 2008. In May 1795, Aruba witnessed a 
small and aborted Indian revolt. There was no indication of Haitian inspiration here, but later 
that year another small revolt of thirty slaves was defended in words reminiscent of Tula’s (Alofs 
2009:44 and Alofs 1996:38).1  Slave resistance  |
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Next, the number of slaves on Curaçao itself shrank by almost 
fifty per cent between 1789 and 1816, making the enslaved popu-
lation a minority of the insular population for the first time since 
early colonisation. Perhaps large numbers of slaves were sold off 
in the region. This, too, may have limited the slaves’ confidence 
to succeed in any type of revolt.18 Afterwards, there was the sale 
of over 4,000 slaves to other Caribbean colonies in the 1819-1847 
period. There is a correlation between years of poor harvests and 
high numbers of slaves sold, and this must have been the most 
important factor. Yet one may speculate that owners were par-
ticularly interested in selling off precisely those slaves they sus-
pected of rebelliousness. Indeed, prior to 1819, only the export 
of ‘bad, stubborn, thievish and for the Colony extremely danger-
ous slaves’ had been admitted by the local authorities and was 
indeed practiced.19
As for colonial rule, the relatively low frequency of slave resis-
tance after 1816 both in Suriname and in the Dutch Caribbean 
islands may have helped the king and his entourage and, after the 
establishment of an elite liberal democracy in 1848, Dutch Parlia-
ment to continue to neglect Caribbean slavery. Tula’s revolt and 
its  aftermath,  in  spite  of  its  eloquently  expressed  humanitarian 
claims, most likely passed virtually unnoticed in the metropolis.20 
Pieter Emmer (2010:107-8) suggests that the Curaçao revolt, or 
whatever other slave resistance in the Dutch Caribbean, did not 
contribute to the abolition of slavery in the Dutch Caribbean at all. 
On the contrary, the absence of dramatic slave revolts seemed to 
suggest that there was no urgency in abolishing slavery at all. One 
may argue with this bold thesis. But certainly there is no indication 
of after-the-fact glorification of the 1795 revolt encouraging the 
Dutch to think of the Caribbean slaves as humans worthy of free-
dom, much less of being treated as equals. Perhaps the link with the 
abhorred Haitian Revolution (would) even (have) had an adverse 
effect. It would take until 1863 before the Dutch abolished slavery, 
and another century before Tula’s revolt became the central topos 
in Curaçaoan nationalist discourse.
18  Manumission does not provide a satisfactory explanation here, as the number of manumis-
sions actually went down after 1804 (Van der Lee 1998:14). Slave mortality and emigration may 
have been of more significance.
19  Renkema 1981b:189-91, 202 (citation from 191); most slaves were sold to Puerto Rico. 
Cf. Dalhuisen 2009:60.
20  I came across one mention of the revolt, in the Leeuwarder Courant, 25-11-1795: an article 
based on a letter written by an eye witness dated 13-9-1795, including this observation ascribed 
to the priest Schinck: ‘The Negroes remained stubborn and demanded their liberty or otherwise 
Death’.|  Gert Oostindie
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The contemporary canonical version of 1795 tends to under-
line the rightfulness of the slave revolt, the crucial influence of the 
Haitian Revolution, and the brutality of colonial suppression.21 The 
1796-1800 sequels seem largely unknown. Hence, the prevailing 
idea of the fin de siècle revolts provides a simple picture of enslaved 
but  revolutionary  blacks  against  repressive  ancien  regime  whites. 
This rendering not only brushes aside the support of at least some 
free blacks and coloureds and even slaves in the crushing of the 
slave revolt, but equally the vital, though in the end fruitless, role 
of whites and free blacks and coloureds in the events of 1799-1800. 
The reality was one of imperfect solidarity within the slave popula-
tion as well as within the various ‘colour communities’. Far more 
nuance is appropriate – and need not deconstruct the 1795 revolt 
as a central topos in Curaçaoan nationalism.
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Slave rebellion during the Age of Revolution
David Geggus
Violent rebellion punctuated the history of African American slav-
ery from its beginnings, but it was apparently never more prevalent 
than during the Age of Revolution. Although no one to my knowl-
edge has attempted a complete census of slave revolts and con-
spiracies in the New World, it would seem that the decades from 
the 1770s to the 1840s witnessed the largest, the best known, and 
most frequent, both in Brazil and North America, as well as in the 
Caribbean heartland of American slavery. Within this timeframe, 
the 1790s stand out as a period of peak intensity, and the single 
year 1795 may be unique for its number of separate incidents in 
different societies. The slave insurrection in western Curaçao in the 
summer of that year, and its unusual sequel of five years later,1 thus 
occurred in the midst of a broad wave of rebellion that challenged 
the institution of slavery in an unprecedented manner. Its signifi-
cance, aims, and ultimate impact remain controversial.
definitions and data 
It is not obvious at what point a collective act of violence merits 
the label ‘slave rebellion’. In his pioneering study of United States 
rebellions, Herbert Aptheker applied a minimum criterion of ten 
participants. I have not done so here, as such information often 
lacks historical sources. The listing offered in the appendix to this 
chapter is therefore somewhat imprecise as well as undoubtedly 
deficient in coverage. As the case of Curaçao illustrates, African 
American rebellion took several forms in this period. The most 
massive and lengthy conflicts tended to be those in which eman-
cipated slaves resisted attempts to reenslave them – as in St. Lucia, 
1  See the chapters by Oostindie and Jordaan in this volume.|  David Geggus
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1795-97, in Saint-Domingue after 1793, and Guadeloupe in 1802 – 
or multi-class rebellions like those on Grenada and St. Vincent in 
1795, which involved slaves but were dominated respectively by free 
men of colour and Black Caribs. For analytical purposes, I think it is 
important to distinguish such events that made use of organization, 
experience, and weaponry available only outside the state of slavery 
from revolts and conspiracies in which enslaved persons were the 
most important participants, on which I focus in this chapter. 
The upheaval of summer 1800 in Curaçao (that involved French 
Caribbean troops and a variety of local actors) is one instance among 
several that pose problems of definition. Since slaves neither initiated 
nor directed the events, it could be termed a multi-class rebellion. 
Yet, as Han Jordaan shows in this volume, participation by the local 
free population was very limited. I have hesitantly classed it as a slave 
rebellion because most participants were slaves and it seems to have 
involved the autonomous participation of most of the slave popula-
tion (Jordaan 2011; Palacios 1983:20-7). The fact that the French 
were not trying to free the slaves only underlines the autonomy of the 
slaves’ actions.2 Borderline cases that I would exclude from the cat-
egory of slave rebellion are the 1802 and 1808 mutinies on Dominica 
and Jamaica of African soldiers serving in the 2nd West India regiment; 
the successful campaign of the Cobreros community in eastern Cuba 
to be recognized as free (that took a violent turn in the banner year 
1795), and attacks on or by established maroon communities, which 
were quite common in Brazil and in the early United States. The revolt 
of Jamaica’s Trelawny Maroons in 1795 clearly should not be confused 
with a slave rebellion since all the insurgents were born free.3 
As for slave conspiracies that did not progress to the stage of 
rebellion,  the  main  problem  for  historians  remains  that  of  the 
slaves’ contemporaries: were the plots real or imaginary? If Robert 
Paquette’s study of Cuba’s ‘Escalera’ conspiracy of 1843 has largely 
removed former doubts about its authenticity, Michael Johnson’s 
research suggests that Denmark Vesey’s much-studied conspiracy 
in Charleston, South Carolina, may well have been a fantasy manu-
factured by Vesey’s white interrogators (Paquette 1988; Johnson 
2001:915-76). Herbert Aptheker’s pioneering survey of U.S. slave 
resistance has been much criticized for using flimsy sources; I have 
relied on it and Guillermo Baralt’s book on Puerto Rico selectively 
(Aptheker 1943; Genovese 1986:24-25).
2  The French invaders informed the Dutch administration they would not interfere with 
slavery (Goslinga 1990:30).
3  The wars fought by the maroons of Dominica in 1809-1814 or by the Boni in Suriname 
(1789-1793) were different but not sufficiently so to qualify as slave rebellions. 2  Slave rebellion during the Age of Revolution  |
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A limited sampling of limited sources, the listing of roughly 
180 incidents presented in the appendix should be understood as 
no more than a minimum tally. It no doubt underrepresents Brazil 
and Cuba.4 The fact that revolts are slightly more numerous than 
conspiracies in the historical record may reflect the vagaries of 
news dissemination and record-keeping rather than slaves’ behav-
ior, and the rough parity between Brazil (27 incidents) and the 
United States (25 incidents) assuredly is due to the latter’s greater 
supply of local newspapers. The prominence of Caribbean soci-
eties is nonetheless as expected. Although only half of American 
slaves lived in the Caribbean in 1790 and less than a third by 1830, 
the region’s pronounced imbalance between slave and free and its 
focus on sugar cultivation both facilitated and provoked a higher 
level of violent resistance than elsewhere.
This regional discrepancy is magnified when we take into account 
the size of the rebellions. Although the Bahian insurrections com-
monly mobilized hundreds of slaves, and the details of the Venezu-
elan conflict of 1811-1813 remain unclear, no mainland rebellion 
appears to have involved more than 1,000 slaves. In North America, 
only the 1811 revolt in the Louisiana territory mobilized more than 
100 slaves. Yet, in the West Indies and Guianas there were, even if we 
count Saint-Domingue 1791-1793 as one case, no fewer than eight 
or nine rebellions that involved at least 1,000 slaves. It is extraordi-
nary that tiny Curaçao accounts for two of these eight or nine cases.
To be sure, such numbers are very approximate, and in the 
largest cases historians tend to shift from counting armed men to 
estimating the total number of slaves living in areas controlled by 
rebels. Even within the Caribbean group of slave rebellions, clearly 
we are dealing with a very disparate array of events. Even if Jamai-
ca’s Christmas Rebellion of 1831 mobilized 18,000 slaves (as per 
Anthony Synnott) rather than 60,000 (as per Michael Craton), it 
would have included half of all the slaves who ever rebelled in the 
British Caribbean.5 As for Saint-Domingue, not only did the North-
ern  Plain  uprising  of  1791-1793  dwarf  all  others  in  magnitude, 
duration, and outcome, but it stimulated five or six other revolts in 
different parts of the colony that each involved probably thousands 
of insurgents.6
4  Yacou (1984:48), claims Cuban revolts numbered ‘une soixantaine’ between 1833 and 
1843, but gives no details. Bahia has been studied more than other Brazilian provinces. 
5  Synnott 1976:270; Craton 1982:291. This excludes the 4 < 6,000 slaves who joined the 1795 
multi-class rebellion on Grenada.
6  Léogane/Jacmel (early 1792); Cul de Sac plain (early 1792, early 1793); Anse-à-Veau 1792; 
Cayes plain 1792; and perhaps the Artibonite plain (1792-93).|  David Geggus
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This  much  greater  incidence  of  large-scale  rebellions  in  the 
Caribbean may be attributed partly to the demographic imbalance 
mentioned above and the region’s larger average plantation size, 
which facilitated mobilization, and partly to the destabilizing politi-
cal influences that marked the Age of Revolution and were particu-
larly severe in the region.
demography
Before considering those political influences, let us note the obvi-
ous  fact  that  one  reason  that  rebellions  and  conspiracies  were 
numerous and large between 1776 and 1848 was because there were 
more people in the Americas living in slavery than ever before or 
there would be again. At 3 million, the American slave population 
in 1790 was roughly twice what it had been fifty years before, and it 
would almost double again during the next half-century, despite the 
ending of slavery in Haiti and the British colonies (Engerman and 
Higman 1997, III:45-104). This explanation, however, only goes so 
far. The incidence of slave rebellion seems to drop off considerably 
after 1848, while the slave population did not do so until the 1860s.
More to the point perhaps, these were the peak years of the 
Atlantic slave trade. There is a strong correlation between mass 
arrivals of enslaved Africans and the incidence of rebellion in Bahia 
(1800-1830), Central Brazil (1835-1850), and Cuba after 1795. The 
same can be said of Louisiana during the decade before the large 
1811 uprising, and of Saint-Domingue on the eve of the Haitian 
Revolution, when the colony was breaking all previous records for 
the Atlantic slave trade. The white proportion of the Cuban and 
Brazilian populations shrank in the early nineteenth century, and 
the  enslaved  proportion  of  the  Caribbean  population  probably 
reached its greatest extent (70 percent) in 1790.
Two caveats should be noted. For the British colonies, there is 
no obvious relationship between the slave trade and slave rebellion 
in these years, and the three ‘late’ rebellions there, on creolized 
Barbados  (1816),  Demerara  (1823),  and  Jamaica  (1831),  seri-
ously undermine any attempt to correlate slave rebellion with an 
African presence. Similarly, while the vertiginous growth of Saint- 
Domingue’s slave trade in 1785-90 almost makes the 1791 upris-
ing look like a product of demographic determinism, the revolt 
in fact broke out in the most creolized part of the colony and was 
led largely by locally born slaves; the most African parts of Saint- 
Domingue were the slowest to join the Haitian Revolution. Hence 2  Slave rebellion during the Age of Revolution  |
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we should not be surprised if the two major rebellions in Curaçao’s 
history took place when its slave population was already highly cre-
olized.
slave rebellion and the age of revolution
The central question raised by this clustering of rebellions and 
conspiracies by black slaves is what connection they might have 
with the white Atlantic’s Age of Revolution. In his grand survey of 
slave resistance in the United States, Herbert Aptheker remarked 
that the spread of progressive ideas in the Western world, includ-
ing abolitionism, and news of foreign rebellions were among the 
background influences on American slave revolts around the turn 
of the nineteenth century, but the causal factors he stressed most 
were recurrent economic depression and the rapid growth of the 
slave population. Michael Craton, a historian of the British Carib-
bean, thought a new type of rebellion emerged in these years, but 
he attributed it to the creolization of the slave population, posit-
ing ‘African’ and ‘Creole’ types of rebellion (Craton 1979:99-125, 
1980:1-20). 
Eugene Genovese put forward a different type of schema, hemi-
spheric in scope, that made libertarian ideology the active agent. 
Seeking to write American slaves into the making of modernity, 
Genovese maintained that, whereas early slave insurgents sought 
seclusion and accepted the enslavement of others, the French Rev-
olution gave rise to a new revolutionary type of slave uprising that 
sought liberty for all and engagement with the wider world (Geno-
vese 1979:xviii-xxii, 82-125). The main weakness of this thesis is that 
Genovese failed to provide any plausible examples of the new type of 
insurrection apart from the Haitian Revolution and the Coro rebel-
lion (Geggus 1989:122, 2002:66-7). Instead of straining to include 
Nat Turner and Denmark Vesey, and using inaccurate descriptions 
of events on Trinidad and Jamaica, he could have strengthened his 
case with mention of the 1795 rebellion on Curaçao. 
More recently, historians have shown greater interest in explor-
ing the impact of the Haitian Revolution in its own right. Separating 
the two intertwined revolutions, French and Haitian, is somewhat 
arbitrary: the metropolitan revolution initiated the colonial one 
and, in turn, the conflict in Saint-Domingue forced antiracism and 
antislavery on to the agenda of the revolution in France. However, 
if the French Revolution proclaimed the ideals of liberty and equal-
ity, the Haitian Revolution demonstrated to colonized peoples that |  David Geggus
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they could be won by force of arms. Plantation societies built on 
bondage, prejudice, and inequality were peculiarly vulnerable to 
the ideology of revolutionary France, but the dramatic example 
of self-liberation offered by Saint-Domingue’s transformation into 
Haiti brought the message much closer to home. On the other 
hand, once the French Republic had adopted slave emancipation, 
it took a more active approach to exporting this policy than did 
black revolutionaries in Saint-Domingue.
Finally, we need to consider the influence on slave insurgents of 
the antislavery movement that became a political force in the years 
between the American and French revolutions and by 1848 had 
freed many more slaves than did the Haitian Revolution. Although 
abolitionism became incorporated into the French and Haitian 
revolutions, it was an autonomous movement that pre-dated and 
outlasted them, and it was more directly relevant to slaves than lib-
ertarian ideology. It was far more influential in the Anglophone 
world than elsewhere, but even where it was least successful, in the 
Spanish empire, it had an influence on slave resistance. 
Unlike the social changes singled out by Michael Craton, or the 
local traditions of resistance that Haitian historians often empha-
size as the main cause of their revolution, the focus on abolition-
ism or foreign revolutions as a major influence on slave resistance 
elevates external over internal causes and shifts attention to the 
circulation of people, news, and ideas that is central to the growing 
popularity of the Atlantic approach. 
the american revolution
Of all the Atlantic revolutions, the American Revolution evidently 
had the least impact on slavery, although many thousands of slaves 
were able to take advantage of the conflict to escape their bondage, 
and its aftermath brought about the abolition of slavery in states 
where it was of marginal importance, like Massachusetts and Penn-
sylvania (Quarles 1961; Schama 2005). After the revolution, many 
slaves  and  freedmen  were  transplanted  to  the  Caribbean  from 
North America. Thomas Benjamin has suggested that they or other 
African American soldiers who fought in the war may have played a 
role in the wave of slave rebellion that swept the West Indies in the 
1790s, but there is no evidence of this.7 However, there are several 
other possible linkages about which we can speculate. First, it is 
7  Benjamin 2009:587. The author confuses slaves with free men of colour. 2  Slave rebellion during the Age of Revolution  |
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worth pondering how Caribbean slaves received the news of the 
northeastern emancipation acts, which, after all, mark the begin-
ning of the end of slavery in the Americas. Given the strong mari-
time links between Philadelphia and New England and the West 
Indies, and the prominence of black sailors in that trade, it would 
be surprising if news of this first legislative assault on slavery did not 
reach the ears of Caribbean slaves and help shape what Julius Scott 
has termed a ‘culture of expectation’ (Scott 1986:122, 158). Second, 
there is the example set by Governor Dunmore of Virginia, who in 
1775 recruited slaves with offers of freedom to fight for the crown 
against their Patriot masters. Did the Saint-Domingue insurgents 
of 1791 have this model in mind when they claimed to be fighting 
for the king? When Dunmore was a dinner guest of Plaine du Nord 
planters in 1789, his wartime experiences were assuredly a topic 
of dinnertime conversation (Geggus 1997b:9, 36 n43). Lastly, the 
surprising fact that Afro-Cuban revolutionary José Antonio Aponte 
possessed a portfolio of pictures that included George Washington, 
as well as Jean-Jacques Dessalines and Toussaint Louverture, and 
that the U.S. slave leader Gabriel also supposedly invoked Washing-
ton’s example, suggests that the American Revolution served as an 
object lesson for slaves as well as others that power could be success-
fully contested (Childs 2006:3, 28; Sidbury 1997:261).
the french revolution
The ways in which the French Revolution encouraged slaves to con-
test their enslavement are varied. Apart from the libertarian ideology 
that enflamed aspirations and exacerbated the sense of injustice, the 
revolution directly weakened colonial power structures by dividing 
their free populations into hostile factions, creating military muti-
nies, and undermining traditional authority, thus creating opportu-
nities that slaves could seize. Chiefly affected in this manner were the 
French colonies, which dominate the record of slave resistance dur-
ing the period 1789-93. When the French Republic finally abolished 
slavery in February 1794, a new, more international phase began in 
which slave emancipation became, for a few years, a weapon of war 
aimed primarily at Britain’s colonies. More specific ramifications of 
the Republic’s foreign policy also encouraged slaves to rebel when 
it seemed likely that the formerly French colonies of Louisiana and 
Tobago might be retroceded to France (in 1795 and 1801 respec-
tively), and when the French occupied the United Provinces, so pro-
viding one of the justifications for Tula’s rebellion in Curaçao.|  David Geggus
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The impact of libertarian ideology is the most difficult con-
nection to prove. At first sight, it may seem the most obvious, but 
slave insurgents in the French Caribbean rarely deployed a lan-
guage of rights. They usually claimed that they had already been 
freed – by the king, in Martinique and Saint-Domingue, or by the 
National Assembly, in Guadeloupe. The slave leaders in north-
ern Saint-Domingue, including Toussaint Louverture, combined 
an ostentatiously royalist rhetoric with rather flexible demands 
as to how many slaves should be freed, until the radical (and 
abolitionist) French commissar Sonthonax ended slavery there 
in August 1793. The evidence that slaves used the term ‘rights of 
man’ is actually quite limited, and in large measure derives from 
a document that is almost certainly a forgery (Geggus 2006:297-
314, 2001:109-16).
Far easier to show is the way the French Revolution materially 
weakened  slaveholding  regimes.  The  moment  chosen  for  their 
uprising by the northern plain insurgents of 1791 coincided with 
the onset of a civil war between whites and free coloureds and fol-
lowed shortly after the deportation of half of the colonial garrison. 
The insurgents astutely exploited divisions between white radicals 
and conservatives, as did their counterparts in Guadeloupe in 1793. 
In Dutch Demerara, much as in Curaçao, the slaves rebelled in 
1795, taking advantage of conflict between pro- and anti-French 
factions in the ruling class, and fighting against both.8
The Republic’s abrupt adoption of abolition in February 1794 
belatedly fused libertarian politics and antislavery, and united the 
movement for black self-liberation with the resources of a major 
power.  The  chief  result  of  France’s  decision  to  use  this  policy 
against its enemies was the series of multi-class risings in the British 
Windward Isles supported by Victor Hugues in Guadeloupe and 
Commissaire Goyrand in St. Lucia. The Coro rebellion, the same 
year, would seem to be another example, in view of the shadowy 
presence of French privateers off the Venezuelan coast, and the 
insurgents’ apparent call for a republic and ‘la ley de los franceses’ 
(Brito Figueroa 1961:60-79, 103-4). This interpretation has been 
challenged, however, by historians who imply that local Spanish 
officials  emphasized  a  French  connection  in  order  to  cover  up 
their oppressive behavior that was the real cause of the insurrection 
(Aizpurua 1988:705-723; Rivas, Dovale Prado and Bello 1996:103-
25). Certainly, the sudden wave of rebellion that affected the Span-
ish empire in 1795, from Buenos Aires to Louisiana, suggests that 
8  Craton 1982:272. However, the events in Demerara might better be described as slave coop-
eration with maroon attacks than an actual revolt.2  Slave rebellion during the Age of Revolution  |
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internal factors like the gracias al sacar law passed that February, 
increases in sales tax, and the withdrawal of a new slave code at the 
end of 1794 were important in mobilizing resistance independent 
of any foreign influence. 
The blacksmith Gabriel’s ambitious conspiracy in Richmond, 
Virginia, in 1800 appears very much a response to the abolitionism 
of the French Republic. France was then unofficially at war with 
the United States, and local Frenchmen reputedly played a role in 
the plot. Historians often link the conspiracy to the Haitian Revolu-
tion, but contemporary sources show no trace of the conspirators’ 
discussing Saint-Domingue, and evidence of the black revolution’s 
impact on Virginian slaves is in fact remarkably slight.9 The attempt 
launched from Saint-Domingue in 1799 to foment a slave insur-
rection in Jamaica was similarly a French rather than a ‘Haitian’ 
venture. The initiative came from Paris, and it was organized by 
the local French official Philippe Roume, not the black governor 
Toussaint Louverture. Toussaint, indeed, secretly revealed the plan 
to the British, and the French emissaries were captured (Debien 
and Pluchon 1978:3-72). This ironic clash between the French and 
Haitian revolutions was due to Toussaint’s need to avoid a maritime 
blockade by the British, which meant he could not afford a policy 
of exporting slave insurrection. 
the haitian revolution
This decision to settle for ‘a revolution in one country’ and to avoid 
foreign entanglement became the policy of independent Haiti and 
was announced in its declaration of independence in 1804. The 
Haitian Revolution’s contribution to slave rebellion elsewhere was 
therefore very rarely a matter of direct assistance. One example is 
provided by the south coast privateers, part-French, part-Domin-
guan, who attempted to launch a rebellion in Maracaibo in 1799, 
and who may have played the same role in Coro four years before 
(Helg 2001:159-60). As they were acting against their French offi-
cers’ wishes, they represent another divergence of the Haitian from 
the French revolution, this time in favor of propagating slave rebel-
9  See, for example, Sidbury 1997:42-3, where the author claims as ‘clear evidence’ of the 
Haitian Revolution’s influence a letter supposedly written by a black conspirator, although he 
notes the letter does not mention Saint-Domingue, that a white contemporary who linked it 
to the Caribbean did so without apparent justification, and that the conspiracy may not have 
existed. The letter, found dropped in the street in 1793, was probably a hoax. Even less evidence 
is offered in Douglas Egerton 1993|  David Geggus
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lion.10 A similar case was Alexandre Pétion’s somewhat accidental 
participation in the 1800 landing on Curaçao along with other 
refugees who had been driven from southern Saint-Domingue by 
Toussaint Louverture.11
If we juxtapose these events, both launched from the southern 
region of Saint-Domingue that was dominated by the free man of 
colour André Rigaud, with Alexandre Pétion’s later assistance to 
Francisco Miranda in 1806 and to Simón Bolívar in 1816 (Verna 
1969:87-298), it appears that attitudes to the propagation of revolu-
tion overseas varied among Haitian revolutionaries between the ex-
slave leaders based in the north province and the anciens libres of the 
Bande du Sud. It was the freeborn men of mixed racial descent who 
sought to internationalize the revolution, not the former slaves.
More common were those revolts and conspiracies where we 
can  show  that  insurgents  drew  inspiration  rather  than  material 
help from the revolution in Saint-Domingue or from later events 
like the coronation of King Christophe in 1811. Surely the most 
remarkable case is the conspiracy, begun soon after the coronation, 
in Havana by the black carpenter José Antonio Aponte, who drew 
pictures of revolutionary leaders as a consciousness-raising exer-
cise (Fischer 2004:41-56). Five years earlier, slaves on plantations 
around Havana, led by two creoles, had plotted to seize the city’s 
forts so they could become free ‘like those in Saint-Domingue’ and 
‘absolute masters’ of the land (García 2003:34-9). In 1796, Afri-
can slaves planning a rebellion on a plantation in Spanish Santo 
Domingo  sought  advice  from  some  Saint-Domingue  insurgents 
who had settled nearby. Three years before, another conspirator 
in Santo Domingo, this time a creole, told his companions they 
were ‘ass-holes’ for doing nothing while blacks were killing whites 
in Saint-Domingue (Geggus 1997a:131) . In 1816, on Barbados, the 
elderly Nanny Grigg advised conspirators to ‘set fire the way they 
did in St. Domingo’ (Craton 1982:261).  
In several instances, we find insurgent slaves expecting ‘Hai-
tian’ help, sometimes because manipulative leaders had assured 
them it would be forthcoming. Apparently a confidence-boosting 
device, it shows up in the Curaçao rebellion of 1795; in the Vesey 
plot in Charleston; in Puerto Rico in 1841; in Havana, in the 1843 
Ladder conspiracy and the 1811 Aponte conspiracy, and also in 
Santo Domingo in 1811, in the multiracial conspiracy of Manuel 
10  French policy distinguished between the colonies of its enemy, Britain, and those of its 
allies, Spain and the Batavian Republic.
11  This followed the War of the South (1799-1800), in which Toussaint defeated André Rigaud 
and took over southern Saint-Domingue. Pétion later became Haiti’s first president.2  Slave rebellion during the Age of Revolution  |
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del Monte. In Curaçao, the slave leader Tula not only claimed to 
be in contact with the Dominguan revolutionary André Rigaud, 
whom the French Republic had promoted to general a few months 
before, but he also adopted his name. In the Aponte conspiracy a 
free black actually pretended to be the Dominguan slave leader 
Jean-François.12 
Another  category  of  rebellions  and  conspiracies  consists  of 
those that involved Francophone slaves or men of colour, known or 
presumed to have come from Saint-Domingue or Haiti, and there-
fore to have been witnesses of the revolution there. Tula’s rebellion 
on Curaçao is a striking example, one of its participants declaring 
‘Nous sommes ici pour vaincre ou mourir’; so is the 1811 insurrec-
tion in Louisiana led by the slave driver Charles Deslondes, which 
was the largest in North American history (Hartog 1961, I:327; 
Paquette 1997:218-20). Less well known is the aborted revolt at 
St. Pierre, Martinique, the same year, whose leader had served in 
the Haitian army and had links to Haitian expatriates on Curaçao 
(Geggus 1996: 127-30). Cuba provides many other examples, from 
1795 down to the Ladder conspiracy in 1843; Louisiana, another 
example in 1795; the Bahamas and Jamaica, two cases each; and 
Puerto Rico, Cartagena, and Marie Galante one case each (Geg-
gus 1997b:14, 40 n79, 2003:43-7). Both the Coro rebellion’s main 
leaders, Chirinos and González, were said to have visited Saint-
Domingue.13
Some historians have claimed a Haitian influence on rebellions 
where evidence seems to be lacking.14 And contemporaries also dis-
agreed sometimes. When Bahian planters, after a large rebellion in 
1814, claimed that local slaves were discussing the Haitian Revolu-
tion, the local governor claimed that the planters were making this 
up in order to force him to adopt more draconian measures of con-
trol (Reis and Gomes 2009:289). In Jamaica, unfounded rumors 
regarding French and French Caribbean agents abounded at the 
time of the Second Maroon War (Geggus 1987:280-3). However, 
there is a methodological or epistemological issue here. Some may 
feel it beyond question that the unprecedented success of Saint-
Domingue’s black rebels inevitably played a major role in motivat-
12  Oostindie  this  volume;  Geggus  2003:43-7.  By  a  strange  coincidence,  Rigaud’s  brother 
Joseph later participated in the 1800 invasion of Curaçao, where he was executed: Pauléus San-
non 1920, II:199. 
13  According to Brito Figueroa 1985:225, Chirinos travelled ‘constantly’ to Saint-Domingue. 
However, only one visit (with his white employer) is reported in Documentos 186.
14  For example, the claims, found in 1997:85 and Langley 1996:141 that, respectively, Jamai-
ca’s Christmas Rebellion and the Malé Revolt in Bahia were Haitian-inspired. On Virginia, see 
above, note 9.|  David Geggus
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ing subsequent resistance, and where written evidence is lacking, 
it must be due to the arbitrariness of colonial document-making.
There is little doubt that news of the Haitian Revolution trav-
eled wide and fast from its opening moments. By September 1791, 
Jamaican slaves were singing songs about it, and blacks in Havana 
were believed to be sacrificing pigs in honor of the insurgents. 
When Toussaint Louverture occupied Santo Domingo in early 1801, 
slaves in the hills above Coro, in western Venezuela, were singing his 
praises within weeks (Geggus 2003:40-42; (pigs) Ferrer 2008:28). 
The year after Haiti achieved independence, supposed conspira-
tors in Trinidad are recorded as parodying the Catholic mass, ‘The 
bread we eat is white man’s flesh. Remember St. Domingo!’15 The 
apparent propensity for Curaçao blacks to sing French revolution-
ary songs, both at home and abroad (as in La Guaira) seems more 
unusual (Hartog 1961, I:327; Edsel 1989:61-8). 
News,  however,  did  not  travel  as  far  and  fast  as  some  have 
suggested. Although Kenneth Maxwell quotes a visitor to Rio de 
Janeiro in 1792 as writing ‘the secret spell that caused the Negro 
to tremble at the presence of the white man [had been] in a great 
degree dissolved’ by the spectacle of ‘black power’, the quotation 
in fact dates from 1806 and applied to the whole of the Americas 
(Maxwell 1973:218; Barrow 1806:117-8). Free black and mulatto 
militiamen in Bahia were found to be wearing medallion portraits 
of Jean-Jacques Dessalines in 1805, a few months after he had been 
crowned emperor of Haiti.16 It is significant, however, that these 
were freemen, not slaves. Stuart Schwartz comments that there is 
nothing to link the long cycle of Bahian slave revolts in the period 
1807-35 to either the Haitian or French revolutions, and that such 
external influences were much more visible in the case of free 
men (as in the 1798 Tailors’ conspiracy) than of slaves (Schwartz 
1986:468-88). The same can be said of the mainly African slave 
uprisings of nineteenth-century Cuba, and in the Caribbean more 
widely (Geggus 1989:109; Tardieu 2003:101-11).
the antislavery movement and reformism
In the British colonies, autonomous slave rebellion reached some-
thing of a low point during the period of the French and Haitian 
15  Brereton 2006:128-9. Brereton points out, however, that the sole source for this story dates 
from more than eighty years after the event.
16  Luiz Mott 1982:5. They are inadvertently described as slaves in Reis 1993:48.2  Slave rebellion during the Age of Revolution  |
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revolutions, but then rebounded. During the fifteen years follow-
ing the Napoleonic War the British Caribbean produced three of 
the largest slave revolts in New World history: in Barbados (1816), 
Demerara (1823) and Jamaica (1831) (Craton 1982:254-321). The 
timing of each was quite clearly connected with successive devel-
opments in the antislavery movement in Britain. In each case, the 
insurgents demanded enforcement of an abolition law that they 
claimed (wrongly) had been passed by the imperial government 
but was being covered up by local authorities. From 1789 to the 
early 1830s, there were more than twenty such rebellions and con-
spiracies in which slaves argued that they had already been freed 
by law (or that their workload had been reduced to three days a 
week). Such rumours also surfaced in several places without pro-
voking resistance (Geggus 1997b:7-11). 
The phenomenon was not confined to slave societies, and it 
was probably rooted in wishful thinking, a desire to believe in the 
beneficent intentions of the powerful, which on some occasions 
was clearly manipulated by astute leaders. Earlier examples can be 
found in the Americas, especially in the 1770s (Geggus1997b:35 
n33; Schwartz 1986:478). However, beginning with an aborted ris-
ing on Martinique in August 1789, the syndrome appeared in a swift 
succession of revolts and conspiracies that were apparently linked 
to the emergence of antislavery movements in England and France 
and to recent government efforts there and in Spain to reform slav-
ery or the slave trade. Such reform efforts and the slaveholders’ 
hostile reaction to them were easily misinterpreted. Rumours of an 
official liberation that was being covertly sabotaged suggested to 
slaves that they had potential allies and obviously exacerbated the 
sense of injustice that Barrington Moore isolated as a crucial stimu-
lant to rebellion (Moore 1978). Such rumours perhaps resonated 
more strongly with the enslaved than the concept of abstract rights 
emanating from revolutionary France, where abolitionism made 
little progress until 1793. Even Tula on Curaçao in 1795 seems to 
have justified his rebellion with reference to the French abolition 
decree (and a Christian egalitarianism) rather than to libertarian 
ideology (Goslinga 1990:10).
The first spate of these rumour-inspired revolts and conspira-
cies numbered nearly a dozen in the period 1789-93. They affected 
British, French, and Spanish colonies, and included the great upris-
ing in northern Saint-Domingue. Another, smaller spate occurred 
in 1795 in the Spanish empire, where the withdrawal of the con-
troversial Código Negro in late 1794, and reforms regarding free 
people of color contributed to a wave of resistance that stretched 
from Louisiana to Buenos Aires. After an isolated conspiracy involv-|  David Geggus
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ing Brazilian slaves in the lowlands of Upper Peru (Bolivia) in 1809, 
more cases appeared in each of the Spanish Antilles and in Marti-
nique in the period 1811-1812. This time the impulse seems to have 
derived from the Cortes of Cádiz, where a deputy proposed in 1811 
to end slavery in Spain’s colonies. In one district of Puerto Rico, 
however, the emancipation rumour became confused with news 
from Haiti, and Henry Christophe was perceived as the liberating 
monarch (Geggus 1997b:8, 10-11; Baralt 1985:27).
A  similarly  hybridized  rumour  sparked  a  slave  conspiracy  in 
Maranhão, north-east Brazil in 1827. On this occasion, it was said 
that British liberators would invade the region on behalf of the 
King of Congo (Röhrig Assunção 1999:23). In 1841, in Ponce on 
Puerto Rico’s south coast, plotters expected help from both Haiti 
and from abolitionists, as did many of the Escalera conspirators two 
years later in Cuba (Baralt 1982:93; Paquette 1988:238, 242, 254). 
Finally, some historians believe that the Missouri debates of 1820 
on limiting slavery’s expansion in the United States and an attempt 
to end slavery in Kentucky in 1829 were among the stimuli that set 
in motion the Vesey plot of 1822 and the Nat Turner rebellion of 
1831 (Aptheker 1943:270, 292).
other themes
(1)  Changing  Tactics.  According  to  Michael  Craton,  rebellions 
dominated by locally born creole slaves tended to be less violent 
than earlier ones led by Africans. Although they usually led to vio-
lence, it seems their leaders intended them to begin as work strikes 
in which the slaves could bargain from a position of strength (Cra-
ton 1979:99-125, 1980:1-20, 1982:291). Craton had in mind the 
last decades of British Caribbean slavery, but earlier examples can 
be found: in Martinique (1789), Dominica (1791), Guadeloupe 
(1793), Buenos Aires (1795), and Curaçao (1795), as well as later 
ones, in Martinique and St. Croix in 1848. These changing tactics 
obviously reflected changing expectations among the enslaved and 
the belief that governments were already willing to end slavery.
(2) Troop Levels. For American slave societies, much of the 
Age of Revolution was a period of warfare. War does not appear to 
have facilitated slave rebellion unless a belligerent party specifically 
encouraged it, as in Venezuela in 1811-1813, or Bahia in December 
1822. In fact, wars probably made rebellions less likely. Sometimes 
they provided a safety valve by making it easier for slaves to run 
away, as in the American Revolutionary War, or they freed restless 2  Slave rebellion during the Age of Revolution  |
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young males through the recruitment of slaves as soldiers, as in the 
long Spanish American conflict. Above all, they often they made 
rebellion more difficult because of their mobilization of large num-
bers of armed men. João Reis made this argument about the lack 
of major slave revolts in Brazil during its separation from Portugal 
(1821-1823), and the dearth of autonomous slave rebellions in the 
British Caribbean during the French Revolutionary and Napole-
onic Wars can be attributed to the islands’ exceptionally large gar-
risons during those years (Reis 1988:122; Geggus 1987:292-8). The 
incidence of slave resistance in Cuba in the same period also seems 
to have been influenced by war but in a reverse manner. Garrisons 
dwindled during periods of maritime war that made it difficult for 
Spain to reinforce them, and rebellion increased. Rebellion tended 
to diminish when the garrison was reinforced, as in 1799-1803, and 
1813-1824 (Geggus 1997b:7 n31).
Apart from these general patterns, many individual rebellions 
or conspiracies occurred following a recent decline in the strength 
of the local garrison. This is true of the three large British Carib-
bean revolts of 1816, 1823 and 1831, and of the Saint-Domingue 
uprising of 1791. The Aponte conspiracy in Cuba also was launched 
when  island  troop  levels  were  at  a  low  point.  Jamaica,  Tobago, 
Santo Domingo, and Venezuela provide other examples (Geggus 
1987:294-7, 2009:8). And one of the reasons the Virginia black-
smith Gabriel organized his conspiracy in 1800 was the opportunity 
provided by a reduction in the number of Federal troops as the 
Quasi-War with France came to an end (Aptheker 1943:225). Cura-
çao’s garrison was always small and, given the difficulty of sending 
out new recruits during the 1790s, it would not be surprising if it, 
too, was unusually weak in 1795 and 1800.17
(3) Free Coloured Involvement. A final way in which to com-
pare acts of slave rebellion in this period is according their degree 
of free coloured participation, which was widespread but varied. 
Denmark Vesey was the only free man involved in the 1822 conspir-
acy he supposedly organized, but free men of African descent made 
up two-fifths of the planners of Venezuela’s Coro rebellion, and 
Indians a tenth (Dominguez 1980:56). According to Jean-François, 
leader of the Saint-Domingue slave uprising, some two percent of 
his insurgent army consisted of free blacks and mulattoes (Geggus 
2002:179). The rapid growth of free populations of colour around 
the turn of the nineteenth century probably explains why so many 
of these revolts and conspiracies involved free non-whites. 
17  In 1801 the garrison numbered just 230, mainly German mercenaries described as ‘unmo-
tivated and unreliable’ (Hartog 1961, I:495).|  David Geggus
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Usually, as in Curaçao, where a couple of free blacks admin-
istered  oaths  to  slave  insurgents  (Hartog  1961,  I:325-6),18  free 
participants were neither numerous nor played prominent roles. 
Even so, several of the most salient events had free black leaders, 
like the carpenters José Antonio Aponte in Havana and Denmark 
Vesey in Charleston, or the sharecropper José Chirinos in Coro. 
Manuel Barcia, in fact, argues that both the Aponte and Escalera 
conspiracies were so dominated by freemen they were not slave 
conspiracies at all (Barcia 2008:46). In Saint-Domingue, the black 
freedman Toussaint Louverture emerged as a prominent leader 
in the 1791-93 insurrection and may have been one of its organiz-
ers. Less well known are the Maracaibo militia lieutenant Francisco 
Pirela; manservant Alexis Casimir, who played a shadowy role in the 
Martinique rebellion in 1789; and the black artillery sergeant who 
provided weapons for the Cartagena conspiracy of 1799. 
Such figures generally lived close to the slave population and 
had enslaved family members. They tended to be black rather than 
of mixed descent, and to have little stake in slaveholding.19 In Brazil 
and Cuba, African ethnicity seems to have been an important vari-
able, with freedmen and slaves from the same parts of Africa combin-
ing in rebellion. In contrast, the free men of colour who dominated 
or participated in multi-class rebellions, or who revolted in their 
own interest, tended to be slaveholders of mixed racial descent, 
as in the Grenada, St. Vincent, and Dominica uprisings of 1795, 
Francisco Morales’s conspiracy of the same year in Cuba, and the 
1798 Tailors’ rebellion in Brazil (Geggus 1989:109-11). Free black 
and mulatto artisans played the most prominent roles in Cuba’s 
Ladder conspiracy but, as a group, the former were regarded as the 
more radical and committed (Paquette 1988:241-2, 251-7). Slave 
rebellions and conspiracies influenced by the French and Haitian 
revolutions and, to a lesser degree, those influenced by abolitionist 
rumours tended to be associated with the presence of free people 
of colour. They no doubt had a wider awareness of external events 
than did the enslaved because of their much greater literacy and 
mobility.  
Notwithstanding this widespread participation of free coloured 
individuals in slave resistance, free men of colour almost every-
18  Free men of colour played a similar role in Cuba’s 1843 conspiracy (Paquette 1988:237-8, 
242-3).
19  However, see Geggus 1997b:41 n96. Pirela was a pardo, of mixed racial descent, although 
wrongly identified as black in Dominguez 1980:159. Vesey’s identity is also unclear (Morgan 
2002:161-2). Chirinos was born free to an Indian mother, but his father, wife, and children were 
slaves. So were Toussaint Louverture’s (Geggus 2007). Vesey’s children were also slaves. 2  Slave rebellion during the Age of Revolution  |
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where played an even more prominent role in the suppression of 
slave rebellions as part of local militia forces. In some instances, 
such as the Maracaibo, Cartagena, and Aponte conspiracies, pardo 
militiamen were responsible for their betrayal. 
conclusion: rebellion and emancipation
Despite the uniquely rapid growth of the U.S. slave population, 
slavery was a declining institution in the Americas by the end of the 
Age of Revolution in 1848. It had been abolished in the colonies 
of Britain, France, and Denmark, and the Atlantic slave trade was 
everywhere illegal, surviving only in Brazil and Cuba. How far, if 
at all, this decline was due to the wave of slave resistance discussed 
above remains a controversial topic (Drescher and Emmer 2010). 
The massive Saint-Domingue slave revolt of 1791 was clearly 
the main factor in ending slavery in Saint-Domingue in 1793, and 
(until Bonaparte restored it in 1802) in Guadeloupe and Guyane 
in 1794. Even there, however, the outbreak of the European war 
in 1793 and the fortuitous presence of the abolitionist Commissaire 
Sonthonax were vital parts of the process. Rather less certain is 
whether the Haitian Revolution contributed to the abolition of the 
British slave trade in 1807 and to slave emancipation in Britain’s 
colonies in 1833. If fear of future rebellions has been exaggerated 
as a causative factor, the revolution was surely important in allowing 
British politicians to vote their consciences by destroying France as 
a commercial rival (Geggus 2010). Similarly, Simón Bolívar’s efforts 
to end slavery in Venezuela were in some measure a response to 
his military difficulties and his Enlightenment sensibility, but they 
could scarcely have been made without the Haitian assistance that 
revived his military campaign in 1816 (Verna 1969:87-298).
The  British  antislavery  campaign  that  climaxed  in  1833  evi-
dently followed a metropolitan timetable, but many historians have 
argued that the major uprisings in Jamaica (1831) and Demerara 
(1823) catalysed its development. Whereas in the past they tended 
to stress metropolitan dread of continuing rebellions or repulsion 
at the planter class’s brutal reaction to them, more recently they 
have emphasized the way the insurgents’ discipline and restraint 
increased sympathy for their cause.20 Historians of Brazil still sharply 
disagree whether slave resistance in the late 1840s contributed to 
the closure of that country’s slave trade (Needell 2001, 2006:377).
20  See Drescher and Emmer 2010 (contributions of Beckles, Blackburn, Davis, and Drescher).|  David Geggus
40
The Age of Revolution ended with two clear-cut cases, in Mar-
tinique and St. Croix, where slave rebellions made a definite con-
tribution to the emancipation process. The rebellions were not, 
strictly speaking, causal factors since the decision to abolish slavery 
already had been taken and was the cause of the insurrections, but 
they did determine its timing. The mass invasion of the town of 
St. Pierre in May 1848 and the fighting it gave rise to in northern 
Martinique  caused  the  governor  to  immediately  declare  slavery 
abolished. This brought forward by some three months the eman-
cipation decreed in Paris by the new revolutionary government 
(Butel 2002:291-4). The declaration had immediate repercussions 
not only in the other French colonies but also those of Denmark. 
The Danish government had announced the previous year it would 
end slavery in 1859, but a massive rising of slaves on St. Croix in 
July 1848 shortened the process by eleven years (Hall 1992:208-11).
Several themes that characterize slave resistance in the Age of 
Revolution can be found in the two rebellions on Curaçao which, 
remarkably, were among the largest of this turbulent period. They 
were among the most closely associated with both the French and 
Haitian revolutions and they demonstrate the inspirational effect 
that  foreign  antislavery  measures  had  on  enslaved  populations. 
They further provide evidence of the adoption of new, non-violent 
tactics. However, the Curaçao rebellions cannot be included in the 
small group that hastened the end of slavery, for which any surviv-
ing participants had to wait more than sixty years.
appendix. slave rebellions and conspiracies, 1776-1848
Conspiracy/Revolt
1776
July, Jamaica  C  Hanover parish. 30 slaves 
executed
July, North Carolina  C?  Beaufort and other counties
1778
Easter, St. Kitts  C  African and creole slaves
1779
November, Peru  R  1 plantation, 1 soldier killed
1784
Jamaica  C  St. Mary’s. Led by slave driver2  Slave rebellion during the Age of Revolution  |
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Jamaica  R  St. George’s. 1 plantation,    
    newly arrived Africans.
1789
June, Brazil  R  Bahia. 50 slaves, 1 plantation,  
    1 white killed
August, Martinique  R  St. Pierre district. 3-400 slaves
Demerara  R  1 plantation. Widespread    
    conspiracy 
1790
January, Cuba  R  1 plantation
April, Guadeloupe  R?   Petit Bourg, etc. 100+ punished
Spring? Venezuela  R  1 plantation, 1 overseer killed
May, Tortola  R   1 plantation, 2 slaves executed
Oct.-Dec., Martinique  R  West coast. Pillage and killing 
1791 
January, St. Lucia  C  Soufrière. 1 plantation
January, Dominica  R  Work stoppage/desertion/   
    confrontation
Mid-Jan., Dominica  R  Free coloured leader. 1 white  
    killed
January, St. Domingue  C  Port Salut. 200 slaves
May, Guadeloupe  C?  Ste. Anne. Led by mulatto slave
June/July, St. Domingue  R  Separate revolts on 3 estates,   
    Cul de Sac
July, Louisiana  C  Pointe Coupée. 17 slaves    
    arrested
August, Marie Galante  C  Saint-Domingue. Free coloured  
    hanged
Aug./Nov., St. Domingue  R  North Province. 100,000+    
    involved
Nov./Dec. Jamaica  C?  North coast
1792
Saint-Domingue  R  Revolt spreads beyond North.  
    1,000s
1793
March, Sto. Domingo  C  Hinche. 19 arrested. No execu- 
    tions
April, Guadeloupe  R  Trois Rivières. 200. 20 whites   
    killed |  David Geggus
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April, Guadeloupe  C  Baillif. 5 death sentences
April, Guadeloupe  C   Basse-Terre region. 14 punished
August, Guadeloupe  R  Ste. Anne. 1,000? slaves and    
    freemen
St. Lucia  R
1794
February, Martinique  R  Ste. Luce. During British    
    invasion
1795
January, Curaçao  R  Santa Katarina. 1 plantation
early, Santo Domingo  C  Samaná. 7 blacks, 3 French    
    whites
April, Louisiana  C  Pointe Coupée. 23 slaves    
    executed
May, Bahamas  C  Nassau. Francophone slaves
May, Venezuela  R  Coro. 300 slaves and free    
    blacks
July, Cuba  R  Puerto Principe. 15 slaves
July? Puerto Rico  R?  Aguadilla. A few slaves
August, Curaçao  R  2,000 slaves? 29 slaves exe   
    cuted
Demerara  R  Cooperation with maroon    
    attacks
Aruba  R  30 slaves, apparent Haitian    
    inspiration 
Argentina  R?  Buenos Aires. 3-day strike
Trinidad  C?  2 conspiracies in south and    
    north
Cuba  C  Bayamo
1796
Feb.-April, Louisiana  C  Pointe Coupée, German    
    Coast. 3 plots?
May, Cuba  C  Puerto Príncipe. 5 ‘French’    
    slaves
Oct., Santo Domingo  R  Boca Nigua. 100 slaves    
    7 executed
1797
August, Bahamas  C  Nassau. ‘French’ slaves.    
    5 executed2  Slave rebellion during the Age of Revolution  |
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1798
January, Venezuela  C  Carúpano/Cumaná. African   
    slaves
June, Cuba  R  Puerto Principe. 20 slaves    
    punished
July, Cuba  C  Trinidad. 2 slaves hanged;    
    8 deported
October, Cuba  R   Guines. 23 slaves on 1 estate
Cuba  C  Mariel
Cuba  C  Santa Cruz
1799
April, New Granada  C  Cartagena. ‘French’ slaves,    
    freemen
May, Venezuela  C  Maracaibo. French and local   
    freemen
1800
August, Virginia  C  Richmond. 25 executed
September, Curaçao  R  Large multi-class rising
1801
December, Tobago  C  7 or 16 estates. 7 slaves    
    executed
1802
Jan.-April, Virginia  C  Norfolk, etc. 25 slaves executed
May, North Carolina  C?  11 slaves executed in a dozen  
    counties
June, Cuba  C  Managua
1803
February, Cuba  C  Río Hondo
June, Jamaica  C  Kingston. 2 executed
1804
Demerara  C?  Igbo and Akan friendly societies
South Carolina  C  St. Peter’s. 10 or 12 slaves    
    executed
1805
Cuba  C  Bayamo. English-speaking    
    slaves 
April, North Carolina  C  Wayne County, etc., 20 arrested,  
    5 executed
December, Trinidad  C?  4 slaves executed|  David Geggus
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1806
Cuba  C  plantations near Havana
Jamaica  C  St. George’s. 1 slave executed
Puerto Rico  R  Humacao. Slaves attack guard  
    house
1807
May, Brazil  C  Salvador/Reconcavo. Hausa   
    leaders 
September, Jamaica  R  St. George
December, Demerara  C  20 slaves arrested. 9 executed
1808
December, Brazil  R  Bahia. Several 100s
1809
Cuba  C  Puerto Príncipe
January, Brazil  R  Salvador/Reconcavo. 400 Africans
March, Jamaica  C  Kingston. 2 executed
Upper Peru  C  Santa Cruz. Slaves and Indians
1810
February, Brazil  R  Salvador
1811
January, Louisiana  R  German Coast. 400 < 500 slaves.  
    About 90 killed
Sept., Martinique  R  St. Pierre, 15 executed
1811-13, Venezuela  R  Central region. Widespread,   
    encouraged by royalists
1812
Cuba  C  Centered on Havana. Wide-   
    spread
January, Puerto Rico  C?  Widespread. 16 punished
January, Cuba  R  Puerto Principe. 8 hanged;    
    73 whipped
February, Cuba  C  Bayamo. 5 slaves jailed
March, Cuba  C?  Holguín. 1 slave executed
March, Cuba  R  Guanabo. 1 estate
August, Louisiana  C  New Orleans. 1 white executed
August, St. Domingo  R  Eastern region. 3 executed
1814
February, Brazil  R  Salvador/Itapoam. 13 whites   
    and 56 slaves killed2  Slave rebellion during the Age of Revolution  |
45
March, Brazil  R  Bahia
1815
December, Jamaica  C  St. Elizabeth. 250 Africans.    
    1 hanged
December, Brazil  C  Alagoas
1816
Jan.-July, S. Carolina  C  Camden, church-based. 6 slaves  
    executed
February, Brazil,  R  Bahia, Santo Amaro etc. Lasted  
    4 days
February, Virginia  C  Spotsylvania County. White    
    leader, 6 slaves executed
April, Barbados  R  +4,000, 120 slaves killed,    
    144 executed
1817
Cuba  R  1 coffee plantation
1819
May, Georgia  C  Augusta
1820
March, Florida  R  Jamaican slaves newly arrived
June, Cuba  R  Montalvo and Armonía plan-  
    tations
August, Cuba  R  La Esperanza and La Concep- 
    ción plantations
Belize  R  New River. +100 slaves
1821
July, Puerto Rico  C  Bayamón. 2 slaves executed
1822
February, Brazil  R  Bahia, São Mateus. Small    
    revolt
May, Cuba  R  Mariel
June, Brazil  R  Itaparicá. Small revolt
Sept., Puerto Rico  C  Naguabo. 2 slaves executed
December, Brazil  R  Bahia. +50 slaves killed. Portu- 
    guese instigated
South Carolina  C?  Charleston. Denmark Vesey,    
    35 executed
October, Martinique  R  Carbet. 2 plantations, several   
    whites killed|  David Geggus
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1823
Tortola  R  1 plantation 
August, Demerara  R  < 12,000 slaves, c220 slaves    
    killed, 33 executed 
December, Jamaica  C  Hanover, etc. 12 slaves executed
1824
February, Jamaica  C  St. George. 6 slaves hanged
1825
June-Aug., Cuba  R  Matanzas. Revolts on 20 estates,  
    500 slaves
1826
Cuba  R  Western region. 1 plantation
May? Maryland  R  29 slaves on ship, killed    
    2 whites
July, Puerto Rico  C  Ponce. 20 slaves executed
August, Brazil  R  Cachoeira
September, Ohio R.  R  77 slaves in transit, killed    
    5 whites
December, Brazil  C  Salvador/Reconcavo, centered  
    on Yoruba quilombo
1827
January, Cuba  R  Tentativa coffee plantation.    
    57 slaves
February, Brazil  C  Maranhão. Emancipation    
    rumor, half-dozen estates
March, Brazil  R  Cachoeira. 3 plantations,    
    30 slaves arrested
September, Brazil  R  Sergipe. 10 plantations, mainly  
    Yoruba. < 18 slaves killed
1828
Cuba  R  Western region. 1 plantation
March, Brazil  R  Pirajá, Yoruba. 20 slaves killed
April, Brazil  R  Cachoeira. 2 revolts
June, Brazil  R  Ilheus
Dec., Puerto Rico  C  Guayama. Small, no executions
December, Brazil  R  Santo Amaro
1829
March, Louisiana  R  2 slaves executed
April, South Carolina  C  Georgetown2  Slave rebellion during the Age of Revolution  |
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August, Kentucky  R  90 slaves in transit, 6 executed,  
    2 whites killed
October, Brazil  R  Reconcavo. 3 plantations, 3 killed
1830
April, New Orleans  C  2 slaves executed
April, Brazil  R  Salvador. +120 slaves
April, Tortola  R  1 plantation 
June, Bahamas  R  Exuma
July, Cuba  R  Guamacaro. 1 plantation
October, Louisiana  C  Plaquemines. 100 slaves
Brazil  R  Salvador. +100 slaves; Yoruba.  
    +50 killed
1831
Cuba  R  Western region. 1 plantation
Martinique  C  St. Pierre
August, Virginia  R  Southampton Co. 77 slaves,    
    57 whites killed
September, Tortola  C  widespread 
December, Tennessee  C  Fayetteville
December, Jamaica  R  18 < 60,000 slaves, 540 slaves   
    killed/executed
1832
May, Puerto Rico  R  Vega Baja. 1 plantation
1833
Jan., Puerto Rico  C  Ponce. 1 plantation
August, Cuba  R  Cafetal Salvador, Guanajay.    
    300 slaves, 53 slaves killed
1835
January, Brazil,  R  Salvador. 300 slaves/freedmen,  
    50 killed, 5 executed
June, Cuba  R  Matanzas. 3 plantations, 130 slaves
July, Cuba  R  Aguacate. 1 estate, 3 whites    
    killed, 11 rebels commit suicide
1836
Suriname  C  Coronie. 1 plantation, shaman  
    leader
1837
June, Cuba  R  La Sonora sugar estate. No    
    whites killed, 3 slaves executed|  David Geggus
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August? Cuba  C  Guantánamo region
October, Louisiana  C  Rapides parish. 50 < 60 slaves,  
    9 slaves, 3 freemen executed
1838
Cuba, January  R  Trinidad region. 52 Gangá    
    slaves, 12 shot
Cuba, April  R  Trinidad region. 1 white killed,  
    5 slaves executed 
November, Brazil  R  Vassouras. 300 slaves
1839
March, Cuba  R  Matanzas. 1 plantation, Yoruba  
    slaves
Cuba  R  Matanzas. Revolts on several   
    other plantations
1840
June, Cuba  R  Güines, Delgado estate. 3 slaves  
    killed
July, Cuba  R  Empresa plantation. +40 Yor-  
    uba slaves, 2 whites killed
Sept./Oct., Louisiana  C  7 parishes. 100s, dozens    
    executed
Sept., Puerto Rico  C  Guayanilla. 32 punished, no    
    executions
October, Maryland  R  1 plantation, 1 white wounded
1840s
Brazil  C  Vassouras. ‘Repeated abortive  
    uprisings’
1841
February, Georgia  C  Augusta. 1 execution
Oct/Dec., Puerto Rico  C  Ponce. 7 slaves executed
1842
July, Cuba  R  La Arratía sugar estate.    
    42 slaves, 5 executed
1843
March, Puerto Rico  R  Toa Baja. 5 soldiers killed,    
    8 slaves executed
March, Cuba  R  Matanzas. 465 slaves, 128 killed,  
    lasted 2 days 
May, Cuba  R  Sabanilla. 2 sugar estates2  Slave rebellion during the Age of Revolution  |
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June, Cuba  R  Sabanilla and Guamacaro.    
    +300 slaves
November, Cuba  R  Matanzas. 66 insurgents killed/  
    executed
December, Cuba  C  Matanzas. 17 slaves executed
December, Cuba  C  Multi-class, widespread,    
    +1,800 punished
1845
July, Maryland  R  75 armed slaves, attempted    
    escape, battle, 1 executed
1848
May, Martinique  R  St. Pierre, Prêcheur. 1,000s,    
    58 deaths, some arson
July, St. Croix  R  8,000 slaves, some property    
    damage, no deaths
July, Puerto Rico  C  Ponce. 21 slaves punished,    
    3 executed
August, Puerto Rico  C  Vega Baja. 3 slaves punished,   
    1 executed
July-Aug., Brazil  C  Paraíba. 50 slaves
August, Kentucky  R  75 armed slaves, attempted    
    escape, battle, 3 executed
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The rising expectations of free and enslaved blacks  
in the Greater Caribbean
Wim Klooster
As David Geggus has shown, scores of slave conspiracies and revolts 
occurred  during  the  Age  of  Revolutions.  In  the  Greater  Carib-
bean, slave uprisings were especially frequent in the 1790s. One 
year stood out: 1795. While in a number of colonies revolts were 
planned in that year but failed to materialize, and in other colo-
nies small numbers of slaves took up arms, large-scale rebellions 
involving slaves did occur in Coro and Curaçao. The seeds for such 
rebellious behaviour had been sown in 1789 with the destruction 
of the ancien régime in France, the adoption of the Declaration of 
the Rights of Man and Citizen, and the promulgation in Spain of 
a new slave code by King Charles IV. The overthrow or reform of 
time-honoured structures had an impact not only on slave popula-
tions, but also on underprivileged free people of colour. Abolition-
ism and the immediate French termination of slavery added fuel to 
the flames.
I will argue here that the French revolutionary message had 
a more direct impact on free people of colour in the Caribbean 
than on slaves. Aiming to achieve full legal equality, free blacks 
and mulattoes echoed the message of the Declaration of the Rights 
of Man. Although some enslaved blacks in Saint-Domingue also 
adopted the Rights of Man as their mantra, slaves generally were 
more often inspired by the notion of a royal decree that emanci-
pated them, but that was withheld by local authorities and slave-
holders. As we will see, rumours spreading this false idea existed 
long before the 1790s and would still circulate long afterwards, but 
they were particularly potent in the aftermath of the French and 
Haitian revolutions. 
Although such rumours seem to have bypassed Curaçao, the 
island had multiple ties to the revolutionary Caribbean around 
the time of the unprecedented revolt of 1795. A lively commercial |  Wim Klooster
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entrepôt, Curaçao was intimately connected to the French, Span-
ish, British, and Danish colonies. These close ties were replicated 
on an individual level, as evinced by the involvement of Curaçaoan 
blacks in a maroon community in Santo Domingo, slave conspira-
cies in Louisiana and Cuba in the 1790s, and the Coro revolt of 
1795. 
free coloureds, slaves, and equality
The tumultuous Caribbean decade of the 1790s had its roots in 
the European events of 1789, although the outbreak of the French 
Revolution did not in itself spark rebellious behaviour of free and 
enslaved blacks in the colonies. More important among free people 
of colour than the demise of the ancien régime was the Declaration 
of the Rights of Man and Citizen, and, by extension, the notion of 
equality as emanating from France. Free people of African birth or 
descent embraced the document’s message as it stressed an attrac-
tive alternative to their plight. Genuine equality was still a remote 
prospect for them prior to the Revolution. In Spanish America, free 
blacks and mulattoes were not allowed to live on their own, could 
not become clergymen, scribes, or notaries, and were forbidden to 
have Indian servants. In Venezuela, females were forbidden to wear 
gold, silk, or pearls, and males did not have the right to walk side 
by side with whites in the streets, nor were they to be given a chair 
in white houses (Ponce 1994:38-9; Pellicer 1996:42, 116-7). In the 
wealthiest French colony, Saint-Domingue, the separate legal status 
of free blacks and mulattoes was not stressed until the 1760s and 
1770s. Starting in those decades, they were forbidden to ride in 
coaches, to be surgeons or midwives, to have certain types of house-
hold furniture, and to adopt the dress or hairstyles of whites. They 
were to be rigorously punished for hitting a white person, even if 
they had been injured first.1 
In order to properly understand the notion of equality held by 
Caribbean free blacks, it may be helpful to contrast their public 
and private opinions and actions in pre-revolutionary with those in 
revolutionary times. Before the 1790s, free nonwhites, even those 
who ended up joining white-led revolts and revolutions, usually 
did not aspire to the creation of a slaveless society; if they did, no 
public record has survived. Instead, they aimed at obtaining and 
1  Raymond  1790;  Raymond  1791:8:  Debien  1956:75;  Debbash  1967:38-9,  53-4,  74-5;  King 
2001:168; Garrigus 2006:95. See for legal discrimination in the British Caribbean: Cox 1984:92-6.3  The rising expectations of free and enslaved blacks in the Greater Caribbean   |
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enforcing  privileges  for  themselves,  individually  or  collectively, 
resorting to the available channels to achieve their ends. The free 
pardos (mixed-bloods of African origin) in the province of Caracas, 
for example, used the courts to be individually admitted to offices 
legally reserved for whites. Some already de facto enjoyed tradition-
ally white privileges, but aspired to legal recognition, while others 
sought to obtain privileges never before granted to a nonwhite. 
Their petitions show that they had mastered the vocabulary of suc-
cessful petitioners, which revolved around the concept of honour. 
They  stressed  their  ‘cleanliness  of  blood’,  Catholicism,  lineage, 
worthy occupation, and devotion to duty.2 
Such strategies did not disappear overnight in times of revolt. 
There are numerous examples of free mulattoes eager to climb 
the  social  ladder  fighting  against  rebels  and  revolutionaries.  At 
the same time, the outbreak of an anticolonial revolt could invite 
radical responses. One source of inspiration may have been the 
text of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen, although 
it is impossible to ascertain for every case whether this document 
– in whatever form it came to the nonwhites – only made mani-
fest what was in the hidden transcript or if it actually changed 
their outlook. The widespread fear of so-called French mulattoes 
among officials across the Caribbean and in ports along the east-
ern seaboard of the United States in the 1790s was not unfounded. 
Many of them adhered to the principles of the French Revolution 
(Morales 1986:36). Nor were authorities in Venezuela delusional 
when they labelled some mulattoes subversive. By 1795, pardo males 
were addressing each other with the title ‘Don’ and asserted that 
there had not been both a white Adam and a mulatto Adam. Some 
mulattoes began to complain openly about the inequality between 
whites  and  pardos.  Venezuela’s  War  Council  singled  out  one  of 
them, a musician named Juan Bautista Olivares, who had requested 
the bishop to be admitted to the priesthood. The bishop noted 
that Olivares’ petition was filled with arrogance and pride, reveal-
ing the author’s spirit, which was ‘capable of animating his class to 
throw off the yoke of obedience and subjection’. What also alarmed 
the War Council was that he had read and explained to another 
mulatto a sermon attributed to a Parisian constitutional priest. The 
text contained references to liberty and equality. Olivares was also 
accused of having given a fellow musician a book that contained 
a subversive message. Citing as additional evidence against him 
the fact that he possessed a large library and that he had spread 
2  Pellicer 1996:132, 135. In other parts of Spanish America, free blacks as well as slaves availed 
themselves of the legal system to assert their rights: Bennett 2003:Chapter 5; Johnson 2007. |  Wim Klooster
60
the ‘Rights of Man’, the Council arrested Olivares and sent him 
to Spain, where the king freed him and sent him back to Caracas 
(Briceño-Iragorry 1947:58-9; Pellicer 1996:85, 102). 
As far as is known, Olivares did not go on to take part in any 
revolt. A lieutenant in the free pardo militia of New Orleans named 
Pedro  Bailly  went  one  step  further,  according  to  contemporary 
accusations. In 1793, he was found guilty of having professed ideas 
suggestive of revolution. Besides, he stood trial twice in the same 
decade for criticizing the Spanish government and following ‘the 
maxims of the French rebels’. He was acquitted in 1791, but con-
demned in March 1794 to serve a jail sentence in Havana. One 
testimony  was  perhaps  decisive:  that  of  Luis  Declouet,  second 
lieutenant of the Louisiana regiment. When Declouet had called 
the French a foe to all humanity, Bailly had replied, ‘Humanity! 
Humanity! I am going to speak frankly to you, sure that you are 
a man of honor. Sir, I do not see that any acts of inhumanity have 
been committed. It is true that they have done wrong by murder-
ing their king, but sir, the French are just; they have conceded men 
their  rights’.  Declouet  asked  Bailly  to  elaborate.  To  what  rights 
did he refer? Bailly answered: ‘A universal equality among men, 
us, people of color. We have on the Island of Saint-Domingue and 
other French islands the title ciudadano activo [active, participatory 
citizen]; we can speak openly, like any white persons and hold the 
same rank as they. Under our [Louisiana] rule do we have this? 
No, sir, and that is unjust. All of us being men, there should be no 
difference. Only their method of thinking – not color – should dif-
ferentiate men’ (Hanger 1997:152-3, 156). 
The Declaration of the Rights of Man was a new ideological 
weapon for people of colour. In its absence, would they have lacked 
an effective argument to bolster their fight for equal rights? The 
answer, I think, is no. Consider the writings of blacks and mulat-
toes in the Thirteen Colonies during the American Revolution. A 
dozen years before the French Revolution, these authors assailed 
the inconsistency of the independence movement for criticizing 
slavery  metaphorically  without  pleading  for  its  actual  downfall. 
They availed themselves of the prevalent natural rights philosophy, 
according to which being human sufficed to have natural rights (Im 
Hof 1994:183-4). Having imbibed the same sources as the authors 
of the Declaration, they shared the conclusions of many black activ-
ists elsewhere in the Americas. One of these Americans was Lemuel 
Haynes, son of an African father and a white mother. Originally an 
indentured servant, he went on to become a clergyman-in-training 
who joined the patriots in Massachusetts as a minuteman. In his 
manuscript antislavery tract Liberty Further Extended, Haynes wrote 3  The rising expectations of free and enslaved blacks in the Greater Caribbean   |
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that liberty was ‘an innate principle [...] unmovebly placed in the 
human Species’ and ‘Coaeval with Existence’. Depriving men of 
their liberty meant to counteract ‘the very Laws of nature’. ‘Lib-
erty’, Haynes added, ‘is Equally as pre[c]ious to a Black man, as to 
a white one, and Bondage Equally as intollerable to the one as it is 
to the other’, since, Haynes reasoned, ‘it Effects the Laws of nature 
Equally as much in one as it Does in the other’.3 Here was a vocabu-
lary akin to that of the Declaration of the Rights of Man. 
So far, I have avoided discussing reactions of enslaved Americans 
to the messages emanating from revolutionary France. Obviously, 
they were not immune to the principles of the Revolution. Nor did 
they live entirely in a world of their own, tied as they were in many 
ways to the free coloureds, who formed a significant section of the 
colonial populations and who often had reasons of their own to 
take part in ‘slave revolts’. In Saint-Domingue, the large revolt of 
1791 that started as a fight against slavery and became a struggle for 
independence was, as might be expected, influenced by the Decla-
ration of the Rights of Man. In Cap Français, the colony’s largest 
city, slaves demanded ‘the Rights of Man’ as soon as they heard the 
news about the start of the revolt in the neighbouring countryside.4 
The issue of slavery resurfaced in 1793, after conservative white 
forces had captured Cap Français. In their desperation, the two 
French commissioners, Sonthonax and Polverel, approached insur-
gent and town slaves with the offer that all blacks fighting for the 
French republic would be given their freedom and enjoy the rights 
of other French citizens. This bold step they took without consult-
ing the metropolis (Stein 1985:75; Fick 1990:159). In hindsight, this 
decision meant that the commissioners embarked on a course that 
was bound to result in general emancipation. Two months later, in 
August 1793, slaves as well as free men in Cap Français made known 
their wish for slavery to end. A petition signed by 842 free men 
3  Bogin 1983. Like Lemuel, various groups of black petitioners addressing Massachusetts 
authorities condemned slavery as incompatible with the rights of man: Davis 1989. 
4  ‘Le début’ 1993:774-6. In addition, according to a journal that appeared in the U.S. press, 
some  rural  slaves,  interrogated  about  the  meetings  they  had  attended  prior  to  the  revolt, 
answered that ‘they wanted to enjoy the liberty they are entitled to by the Rights of Man’ (Dubois 
2004:105). It is no longer possible to portray a letter, supposedly penned by Jean-François, 
Georges Biassou, and Gabriel Bellair to the Colonial Assembly and the French commissioners 
on the island, as having been inspired by the Declaration. In the letter, cited by Dubois 2004:141, 
the authors argue that the Declaration stated that ‘men are born free and equal in rights’ and 
that their ‘natural rights were liberty, property, security, and resistance to oppression’. Although, 
they went on, the French had sworn to follow the Declaration, officials had crossed the ocean to 
fight the insurgent slaves. The rebels then offered to lay down their arms if all slaves were freed 
and an amnesty was declared ‘for the past’. David Geggus (2006) has exposed the letter as fake, 
produced by counterrevolutionaries.|  Wim Klooster
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demanded that the rights of man be extended to the slaves, in the 
name of whom they spoke. The petitioners were accompanied by 
a crowd of 10,000 slaves to the house of Sonthonax, who told them 
he would yield to their demand. By the end of October, general 
liberty had been introduced throughout the colony.5 
White elites realized the power of the Rights of Man. A few days 
into a massive revolt of free people of colour on the tiny island of 
Grenada (1795), there was a festive atmosphere among the rebels. 
Men played fiddles in front of the prison door, and white prison-
ers noted the prominent part played by a black man who ‘from his 
hideous figure and ludicrous dress, we supposed personated their 
guillotine-man, or the avenger of the rights of man’ (Hay 1823:47). 
Nor did the Declaration’s impact in the colonies catch officials in 
France by surprise. They had warned from the beginning against 
keeping news about the French Revolution from the overseas prov-
inces. Slaves arriving in France from Saint-Domingue were sent 
back before they were able to hear about the revolution, and cap-
tains of ships leaving France in the opposite direction had to leave 
the letter bags behind. Especially the Declaration of the Rights of 
Man was seen as a dangerous document (Laborie 1789:4-5n; Obser-
vations 1789:11-2). 
a monarchist rumour
Outside Saint-Domingue, it is hard to detect the impact of the Dec-
laration of the Rights of Man, in part because it cannot easily be 
separated from the very influence of the Haitian Revolution. This is 
particularly true for the aftermath of the French abolition of slavery 
in February 1794. New World slave revolts in the 1790s were often 
blamed on French revolutionary concepts, but it would be too sim-
plistic to assume that the Declaration propelled slaves into action.6 
For all the influence that the enlightened notion of freedom had 
in slave societies, its impact was often invisible. Historian Manuel 
Barcia has argued that the overwhelming majority of slave revolts in 
Cuba during the Age of Revolution ‘were not induced or provoked 
by external factors. Rather, they grew out of personal experiences 
5  Stein 1985:79, 88-9; Journal des Révolutions de la partie française de St.-Domingue [Philadelphia], 
7-10-1793; Dubois 2004:162-5.
6  See for a critique: Aizpurua 1988:715. More generally, Eugene Genovese’s argument that 
the French Revolution and its egalitarian message inspired slaves everywhere to relinquish tradi-
tional modes of revolt and aim for an equal place in dominant society can no longer be consid-
ered valid: Genovese 1979:xix-xx.3  The rising expectations of free and enslaved blacks in the Greater Caribbean   |
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– cultural, military, religious, and so forth – rather than revolution-
ary ideas imported to Cuba from elsewhere’ (Barcia 2008:46). Simi-
larly, Michael Craton has written that the reasons for most slave 
revolts during this period ‘were essentially internal, intrinsic, and 
traditional’ (Craton 1982:272). 
However, denying any impact of European ideas and policies is 
not prudent either. Although numerous slaves may have had only 
mundane reasons to revolt, others consumed texts and ideas arriv-
ing from adjacent colonies or distant shores, which they appropri-
ated and adapted to their cultures, and in the process reshaping 
those  cultures.  Slave  cultures  were  often  monarchical.  Hidden 
forms of resistance were cloaked in royalist language, and fantasies 
about a better world involved the intervention of a good king. In 
order to grasp the impact of the notion of equality on enslaved 
Americans, we first have to understand their monarchist affinities. 
The monarchism of New World Africans was not solely African in 
orientation but extended to an affiliation with the imperial ruler in 
Europe. Brendan McConville has recently suggested that slave sub-
cultures in colonial British America drew on inspiration from the 
British king, a distant, but powerful ally (McConville 2006:175-9). 
This same phenomenon can be discerned in other empires. 
Africans in the Americas unmistakably derived inspiration from 
‘monarchist’ rumours. Rumours can serve an important function. 
In a classic study, two psychologists have argued that rumours ‘some-
times provide a broader interpretation of various puzzling features 
of the environment, and so play a prominent part in the intellec-
tual drive to render the surrounding world intelligible’ (Allport 
and Postman 1947:38). A historian of colonial India has added that 
‘rumour is both a universal and necessary carrier of insurgency in any 
pre-industrial, pre-literate society’ (Guha 1983:251). Any student of 
premodern or early modern revolts will therefore detect the work-
ings of rumours. In American slave revolts, one remarkably common 
element was the rumour that a European monarch had decreed 
slave emancipation, but that local authorities or slaveowners with-
held the freedom.7 The longevity of this type of rumour is striking. 
I have found evidence of this ‘monarchist’ rumour as early as 1669 
(Bermuda) and as late as 1848 (St. Croix) (Bernhard 1999:137-8; 
Holsoe 1996:164). The rumour was invoked particularly frequently 
in the period 1789-1832: David Geggus has counted over twenty 
actual or attempted slave revolts in these years, including the largest 
slave rebellions in the history of the New World (Geggus 1997:7-8). 
7  Such benevolence was not always attributed solely to a monarch. See, for instance, Viotti da 
Costa 1994:177-84. For a more in-depth discussion of this rumor, see Klooster 2011.|  Wim Klooster
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Such rumours could spread across imperial borders. This may 
have been the case with a revolt in 1790 in Tortola, one of the Brit-
ish Leeward Islands. The slave rebels, who argued that the white 
inhabitants  were  suppressing  an  act  of  Britain’s  government  to 
abolish slavery (Goveia 1965:95), were likely influenced by the ris-
ing expectations among people of colour in nearby French colo-
nies. What may also have carried weight was a rumour circulating 
in the Spanish colonies about Spain’s king. What prompted this 
rumour was a slave code with far-reaching implications issued by 
King Charles IV in 1789. It regulated the treatment slaves were to 
receive from their masters, stipulating that owners should exempt 
their slaves from before sunrise, past sunset or on Catholic holi-
days. They had to allow slaves to interrupt their work to spend two 
hours each day on their own provision grounds. Masters had to 
encourage their slaves to marry, and they were to take responsibil-
ity for old and sick slaves. Authorities in Havana and Caracas did 
everything they could to keep this slave code a secret, but to no 
avail (Scott 1986:153).
The news about the code had a powerful effect, and not so 
much because of its actual content. In Venezuela, the slave code 
may have resuscitated the ‘monarchist’ rumour that had been dor-
mant for decades that the king had issued a decree that implied 
immediate freedom for all slaves. The first recorded instance of this 
rumour occurred during a widespread slave revolt in the province 
of Caracas in 1749. One man, the sergeant of the free blacks, stated 
that another black from Cádiz, Spain, had told him that the bishop 
who was expected to arrive from Spain would bring the emanci-
pation decree with him. He would also be accompanied by four 
black crusaders on horseback. A slave who was later interrogated 
declared that ever since a former member of the municipal council 
had died, his spirit wandered around on a white horse – a clear 
reference to the Second Coming of Christ. The horse had brought 
him to Spain, from where he had returned with the liberty decree.8 
In May 1790, one year after the promulgation of the slave code, 
a manifesto authored by blacks appeared in the streets of Caracas, 
once again stressing the imagined royal decree favouring the slaves 
(García 1991:187-8). Six years later, the rumour of a royally-sanc-
tioned emancipation decree reared its head again, even though the 
slave code had been repealed two years before. An inquiry ordered 
by the province’s Captain-General yielded that slaves in the valleys 
of Caucagua, Capaya, and Curiepe believed that an edict had been 
8  García Chuecos 1950:71. See for other manifestations of this rumour in Venezuela in 1749: 
Castillo Lara 1983:280; Ramos Guédez 2001:459. 3  The rising expectations of free and enslaved blacks in the Greater Caribbean   |
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issued in those valleys in the previous years. The edict had suppos-
edly announced the king’s decree setting the slaves free (Castillo 
Lara 1981:281). The rumour may have hibernated in the years after 
1790 (or even 1749), but it may also have been introduced by way of 
Coro, where the famous uprising had occurred the previous year.
The  monarchist  rumour  did  indeed  surface  in  Coro,  even 
though the insurrection of May 1795 was not exclusively a slave 
revolt. Slaves were joined by free people of colour and tributary 
Indians,  who  had  tried  in  vain  to  address  their  own  grievances 
through legal channels in the previous years. The participation of 
these groups was reflected in the revolt’s stated aims, which also 
included the abolition of Indian tribute and exemption from pay-
ment of the hated sales tax (alcabala). Slaves, nonetheless, played 
an important role. The road to their revolt had been prepared by 
a healer without any formal occupation called Cocofío, who had 
roamed around the area for many years. Once news of Charles IV’s 
slave code made it to the area, Cocofío’s message that the slavehold-
ers had suppressed the royal emancipation decree found fertile 
ground. After Cocofío’s death in 1792 or 1793, his successor fur-
ther disseminated the belief in the thwarted decree, which eventu-
ally inspired at least one section of the rebelling slaves in 1795.9 All 
over the Greater Caribbean, reformism, abolitionism, and French 
revolutionary ideology contributed at best indirectly to slave upris-
ings. These factors seem to have confirmed time-honoured notions 
among enslaved populations of the legitimacy of black freedom, 
thereby increasing rebelliousness. 
What added another dimension to the turbulent Caribbean of 
the 1790s was the actual emancipation of all slaves in French-held 
colonies, as decreed by the French Convention on 4 February 1794, 
as well as the war afloat and ashore waged by France in the Carib-
bean.  The  war  leader  and  administrator  of  Guadeloupe,  Victor 
Hugues, targeted the British islands with the threat of liberating 
their enslaved populations if the French were to win, scaring plant-
ers everywhere, in the hope of rallying slaves to his side. In real-
ity, the French would not have ended slavery in the British islands, 
but  their  propaganda  was  effective  (Pérotin-Dumon  1988:293). 
Hugues’s campaign, begun in late 1794, seems to have had an effect 
on slave populations. It is no coincidence that perhaps no year saw 
more (attempted) slave revolts than 1795.10 The slaves who con-
spired at Pointe Coupée, Louisiana, in that year, debated the pos-
9  Testimony of Manuel de Carrera, Valle de Curimagua, 2-6-1795, in Documentos 1994:44-5. 
10  David Geggus lists conspiracies in four or five and revolts in five to seven colonies. See the 
appendix to his essay in this volume. |  Wim Klooster
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sibility of a French invasion, in which case they would side with the 
French for the sake of liberty (Hall 1992:369; Din 1997). Similarly, 
one account of the Coro revolt mentions the leaders’ envisaged col-
laboration with the French. Their plan was to conquer the entire 
area from Maracaibo to Puerto Cabello, for which French aid was 
said to be forthcoming. The rebels presumably maintained contact 
with the French by means of a shuttling vessel.11 While probably 
non-existent, the discussion of such contacts may have convinced 
some slaves to join the revolt.
the curaçao connection
It is not clear whether Curaçao’s insurgents contemplated collab-
orating with French forces in 1795, but the power of the French 
did impress them. Propaganda diffused by colonial Frenchmen on 
their island must have influenced them. Since late 1792, French 
refugees  from  Saint-Domingue  went  around  exaggerating  the 
success  of  French  armies  on  the  European  battlefields,  which 
prompted Governor De Veer to order those spreading unrest to 
be removed from the island.12 Hyperbole was no longer needed 
in 1795, when the French overran the Dutch Republic and set the 
stage for the establishment of the Batavian Republic. In his meet-
ing with Father Jacobus Schinck, rebel leader Tula connected his 
revolt to that invasion, reasoning that since French blacks had been 
emancipated and the Netherlands was now under French control, 
‘hence we too must be free’.13 
Curaçaoans of African birth or descent did not have to rely only 
on news arriving on foreign vessels or ships from the Dutch metrop-
olis to inform them about the revolt in Saint-Domingue. As sailors, 
many free coloureds had spent time in French colonial ports. Since 
the Seven Years’ War (1756-63), Curaçao had conducted a brisk 
trade with the French Antilles, supplying provisions and Venezu-
elan mules in exchange for cash crops. The links with the south-
ern parts of Saint-Domingue were especially close, in particular 
after the outbreak of an Anglo-French war in 1779, when French 
11  Testimony of Manuel de Carrera, in Documentos 1994:51.
12  Nationaal Archief, The Hague (NA), Raad van Koloniën 77, Journal of Governor De Veer. 
Curaçao was certainly not alone in introducing such a measure. In 1794, the authorities in Eng-
lish Antigua ordered as many French refugees as possible to be removed from the island and all 
blacks hailing from French colonies to be imprisoned. The next year, many whites and blacks 
from the French islands were expelled from St. Kitts (Goveia 1965:254).
13  Account of Father Jacobus Schinck, 7-9-1795, in Paula 1974:268.3  The rising expectations of free and enslaved blacks in the Greater Caribbean   |
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authorities invited foreign merchants to do business there. By the 
mid-1780s, sixty-eight vessels arrived annually in Willemstad from 
Saint-Domingue.14 Heavy traffic continued well after the outbreak 
of the Haitian Revolution. When a disappointing number of free 
coloureds reported for militia inspection on Curaçao on the first 
day of 1793, their captains explained the many absentees by ref-
erence to the trade with the French colonies, in which they were 
employed.15 
The trading partners of Curaçaoan merchants included free 
coloured residents of Saint-Domingue born in Curaçao – the small 
town of Aquin offers an interesting example (Garrigus 2006:75, 76, 
193, 217). Free Curaçaoans of colour were conspicuously mobile, 
sojourning and settling in a variety of foreign colonies. In 1803, a 
total of 156 Curaçao-born blacks and mulattoes lived on the Danish 
island of St. Thomas, representing the largest contingent of free 
coloureds not native to that island.16 A number of Afro-Curaçaoans 
are known to have taken part in seditious activities outside their 
native island. A few were part of the floating population of a run-
away logwood community in Santo Domingo in 1790, described by 
contemporaries as exclusively male and living ‘without God, law or 
King’ (Lienhard 2008:97-8). Five years later in Louisiana, the Pointe 
Coupée conspiracy featured a creole slave from Curaçao who went 
around telling the story that ‘they [the authorities] are awaiting at 
the Capital an Order of the King which declares all the slaves free 
[...]’.17 The investigation of another abortive slave revolt, prepared 
in the sugar-rich area of Trinidad, Cuba, in 1798, yielded that the 
ten-men leadership of a planned uprising included natives of Cura-
çao, Jamaica, and others described as Mandinga, Mina, and Canga 
slaves. The impending start of the revolt came to light after a slave 
called José María Curazao told his overseer about the events bound 
to transpire the following night (González-Ripoll et al. 2004:280).
Given the close commercial and personal ties linking the Dutch 
island and Coro – carefully analyzed by Linda Rupert in this vol-
14  Klooster  1998:96-7.  Garrigus  2006:52,  70,  172,  175,  183-4.  NA,  Nieuwe  West-Indische 
Compagnie [NWIC] 609, fol. 556, Governor Jean Rodier and Council to the WIC, Curaçao, 
14-3-1774. NA NWIC 612, C.A. Roelans and Michiel Römer to the WIC, Curaçao, 4-4-1783. NA 
NWIC 1174, daily registers, 1-7-1785 to 30-6-1786. In the year 1785-86, twenty-five vessels sailed 
from Martinique and seven from Guadeloupe. One firm maintaining close connections with 
Les Cayes and Jacmel was that of Pierre Brion, the father of the later revolutionary Luis Brion: 
Häberlein and Schmölz-Häberlein 1995:91, 102. 
15  NA, Raad van Koloniën 77, Journal of Governor De Veer. 
16  Three-quarters of them were freeborn and one-quarter had received their freedom in the 
course of their lifetime: Knight and de T. Prime 1999. 
17  This was, indeed, yet another version of the emancipation rumour. Hall 1992:352.|  Wim Klooster
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ume – it is no surprise that Afro-Curaçaoans also took part in the 
revolt that shook the Venezuelan town in 1795. The route to nearby 
Coro was not only crossed by numerous merchant vessels,18 but 
traversed informally by slaves stealing boats and rowing their way 
until they hit land.19 In the year 1774 alone, with Curaçao facing a 
severe food crisis, 140 slaves succeeded in escaping from the island 
to Coro. Five of them staged a great escape along with sixty-seven 
other slaves from the same plantation in an attempt to flee to Coro. 
When they departed in a large canoe, they were spotted and cap-
tured. Only those five eventually reached the Coro coast.20 
Provided  they  converted  to  Catholicism,  Curaçaoan  slaves 
received their freedom upon arrival – a prospect that had been 
a major incentive for slaves to turn maritime maroons through-
out the century (Rupert 2006:43-45; Rupert 2009). By the 1790s, 
as many as 400 former Curaçaoans lived in the southern part of 
the town of Coro. Not all refugees, however, settled here, scores 
of them surviving on their own in various parts of Coro’s moun-
tainous surroundings (the serranía) or moving to runaway commu-
nities (Castillo Lara 1981:61, 285). One such community, located 
near Coro, founded by Curaçaoans, and predominantly inhabited 
by males, was Santa María de la Chapa. Ramón Aizpurua has sug-
gested that a feud that tore this town apart in the early 1770s, with 
creole blacks pitted against natives of Africa, may have originated 
in Curaçao.21
Some Curaçaoan refugees were apparently lured by José Cari-
dad González, a long-time free resident of Coro and spouse of a 
slave. González had been born in the African kingdom of Loango, 
was shipped to Curaçao as a slave, but fled from the Dutch island 
to Coro in his youth. Since then, he was known to have traveled to 
Saint-Domingue (Documentos 1994:44-48; Rupert 2006:46-47). He 
was the man who took over from the recently deceased Cocofío, 
spreading the latter’s notion of a hidden emancipation decree, 
and even claiming he had seen the document with his own eyes 
– a claim that appeared truthful in the light of a voyage he had 
18  During a twelve-month period in 1785-86, the number was 117. NA, NWIC 1174, daily reg-
isters 1-7-1785 to 30-6-1786.
19  NA, NWIC 1166, fol. 124, list of runaways slaves, compiled in 1775. No actual slave trade 
between Curaçao and Coro has been recorded in the 1780s and 1790s, nor did any slave ship 
arrive from Africa after the 1770s. Nonetheless, although ignored by its historians, Curaçao 
remained a re-exporter of enslaved Africans to Tierra Firme in the late eighteenth century: Scott 
1986:78; Andrade González, 1995:52; Romero Jaramillo 1997:72. 
20  NA, NWIC 1166, fol. 17, Governor Jean Rodier to the WIC, Chamber of Amsterdam, 10-1-
1775. 
21  Aizpurua 2004:127-8. See also Acosta Saignes 1978:193, 196; Gil Rivas et al. 1996:71-5.3  The rising expectations of free and enslaved blacks in the Greater Caribbean   |
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undertaken to Spain. González also assured his Curaçaoan (or 
‘Luango’) followers22 that the French, with whom he pretended 
to maintain a regular correspondence, would offer the rebels pro-
tection. Whether he was actually a leader of the 1795 revolt as 
some historians have portrayed him is hard to establish. Nor is 
it possible to determine if his attempts to obtain the rank of cap-
tain in the battalion he had founded occupied him more than 
the ideas he professed (Aizpurua 1988:720-721; Jordán 1994:24). 
What is clear is that González bridged the divide between freedom 
and slavery, connected Coro with Curaçao and Saint-Domingue, 
spread a false emancipation rumour, and feigned close ties with 
the revolutionary French. He personifies the Greater Caribbean 
circa 1795: a closely connected, mutinous world, driven by a well-
oiled rumour mill. 
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Inter-colonial networks and revolutionary ferment  
in eighteenth-century Curaçao and Tierra Firme
Linda M. Rupert
Whether or not the slave uprisings that occurred within three months 
of each other in Curaçao and Coro in 1795 were part of a coherent 
conspiracy remains open to debate, and it may never be resolved with 
irrefutable evidence. There is no doubt, however, that the revolts were 
connected at a much deeper level: people of African descent were part 
of well-established communications and exchange circuits that had 
linked the two areas for over one hundred years. In fact, ties between 
Curaçao and Tierra Firme, most especially the area around Coro, had 
a much longer history, one which predated the Dutch and even the 
Spanish presence in the Caribbean, and which was integrally tied to the 
area’s geography.1 Throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centu-
ries, once the island and the nearby mainland became part of separate 
colonial spheres (the Dutch and the Spanish, respectively) denizens 
from across the socio-economic spectrum forged their own inter-colo-
nial networks, especially via contraband trade (Rupert 2006:35-54). 
The links that people of African descent developed between Curaçao 
and Tierra Firme were embedded in these wider trans-colonial con-
nections and went much deeper than any possible slave conspiracy.
overlapping jurisdictions
Markedly  different  degrees  and  styles  of  imperial  management 
shaped the character of the inter-colonial ties that developed between 
the two areas. For the Dutch in Curaçao, territorial hegemony was 
almost incidental to the development of empire. Control over this 
small Caribbean nodal point, with its strategic location and excellent 
deep-water harbour, was sufficient for opening the broader commer-
1  Haviser 1987:11, 51–4; 73–9, 140–9; Watlington 2003:31-2; Whitehead 1995: Introduction.|  Linda M. Rupert
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cial networks that were necessary to develop and sustain their vigor-
ous Caribbean and Atlantic trade.2 The small, arid island of Curaçao 
was tightly and continuously governed by the Amsterdam Chamber 
of the Dutch West India Company (WIC), which had a full complex 
at Fort Amsterdam, perched at the entrance to the capacious har-
bour on St. Anna Bay. The establishment of a regional trade centre 
at Curaçao was a logical extension of WIC activities throughout the 
Atlantic and Caribbean (Den Heijer 2003). Because Curaçao lacked 
the climate and soil for agricultural production, the compact port 
of Willemstad, adjacent to the fort, soon became the motor of the 
island economy. The WIC’s decision to open Curaçao to free trade 
in 1675, an unusual move for the times, stimulated the island’s role 
in inter-colonial commerce, most of it illicit from the point of view 
of other imperial powers. Even while the Dutch successfully main-
tained tight and continuous political jurisdiction over Curaçao their 
primary focus was the lucrative economic gain provided by much 
more extensive and amorphous inter-colonial trade circuits.
Spanish imperial control over Tierra Firme, in contrast, was both 
more tenuous and more concerned with territorial domination. Ini-
tially under the jurisdiction of the Viceroyalty of Santo Domingo, 
located on the island of Hispaniola hundreds of miles to the north, 
Tierra Firme was transferred to the newly-created Viceroyalty of New 
Granada in 1717 in an effort to improve contact with representatives 
of the Spanish Crown and also to discourage the growing contraband 
trade. However, effective overland communication within this vast and 
varied continental jurisdiction proved even more unreliable than the 
maritime connections with Hispaniola, and so throughout the eigh-
teenth century Tierra Firme repeatedly was transferred between the 
viceroyalties of Santo Domingo and New Granada (Briceño 1965:41-
51). Due to this fluctuating authority and to the difficult, unreliable 
communications with either colonial seat of power, governance of 
much of Tierra Firme was chaotic throughout the eighteenth century. 
Lines of colonial authority often were unclear over the sparsely inhab-
ited coast (Castillo 1981:113; Ferry 1989:114-7). Such administrative 
confusion, along with overall Spanish neglect of the region, spurred 
the development of a thriving contraband trade by a variety of people 
across the socio-economic spectrum. This included local authorities 
who often were uncertain about the precise imperial chain of com-
mand and their own authority and position in the hierarchy, but were 
2  For different perspectives on the relative roles of commercial maritime networks and territo-
rial control in the development of the Dutch imperial project see Schmidt 2009:163-87; Enthoven 
2003:17-47; Seed 1995:154-60. More generally, Lauren Benton has argued that territorial control 
often was an ‘incidental aim of imperial expansion’ in the age of European empires (Benton 2010:2).4  Inter-colonial networks and revolutionary ferment, Curaçao and Tierra Firme  |
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eager to placate their local constituents and to seize lucrative oppor-
tunities to improve their own lot. Thus, Spain’s inability to exercise 
territorial hegemony was also reflected in its lack of control over the 
region’s economy and commercial circuits.
Tierra Firme, easily accessible because of favourable winds and 
currents and just seventy kilometres away, was a particularly attrac-
tive market for Curaçaoan merchants. It was filled with eager trade 
partners who provided a variety of coveted commodities, especially 
cacao and tobacco, to be traded on the regional and Atlantic mar-
kets.3 Tierra Firme functioned de facto as the vast economic hinter-
land for Curaçao’s port of Willemstad. The area around Coro, at the 
base of the Paraguaná Peninsula, developed particularly close ties to 
the island.4 Trade with Tierra Firme made up fully half of Curaçao’s 
total shipping throughout the second half of the eighteenth century 
(Klooster 1998:175). By the mid-eighteenth century entire areas of 
Tierra Firme were much more closely tied to Curaçao than to Spain 
(Aizpurua 1993:293). Inhabitants of both areas depended on the 
inter-colonial trade for their livelihood. Smuggling became the eco-
nomic foundation of broader ties that developed between the two 
areas. It played out differently for the two European powers, rep-
resenting success for the Dutch in developing and controlling the 
lucrative commercial circuits that formed the basis of their domin-
ion, and failure for the Spanish in protecting both the territorial 
integrity and the mercantile exclusivity of their colonial possession.
If Tierra Firme functioned as Curaçao’s economic hinterland, 
the roles were somewhat reversed and more complicated in the reli-
gious realm. This, too, was not so much due to carefully devised 
imperial policies as to colonial realities. Colonialism often led to 
messy situations on the ground, ones which did not always fit into 
the neat categories devised by authorities in distant Europe. Reli-
gious jurisdiction cut across lines of political authority. Curaçao had 
been under the umbrella of the Roman Catholic Church in Tierra 
Firme during the 135 years that the Spanish ruled the island (1499-
1634). Even after the Dutch seized the island in 1634 the Roman 
Catholic Church considered Curaçao to remain under the control 
of Tierra Firme, an arrangement that was accepted at least tacitly 
by  the  Dutch  West  India  Company.  The  so-called  ‘ABC  islands’ 
(Aruba, Bonaire, and Curaçao) fell under the administration of 
3  The complexity and particularities of the contraband trade between Curaçao and Tierra 
Firme have been well documented. See especially Klooster 1998; Aizpurua 1993; Arauz 1984.
4  Socio-cultural, economic, religious, and political ties between Curaçao and Coro had deep 
historical roots, which also dated from pre-Colombian times and were strengthened during 
Spanish rule. For example, see Archivo General de Indias (hereafter AGI), Patronato 18 R3.  |  Linda M. Rupert
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the Bishopric of Coro until 1637 when, due to internal reorganiza-
tion within the Roman Catholic Church, they were transferred to 
the Bishopric of Caracas (Brada 1953). Curaçao’s Roman Catholic 
inhabitants retained close religious ties to Coro even after the trans-
fer. Although the Church did not officially authorize any priests to 
visit the island for over four decades after the Dutch takeover there 
were some reports of unofficial, semi-clandestine visits by itinerant 
priests.5 While apparently turning a blind eye to these occasional 
visits the Dutch made some effort to limit more formal clerical con-
tact and to exercise some level of at least nominal jurisdiction in the 
religious sphere. In 1661 the Dutch States General required that any 
Catholic priest who wished to settle on the island obtain a permit 
from the company (Brada 1956:40).6 This had the result of further 
encouraging the visits of itinerant priests, many of whom regularly 
arrived en route to and from other destinations around the Atlantic 
since Curaçao offered by far the most frequent, varied, and reliable 
transportation connections in the southern Caribbean.7
The Spanish formalized the role of visiting priests to the island 
in 1677, just two years after Curaçao became a free port. As part 
of an extensive pastoral letter encouraging evangelization on the 
island the Bishop of Caracas authorized any priests who arrived 
there to celebrate mass, perform sacraments, and generally attend 
to the spiritual needs of local Catholics, without needing prior or 
formal approval from the Church hierarchy (Felice 1982:394). This 
proved to be a highly effective way for the Roman Catholic Church 
to maintain an ongoing influence over Curaçao’s population (espe-
cially slaves) and to minister to their spiritual needs without engag-
ing in any political entanglements, and without having to obtain 
authorization of the Dutch States General or the WIC. Between 
1680 and 1707 over fifty Roman Catholic priests visited Curaçao; 
thereafter virtually all of the island’s denizens of African descent, 
enslaved  and  free,  were  baptized  Catholics  (Felice  1982:393-6). 
Throughout the eighteenth century a steady stream of priests from 
Spanish America continued to visit Curaçao, some secular, others 
members of religious orders (Lampe 2001b:108-9). Many were in 
transit; others stayed for extended periods of time.
In effect, the regular visit of Roman Catholic priests allowed the 
Spanish to have extensive influence over Curaçao’s inhabitants, 
especially the majority of African descent, by proxy, accomplish-
5  Gehring and Schiltkamp 1987:103; Gonzalez 1990:41; Felice 1982:391-2.
6  Apparently they reissued it in 1705, perhaps indicating that it largely had been ignored in 
the interim (Schunk 1990:129).
7  Felice 1982:393; Schunk 1990:129; Lampe 2001a:131. 4  Inter-colonial networks and revolutionary ferment, Curaçao and Tierra Firme  |
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ing one of the major expressed aims of the empire – the propaga-
tion of the Roman Catholic faith – in the colonial territory of a 
rival Protestant power.8 The Spanish thus maintained a degree of 
non-official religious control over Curaçao via the Roman Catholic 
Church, just as the Dutch had economic power over Tierra Firme 
via inter-colonial trade. Like smuggling, the regular visit of Roman 
Catholic  priests  to  Curaçao  provided  an  opportunity  for  inter-
colonial exchanges that directly engaged the needs and aspirations 
of colonial inhabitants. At the same time these inter-colonial net-
works allowed each power to exercise a certain degree of control 
in its preferred sphere of influence, well beyond the boundaries of 
official imperial demarcations. In the case of Curaçao and Tierra 
Firme, religious and economic spheres of influence did not cor-
respond neatly to political demarcations. Nor were they entirely 
separate; many priests were involved in smuggling.9
smuggling slaves
By the mid-eighteenth century illicit inter-colonial commerce had 
become the bedrock of a complex, multi-faceted exchange net-
work that bound Curaçao and Tierra Firme across the imperial 
divide. Smuggling not only dominated economic ties between the 
two areas, it also shaped socio-cultural interactions and even the 
emerging contours of the colonial legal system in Tierra Firme. 
People of African descent, enslaved and free, played a central role 
in these inter-colonial trade networks. Enslaved Africans were an 
important  early  commodity  that  was  shipped  from  Curaçao  to 
Tierra Firme through the contraband trade and often opened the 
way for other forms of smuggling. Alongside the official trade that 
took place via the asiento de negros in the last quarter of the seven-
teenth century Curaçao also developed a thriving clandestine com-
merce in human cargo (Postma 1990:29-36). In years when supply 
from Africa greatly outstripped the abilities of the official trade 
channels to distribute the chattel legally, this illegal commerce was 
an important safety valve for the entire system, allowing it, in prac-
tice, to operate along the lines of a free market. It was clear to the 
Spanish Crown, and to everyone else involved, that the asiento often 
8  The degree to which the Dutch cared about Christianization of their colonial subjects has 
been the subject of historiographic debate (Oostindie 1996).
9  Schabel, ‘Dagboek’ (Nationaal Archief Nederlandse Antillen, Willemstad, Curaçao); Geh-
ring and Schiltkamp 1987:103; Felice 1982:392 fn 9; Gonzalez 1990:36, 41; Schunk 1997:96, 100. |  Linda M. Rupert
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was used as a front for a far more extensive, more lucrative trade in 
a wide variety of contraband goods to Spain’s neglected American 
colonies. For example, the license that the Spanish Crown issued 
to Juan Barroso del Pozo in February 1680 noted how the Dutch 
‘furtively introduce’ a variety of products, including ‘clothing, fruit, 
and, merchandize, which results in grave damages’, and it specifi-
cally prohibited the introduction of any such goods alongside the 
human commodities.10 This prohibition blatantly was ignored. The 
clandestine trade also opened multiple opportunities for cultural 
and economic exchanges between Curaçao and Tierra Firme.
The contraband trade in slaves to Tierra Firme raised difficult 
issues for the Spanish Crown, which was acutely aware of the labour 
shortage on the isolated mainland coast, but loathe to sanction 
smuggling to its colonies in any form, and especially leery of the 
developing  relationship  between  Curaçao  and  Tierra  Firme.  By 
the end of the seventeenth century the illicit import of enslaved 
Africans to the Spanish mainland was so prevalent that it caused 
the Crown a legal headache: what to do with the existence of large 
numbers of enslaved workers whose labour was vitally needed in 
the under-populated areas, but whose very presence testified to 
the  brazenly  successful  and  highly  illegal  trade  that  inhabitants 
conducted  with  the  nearby  Dutch  island?  Perhaps  surprisingly, 
the Crown’s solution was to offer freedom to these slaves. Between 
1685 and 1705 the Spanish Crown issued three strongly worded 
Royal Decrees aimed at addressing the problem of these so-called 
‘blacks of bad entry’ (negros de mala entrada), threatening to grant 
freedom to any slave on the mainland whose owner did not have 
a legitimate bill of purchase via the asiento.11 In 1685 the Crown 
granted freedom to all slaves in Tierra Firme whose owners could 
not produce such a document, and further required the owner to 
pay the asiento for the full value of the slave. In early 1689 the Gov-
ernor of Mérida petitioned the Crown to allow local slaveholders to 
keep without reprisals the many bondsmen they had illegally pur-
chased via Curaçao, citing the ease with which foreigners trafficked 
on the vast, open coast. But the king held fast. In 1690 the Crown 
issued  another  decree,  specifically  mentioning  the  widespread 
fraud committed by the Coymans asiento, based on Curaçao, which, 
it claimed, had ‘introduced over 400 heads of bad entry, of which 
no more than sixteen have been captured’.12 In 1692, in specific 
10  ‘Licencia para comprar esclavos negros en Curazao’ 10-02-1680 in Marley 1985: Docu-
ment II: no pagination. 
11  Marley 1985: Documents III and V: no pagination.
12  Real cédula 30-01-1690 in Marley 1985: Document V: no pagination.4  Inter-colonial networks and revolutionary ferment, Curaçao and Tierra Firme  |
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response to the governor’s petition, Charles once again ordered 
all such slaves to be freed, citing the full text of the previous Royal 
Decrees of 1685 and 1690.13 A Royal Decree issued in 1705 again 
echoed the Crown’s earlier concern, fined owners in Tierra Firme 
two hundred pesos for each illicitly obtained slave, and granted 
freedom to the slaves.14
It  is  unclear  to  what  extent  these  decrees  or  the  fines  were 
enforced, and how many enslaved Africans, if any, actually obtained 
their  freedom  in  this  way.  The  very  fact  that  four  such  similar 
decrees were issued in twenty years is powerful evidence not only of 
the trade itself, but of the Crown’s ineffectiveness in combating it. 
Similarly, the failure of these and other official efforts to curb the 
clandestine trade indicates its appeal not only for Curaçaoan trad-
ers but also many different denizens of Tierra Firme. The Spanish 
Crown knew that the illicit slave trade was used as a cover for the 
broader contraband trade in other commodities. Colonial officials 
in Tierra Firme, for their part, were aware of smuggling’s impor-
tance for the local economy. No doubt they felt conflicting loyal-
ties. The Crown appears to have valued its protectionist policies 
above the rights of slave holders to own chattel, which had been 
obtained outside of approved distribution networks.15 The smug-
gled slaves entered Tierra Firme as valuable contraband commodi-
ties and, once they were there, often continued to participate in 
illicit inter-colonial commerce as both labourers and traders.
While some slaves were being smuggled from Curaçao to Tierra 
Firme to continue in bondage, others smuggled themselves along 
the same route in pursuit of freedom. The documented number of 
runaways who escaped from the island to the mainland rose dra-
matically in the last quarter of the seventeenth century, spurred by 
the expansion and consolidation of illicit inter-colonial commer-
cial networks (including, perhaps ironically, the slave trade). The 
dozens of small sea-craft that sailed regularly between the two areas 
provided ample opportunity for enslaved Afro-Curaçaoans to flee. 
Coro was a particularly favourite destination for Afro-Curaçaoans 
who sought to escape enslavement, just as it was a magnet for illicit 
inter-colonial commerce. This was not a coincidence. Like trad-
ers, fugitives took advantage of the favourable geography: ocean 
currents and trade winds moved towards the southwest, pushing 
13  ‘Bando sobre negros “de mala entrada”’ 24-03-1692 in Marley 1985: Document V: no pagi-
nation.
14  Real cédula 25-10-1705 in Troconis 1969:240-3.
15  The opinions of the slaves in question are not recorded, although one can assume that they 
would have welcomed opportunities to obtain freedom.|  Linda M. Rupert
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vessels that departed from Curaçao’s shores directly to the base 
of the Paraguaná Peninsula. As a smuggling centre already estab-
lished by the 1650s, frequented by small-scale merchants and sea-
farers, Coro offered ample opportunities for runaways to work in 
the contraband trade and to become part of local networks (Geh-
ring and Schiltkamp 1987:104; Aizpurua 2001:69-102). Authorities 
in Coro apprehended at least forty-four runaway slaves from the 
island between 1690 and 1702.16 By 1704 there were so many fugi-
tive Afro-Curaçaoans living in the area around Coro that the local 
government considered rounding them up and centralizing them 
in a special, newly-created town (Gonzalez 1987:120-1). 
It  was  in  this  context  of  rampant  smuggling  of  people  and 
goods, and continued marronage from Curaçao, that the Spanish 
Crown issued two reales cédulas in 1704 and 1711, which offered free-
dom and land to enslaved Afro-Curaçaoans who arrived in Tierra 
Firme.17 The process was not automatic; new arrivals had to petition 
in colonial courts separately for freedom and land, and they had 
to provide documents and often testimony of third parties proving 
that they had converted to Catholicism and had been baptized after 
arriving in Spanish territory.18 The conversion requirement was a 
bit of a ruse since Spanish authorities at every level had ample evi-
dence that virtually the island’s entire enslaved population already 
was Roman Catholic. After all, they had been overseeing evange-
lization efforts there for decades.19 Here again, people of African 
descent had a major impact on the development of Spanish colo-
nial legal frameworks.
These Royal Decrees provided one way for Spain to populate 
Tierra Firme with potentially loyal subjects. Slaves from Curaçao 
would metamorphose from being lucrative commodities in a trade 
that challenged Spanish imperial interests – or fugitives who were 
slated to live furtively on the margins of society – into devoted sub-
jects of the Crown, who, presumably, were grateful for the oppor-
tunities for their new lives as fully vested citizens. Similarly, in this 
view, the Curaçaoan merchants who participated in contraband 
16  Archivo General de la Nación Caracas, Venezuela (AGN) Diversos (D) I folio 408–14; Cas-
tillo 1981:343, 345–6. 
17  AGN Reales Cédulas (RC) Sección 1a Vol X; Torres 1997:49–55; Castillo 1981:350, 600; 
Ferry 1989:110–3. For discussion of the wider context of these decrees see Rupert 2009:362-7.
18  For example, see Archivo de la Academia National de la Historia (AANH) Sección Civiles, 
Esclavos (SC-E) T 1742 CGPRSUZ Exp. #9.
19  The wording of the decrees, including the provision for conversion, is virtually identical to 
that of other such reales cédulas that were issued for other parts of the circum-Caribbean, indi-
cating that the provision may have been a standard one that did not account for the particular 
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trade, most of whom were slave-owners, would now be seen as ene-
mies bent on re-enslaving their former chattel rather than as attrac-
tive trade partners. Attracting fugitive slaves also drained labour 
from rival European powers. In practice, the fugitives were quite 
capable of using the system to their own ends. Like so many others 
who were affiliated with illicit inter-colonial trade they seemed per-
fectly content to maintain dual loyalties, nominally professing their 
new allegiance to the Crown while keenly looking out for their own 
interests.
In the decades after these decrees were issued, marronage from 
Curaçao  to  Tierra  Firme  skyrocketed,  spurred  by  the  close  ties 
between the areas created by contraband trade, as well as by the 
framework that the reales cédulas provided.20 Coro was a particularly 
popular destination due to its proximity and accessibility, but records 
indicate that enslaved Curaçaoans travelled to a variety of different 
destinations along hundreds of miles of Tierra Firme’s Caribbean 
littoral. The coast of Barlovento, especially the area around Curi-
epe, was another attractive destination.21 Runaway slaves put into 
place a sophisticated trans-colonial network to navigate the process 
of emigrating from slavery on the small Dutch island to freedom 
in Spanish America. Some slaves left the island openly by forging 
documents or posing as freemen and women; others surreptitiously 
stowed away on sea-craft (Klooster 1998:68–9). Many seafarers sim-
ply jumped ship once they reached a mainland port.
After finding sympathetic ship captains and crew members in 
Willemstad and safely crossing the waters to Tierra Firme without 
being captured, the new arrivals faced a variety of tasks in their new 
homeland. They had to identify, arrive at, and settle into mainland 
communities that would welcome (or at least not be hostile to) 
them; learn a new language and culture; negotiate the complexi-
ties of an unfamiliar legal system; and find the necessary support 
system in Tierra Firme – including lawyers to argue their cases, wit-
nesses to testify on their behalf in court, and priests to baptize them 
(Castillo 1981:603).22 We do not know how many fugitives pursued 
their cases in Venezuelan courts or what percentage of those who 
did successfully obtained their legal freedom. Many who sought 
20  For a detailed list of 585 slaves who fled from Curaçao to Tierra Firme between 1729 and 
1775  see  Nationaal  Archief  Nederland  (NAN)  Nieuwe  West  Indische  Compagnie  (NWIC) 
1166:124 (07-08-1775).
21  See, for example, among others, AGN, Archivo del Registro del Distrito Federal, Tierras 
1767-M #1; NAN Oud Archief Curaçao (OAC) 1548:60 (14-01-1739); AGI Santo Domingo (SD) 
782, 1732–33; AGN D VXIII #10, 1736.
22  For a detailed description of the process and mechanisms of marronage, see Gonzalez 
1987:127–130 (01-02-1752).|  Linda M. Rupert
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freedom across the imperial divide never bothered to legalize their 
status.23 Many maintained close ties with Curaçao and participated 
actively in smuggling even after they moved to Tierra Firme. Span-
ish intentions notwithstanding, the fugitives seem to have had no 
compunction about trading with Curaçaoan merchants and engag-
ing in contraband.24
Dozens of cases in the archives attest to the tenacity and cre-
ativity  of  those  who  litigated  to  obtain  their  freedom,  and  the 
many locals who assisted them in their endeavours. Successful suits 
required someone who was well versed in the relevant Spanish legal 
codes, strategies, and precedents. Many cases show a clear under-
standing of the subtleties required to game the system, with fugi-
tives and their advocates employing a range of tactics to win the 
ultimate prizes of manumission and land. For example, three men 
who arrived in Coro from Curaçao in 1740 took six years of legal 
manoeuvring to gain their freedom, and they changed their story 
several times along the way to enhance their case. After initially tes-
tifying that they already were Catholic and remaining in jail for sev-
eral years, all three subsequently claimed that they had come to the 
mainland to escape from ‘heretical owners’ and that they sought 
‘the sacred waters of baptism’, to be accepted into ‘the one true 
faith’.25 They then enlisted a local priest to (re)baptize them, and 
soon thereafter won their freedom, both from jail and from slavery.
An elaborate dance played out within the Spanish colonial legal 
system, one which often involved years of complicated proceedings 
and multiple court cases, in which colonial authorities, fugitives, 
court personnel, Roman Catholic clergy, and witnesses duly cer-
tified the conversions and baptisms of people who already were 
Catholic. A host of other middle sectors, including lawyers, scribes, 
and clerks, as well as general character witnesses drawn from the 
wider  community,  were  also  involved  in  the  fugitives’  quest  for 
legal  freedom.26  In  some  cases  freedom  was  granted  and  then 
revoked multiple times, sometimes on a technicality, other times 
on more substantive issues. Such cases could drag on for years, 
or even decades.27 The voluminous paperwork left by these cases 
23  For example, NAN OAC 318, Jean Rodier et al. (14-04-1766).
24  See, for example, AGN D VXIII #10 (1736).
25  Archivo Histórico Nacional, Madrid, Spain (ANH) Vol. 1740 G #283 Arch. 1. Similar word-
ing appears in many such cases.
26  See the following in Gonzalez 1987:122–3, 125–6, 132; Torres 1997: ‘Autos seguidos por 
María Francisca de Nieto’, July 1738–Oct. 1743 (1743-BSWS, Exp. 3:85); ‘Autos formados por 
Juan Joseph’, Jan.-July 1753 (1753-JP, Exp. 1:92).
27  See, for example, AANH Archivo del Registro del Distrito Federal, Cajas Negras (ARDF-
CN) 1787-A1.4  Inter-colonial networks and revolutionary ferment, Curaçao and Tierra Firme  |
85
often involved suits and counter-suits, testimony for and against 
the fugitive by a cross section of the local population, and a variety 
of sophisticated legal manoeuvres and arguments. Fugitives mar-
shalled extensive local resources to bolster their claims, as did those 
who fought them in court.
inter-colonial connections
Upon arriving in Tierra Firme many Afro-Curaçaoans established 
links  with  existing  communities  of  Afro-Venezuelans,  including 
rural maroon settlements, groups of urban freemen and women, 
and enslaved agricultural labourers, many of whom were involved 
in smuggling.28 These relations were complex and multi-faceted. 
Venezuelan archives are filled with legal proceedings that pitted 
Afro-Curaçaoans and locally-born blacks against each other.29 Afro-
Venezuelans were often hostile to the special privileges that the 
runaways from Curaçao received, especially their access to manu-
mission and land through conversion, options which were closed 
to them. Local slaves sometimes testified that an immigrant’s con-
version was bogus, an accusation that probably was true more times 
than not, but was frequently ignored by the courts. On occasion 
fugitive Curaçaoans and locally-born blacks fought intensely over 
property rights.30 Sometimes local slaves could receive their free-
dom by denouncing smugglers; fugitive Afro-Curaçaoans were an 
easy target.31
The number of fugitive slaves from Curaçao had a major social, 
cultural, and economic impact on entire areas of Tierra Firme. 
Curaçaoans made up at least thirty per cent of the original inhabit-
ants of Curiepe, a town of free blacks that mainland authorities had 
established on the north-eastern coast as a buffer against enemy 
attack  in  1721,  and  where  dozens  of  fugitive  Afro-Curaçaoans 
acquired land and planted small cacao groves in the early to mid-
eighteenth century (Castillo 1981:375-83). The thriving neighbour-
hood of Guinea, located on the southern outskirts of the town of 
Coro, was a magnet for fugitive slaves from Curaçao, and the only 
part of the town that saw steady demographic increase in the eigh-
28  NAN OAC 806: #622–624 (22-06-1737); Castillo 1981:342, 381; Gonzalez 1987:124.
29  For example, ‘Capitan Juan Marcos Marin, Moreno Libre Contra Jose Miguel de Soto, 
Moreno Libre’: Castillo 1981:312–5.
30  Castillo1981:376–7 and Chapter XVIII.
31  AGN D XLII #12.|  Linda M. Rupert
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teenth century (Gonzalez 1990:96). Curaçaoans were such a large 
percentage of Coro’s black population that some Venezuelan his-
torians consider them to have made a significant contribution to 
the area’s ethnic composition (Gonzalez 1987:23). By the end of 
the eighteenth century over 400 Afro-Curaçaoans had settled in the 
hills around Coro.32 Many of them lived in Santa María de la Chapa, 
a  maroon  community  that  was  established  in  the  surrounding 
mountains at mid-century (Gonzalez 1990:50, 52). The last names 
of many residents were some variation of the name Curaçao.33 Place 
names are also revealing; church records identified the town as Sta. 
María de los Negros de Curazao – ‘Santa María of the blacks of 
Curaçao’ (Gonzalez 1990:5).
Many fugitives and their descendants became small-scale inde-
pendent farmers, producing crops such as cacao for the thriving 
contraband trade. Many retained close ties to Curaçao.34 Some were 
enlisted  to  help  Spanish  colonial  authorities  defend  the  isolated 
coast from the incursions of rival European powers and individual 
freebooters,  either  by  being  conscripted  into  free  black  militias, 
or by becoming founding members of new towns of free blacks, 
or both. In 1745 Curiepe’s free blacks were commissioned to fight 
against smugglers in spite of – or perhaps because of – the town’s 
close ties to the island.35 But the very circuits that brought freedom to 
some people of African descent were also used to snatch it from oth-
ers (González 1987:81-82, 126). The number and influence of the 
enslaved Curaçaoan runaways deeply concerned colonial authorities 
in Tierra Firme, occasionally provoking serious diplomatic tensions, 
and generating an extensive paper trail of official efforts to return 
to Curaçao those fugitives who had not legalized their status, and 
counter-efforts to prevent this, in cases that could drag on for years.36 
If a Curaçaoan owner petitioned in a mainland court for the return 
of a fugitive before the slave had legally filed for freedom, Spanish 
colonial authorities would proceed with the extradition. For people 
of African descent, then, the trans-colonial exchange circuit could 
be an extension of enslavement as well as a path to freedom.
32  AGN D XVIII: 1773 #4; AGN D XLI: 1771: #3, #6; Castillo 1981:605. 
33  For example, Francisco Curasao is co-petitioner on documents dealing with the loss of 
a sloop in Coro, 3-12-02-1730 (Gonzalez 1987:123); three men with the last name Curazao 
appear on the list of people implicated in the 1795 slave uprising in Coro, Rafael Diego Mérida 
report, 25-06-1795 (Troconis 1969:311); there are sixteen people with the last name Curazao or 
Curazado in the onomastic index of Castillo 1981.
34  NAN OAC 1548:60 (14-01-1739); AGI Santo Domingo (SD) 782 (1732–3).
35  Castillo 1981:508. For the role of Curiepe’s inhabitants in contraband trade: AGN D VXIII 
#10, 1736.
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Religious ties between Curaçao and Tierra Firme strengthened 
throughout  the  eighteenth  century,  spurred  by  the  sustained, 
direct contact between the majority populations of African descent, 
as well as by the institutional framework of the Roman Catholic 
Church. Catholic clergy who spent time on the island maintained 
communication  with  supervisors,  fellow  clergy,  and  parishes  in 
Tierra Firme, as well as with their respective hierarchies and with 
clerical networks fanning across the Americas and beyond. These 
connections  were  sanctioned  fully  by  Spanish  authorities,  and 
they were at least tolerated by WIC officials. Priests developed and 
maintained an important network between the two areas; their 
high degree of mobility allowed them to parlay religious links into 
economic and socio-cultural contact. Roman Catholic clergy, who 
were allowed to travel relatively freely across the imperial divide 
and enjoyed widespread respect among large sectors of the pop-
ulation on both sides, were particularly well-positioned to make 
contacts and engage in illicit commerce, as well as to promote 
socio-cultural and religious contact.37 The inherently transatlan-
tic, inter-imperial character of Catholic clerical networks, includ-
ing the fact that many felt their primary alliance to the Holy See 
in Rome and/or to their respective religious orders rather than 
to secular authorities in Madrid or Caracas, facilitated economic 
exchanges outside official circuits. Within this framework people 
of African descent developed their own trans-colonial religious 
networks. In the 1760s and ’70s, for example, several religious 
brotherhoods (cofradías) in Coro had direct ties to similar societies 
in Curaçao, and some even had members who lived on the island. 
The Cofradía del Carmen in Coro sent a delegation to the island, 
which remained there for six months (Gonzalez 1990:38). At least 
some members of the brotherhood in Coro likely were fugitives 
from Curaçao and their descendants.
Beginning in the 1760s, religious and secular authorities in 
the Dutch and Spanish realms engaged in a decade-long power 
struggle to control the Roman Catholic Church structure on the 
island and thus manage the religious life of the black Catholic 
majority (Felice 1982:405-11). Spanish authorities formally peti-
tioned the WIC to allow the Bishop of Caracas to appoint priests 
to the island, or at least to require that the island governor not 
accept  any  priest  who  had  not  first  presented  his  credentials 
to the Bishop of Caracas. Although this had been the de facto 
modus operandi for decades it was an extraordinary request to 
make officially, considering that the Dutch had held undisputed 
37  Gonzalez 1987:63, 78; 1990:36; Goslinga 1985:259; Arauz 1984:100, 135-9.|  Linda M. Rupert
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sovereignty over the island since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. 
Not surprisingly, company officials demurred, and they further 
insisted that thereafter only Dutch priests be sent to the island. 
The  Spanish  Council  of  the  Indies  countered  that  the  Bishop 
of Caracas retained the exclusive right to designate priests for 
Curaçao, citing both the extensive historical precedent and, per-
haps rather oddly, selected passages in the treaties of Westpha-
lia and Utrecht that guaranteed the free practice of religion to 
denizens of colonial areas that changed imperial domain (Felice 
1982:410).38 Continued diplomatic wrangling produced an exten-
sive paper trail but no clear diplomatic resolution. In 1773 Bishop 
Martí brazenly proclaimed that ‘the islands of Curazao, Aruba 
and Bonayre belong to this parish of Coro and to the Bishopric of 
Caracas’ (Gonzalez 1990:39). Three years later a group of eight 
Dutch Franciscans arrived to take charge of the Roman Catho-
lic Church on the island, which their order controlled continu-
ously until 1820 (Felice 1982:410; Lampe 2001a:131). Individual 
Roman Catholic priests regularly continued to visit from Tierra 
Firme, however.
contraband and collusion
As the century progressed, increased repression of contraband trade 
shaped patterns of popular resistance in Tierra Firme. The forma-
tion of the Real Compañía Guipuzcoana de Caracas (or Caracas 
Company) in 1728 was a catalyst for resistance. This Basque-owned 
company was one of Spain’s most ambitious and comprehensive 
attempts to limit illicit trade and channel its wealth directly to the 
royal treasury.39 The Caracas Company established a coast guard 
that was authorized to intercept and repress suspected smugglers 
and confiscate their vessels along hundreds of miles of the Carib-
bean littoral.40 This met with immediate resistance from the many 
different people who were involved in illicit inter-colonial trade. 
There were at least six major rebellions in cacao-producing areas 
during the fifty-six years of the company’s existence.41 These distur-
bances provide clear evidence of the close relations that developed 
38  The cited passages in the treaties dealt with allowing freedom of religion among colonial 
inhabitants rather than with establishing religious jurisdiction or chain of command.
39  Hussey 1934; Aresti 1963; Vivas 1998.
40  NAN NWIC 1154:62 (07-09-1726); NAN NWIC 1154:67 (12-03-1727); NAN NWIC 1154:74 
(01-09-1727).
41  Felice 1977:39-92; Brito 1985:209-36, 1961; Morales 1955; Ferry 1989: Chapter 5.4  Inter-colonial networks and revolutionary ferment, Curaçao and Tierra Firme  |
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between the different participants in the contraband trade. Smug-
gling  sometimes  proved  to  be  a  unifying  force,  trumping  race, 
ethnicity, social class, and colonial affiliation. Smugglers often par-
layed their inter-colonial contact into collusion against those who 
would limit the trade.
The first of the revolts broke out in 1730, soon after the Caracas 
Company began patrolling the Caribbean coast of Tierra Firme. It 
was led by Andrés López del Rosario, alias Andresote, a mixed-race 
Venezuelan of African and indigenous descent who had close ties to 
the trade with Curaçao.42 This uprising of slaves, free blacks, mulat-
tos, and native people was directed against the Caracas Company 
and the colonial authorities who were trying to curtail smuggling. 
It had the full support of local whites, including elite landholders. 
At its height participants took over several towns and blockaded 
roads in the Yaracuy Valley, a major contraband area and site of 
the thriving smuggling settlement of Tucacas. Most of the Yaracuy 
Valley’s inhabitants, including local officials, enslaved plantation 
workers, indigenous people, and maroons, as well as white farmers, 
rightly felt that their entire livelihood was jeopardized by the Cara-
cas Company’s crackdown on smuggling. Curaçaoan traders, who 
also felt threatened by the Caracas Company’s activities, provided 
critical support to the rebels, trading arms and alcohol to them in 
exchange for cacao (Brito 1985:209). When officials sent in several 
thousand troops to intensify repression of the uprising, Curaçaoan 
smugglers whisked the rebel leader Andresote off to the nearby 
island where he remained at least until 1739.43 In the subsequent 
trials several residents of Tierra Firme testified that they had taken 
Andresote to Curaçao several times to purchase goods prior to the 
revolt.44
The uprisings in Tierra Firme were also connected to deeper 
currents that swept through the Atlantic world during the second 
half of the eighteenth century. As early as the 1740s, stories began 
to circulate among Tierra Firme’s blacks that the Spanish Crown 
had issued an order to free all slaves throughout the empire, but 
42  The Venezuelan historiography is divided on Andresote’s status. Brito claims he was born 
a slave but had joined maroon communities years before the uprising; others say he was free, 
either by birth or manumission. His status at birth would have depended on that of his mother. 
Brito 1985:209, 1961:47-9; Felice 1952; 1977:33-8; Hussey 1934:66-9.
43  NAN OAC 1548:60 (14-01-1739); AGI Santo Domingo 782, ‘Rebelión del zambo Andrés 
Bota’ (1732-33). 
44  The trial transcripts are in AGI Santo Domingo 270, 781, 782. Also see Troconis 1969:246-
50.  One  must  read  such  testimonies  with  a  healthy  dose  of  scepticism,  however,  since  the 
witnesses would have had little to lose by fabricating or exaggerating such ties, and stood to 
improve their own situation if they fed authorities the information the latter hoped to hear.|  Linda M. Rupert
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that local authorities were refusing to comply (Felice 1977:72). 
Given  the  Crown’s  history  of  issuing  several  reales  cédulas  that 
granted freedom to fugitive slaves from Curaçao (and elsewhere) 
and to slaves who were smuggled into Tierra Firme, a more gen-
eral emancipation was not outside the realm of imagined possi-
bilities. These rumours intensified later in the century.45 Between 
the  1770s  and  1790s  an  enslaved  healer  named  Cocofío  often 
absented himself from his master, travelling around the mainland 
countryside insistently proclaiming that a Spanish Royal Decree 
had freed the slaves but was being suppressed by local authori-
ties. After Cocofío’s death the rumours persisted, allegedly fanned 
by fugitive slaves from Curaçao, who brought more reliable news 
from the port of Willemstad of the French and Haitian revolutions, 
including repeated reports from black seafarers that slaves had 
been freed elsewhere in the Caribbean (Brito 1961:219).46 This 
social unrest was intensified by a changing economic situation. By 
the end of the eighteenth century it became increasingly difficult 
for people of African descent, including fugitives from Curaçao, to 
obtain land in Tierra Firme. In response to the exploding Atlantic 
market for chocolate, Tierra Firme’s lucrative cacao plantations 
were increasingly concentrated into larger holdings that were held 
by fewer families and worked by larger numbers of slaves (Brito 
1961:60, 63).
By the last decades of the century the geopolitical usefulness 
of fugitive slaves in Tierra Firme was also shifting. Increasingly the 
Spanish Crown and local authorities saw them as a threat rather 
than as a needed infusion of labour. In 1771 the commander of 
the Caracas battalion warned of ‘the suspicion and fear which is 
being caused by the continued flight of black slaves from Curaçao’ 
(Gonzalez 1990:52). In 1789 Spain allowed free trade in enslaved 
Africans to some of its American colonies, including Venezuela.47 
This eliminated, at least in theory, the need both for the asiento 
and for the parallel contraband trade in slaves (although it is not 
entirely clear how this played out, especially in the short term, and 
whether, in fact, it immediately led to the cessation of the illicit 
trade in enslaved labour). Spain’s offer of freedom to enslaved 
fugitives from rival Protestant powers had outlived its usefulness. 
45  For more about the role of these rumours see Klooster’s article is this volume.
46  For analysis of the role of maritime communications networks in the Caribbean during the 
Haitian Revolution see Scott 1986.
47  ‘Real Cédula de su Magestad Concediendo Libertad para el Comercio de Negros con las 
Islas de Cuba, Santo Domingo, Puerto Rico, y Provincia de Caracas’, 28-02-1789 (reproduced in 
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In 1790 Venezuelan authorities denounced slaves born in Cura-
çao as ‘detrimental to these provinces’, articulating a sharp break 
with previous policies that had welcomed them over eight decades 
(Acosta 1961:39).
By  the  early  1790s,  increasingly  concerned  about  the  wide-
spread travels of people of African descent around the Caribbean 
and the potential impact of news of the developing French and 
Haitian revolutions, the Spanish Crown rescinded all the Royal 
Decrees  that  had  granted  freedom  to  runaway  slaves  through-
out the Americas. The new law applicable to the Dutch sphere, 
promulgated  in  1791,  specifically  noted  the  close  relationship 
between marronage and contraband trade in the area between 
Curaçao and Coro (Torres 1997:50). That same year Spain and 
the Dutch Republic also signed an agreement for ‘the reciprocal 
restitution of fugitives’ (De Granda 1973:6-7). Foreign fugitives 
were now seen as a threat to Spanish colonial interests rather than 
as useful geopolitical pawns or as a way to increase the number of 
loyal subjects.
It is in this context of well-established, overlapping inter-colonial 
networks – networks in which people of African descent played a   
central role – that one must situate the slave uprisings that occurred 
in Curaçao and Coro in the summer of 1795, just three months 
apart. In May 1795 Venezuela’s largest slave revolt of the colonial 
era broke out in the hills around Coro, an area that was home to 
hundreds  of  fugitive  Afro-Curaçaoans  and  their  descendants.48 
Leaders of the uprising had close ties to Curaçao, which saw its 
own largest slave revolt just three months later. Local authorities in 
both places claimed that the two rebellions were linked, a charge 
that has sparked spirited debate in the Venezuelan historiography, 
with  some  focusing  on  the  influence  of  outside  agitators,  espe-
cially those with links to Haiti, and others prioritizing local and 
regional factors (Rivas et al. 1996; Arcaya 1949). One of the lead-
ers of the Coro rebellion, José Caridad González, was himself an 
inter-colonial fugitive. Born in West Central Africa (records iden-
tify him as Loango, although it is not clear what this term actually 
meant49), he was taken to Curaçao by Dutch slavers sometime at 
mid-century, then escaped to Venezuela, where he subsequently 
helped other Afro-Curaçaoans flee to freedom along a well-estab-
48  AGN D LXIX #7.
49  Spanish colonial documents in Tierra Firme frequently used the term ‘Loango’ to refer 
to any slave who came through Curaçao; the phrase ‘los loangos de Curaçao’, for example, is 
frequently used in reference to the inhabitants of Santa María de la Chapa. It is unlikely that this 
term was a precise indication of either ethnicity or African provenance.|  Linda M. Rupert
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lished route travelled by hundreds of Afro-Curaçaoans. In Tierra 
Firme, González also worked to defend the lands of free blacks 
(including some Curaçaoans) from the incursions of white land-
holders; on at least one occasion he travelled to Spain to procure 
a Royal Decree supporting the small-scale landowners. The other 
leader of the revolt, José Leonardo Chirinos, was a freeman who 
worked on cacao plantations and had direct links to the contra-
band trade with Curaçao (Brito 1985:225-226; Castillo 1981:603). 
There is evidence that Chirinos travelled regularly to Curaçao and 
also to Saint-Domingue in the early 1790s (Documentos 1997:186; 
Brito 1985:225-6).50 Whether or not there was a direct conspiracy, 
it is clear from the participation of people like González, Chirinos, 
and others that the mainland uprising involved people who had 
close, ongoing ties to Curaçao. Thus, one may reasonably surmise 
that the two revolts were connected at some level. Enslaved people 
who travelled between the two areas certainly would have carried 
news about rising discontent and perhaps even plans to organize 
resistance in both places. Given the well-established communica-
tion circuits between Curaçao and Coro, word of the Coro uprising 
and the subsequent repression likely reached Curaçao before the 
island’s August revolt.
While  we  probably  will  never  know  with  certainty  the  exact 
degree and type of collaboration that existed between the rebels in 
Curaçao and Coro, perhaps we are missing the point if we focus too 
narrowly on the intriguing possibility of a slave conspiracy. By 1795 
people of African descent in both areas had been part of exten-
sive, over-lapping, inter-colonial networks for well over a hundred 
years.  Through  these  networks  they  forged  deep,  multi-faceted, 
on-going ties that included economic, religious, and socio-cultural 
dimensions. The largest slave uprisings in the southern Caribbean 
occurred in close succession in two places, which, although they 
belonged to separate imperial spheres, were closely linked through 
smuggling, migration, and various other forms of exchange. As Lau-
ren Benton has noted, early modern empires often were ‘encased 
in irregular, porous, and sometimes undefined borders’ (Benton 
2010:2).  The  irregular,  porous,  and  often  undefined  imperial 
boundaries between Curaçao and Tierra Firme created opportu-
nities for people of African descent to develop extra-official inter-
colonial  economic,  political,  legal,  and  religious  networks.  By 
participating in these networks they, in turn, shaped the contours 
of each developing colonial society.
50    For Chirinos’s testimony following the uprising, which includes information about ties to 
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Revolution and politics in Venezuela and Curaçao, 
1795-1800
Ramón Aizpurua
Economic and social relations between Venezuela and Curaçao in 
the late eighteenth century were dense, complex, and varied in 
content.1 From the time the Dutch settled on the small island in 
1634 and particularly after their authority was recognized in 1650, 
Curaçaoans  and  Venezuelans  enjoyed  regular  commercial  rela-
tions. Once the island became a free port in 1674, this relationship 
attained such importance that at times it might have been thought 
that Venezuela’s ties to the Dutch Republic were tighter than those 
with Spain. This developed into a symbiotic, mutually beneficial 
relationship, particularly throughout the eighteenth century. Ven-
ezuelan products and produce were daily fare at Curaçaoan tables. 
A large portion of the harvest from Tierra Firme found its way 
onto the foreign market through Curaçaoan traders, who set sail 
daily in their vessels to ply the waters of the Caribbean, finding 
in what was then known as the coast of Caracas, and especially 
the coast of Coro, their principal trading partner (Aizpurua 1993, 
2004a; Klooster 1998).This dense trade relationship was accompa-
nied by continuous, commonplace interactions among the people 
who gave it life. It was not unusual to find Curaçaoan merchants 
and mariners in Venezuelan waters, nor unusual to find Venezue-
lan mariners and merchants in Curaçao. Slaves who fled the island 
throughout the eighteenth century found a relative but real land 
of liberty in Venezuela, especially in Coro, where probably more 
than a thousand slaves landed, fleeing slavery and the abuse of 
their island masters (Aizpurua 2002, 2004b, 2008; Rupert 2006, 
2008).
1  Translated from Spanish by Susan Greenblatt. This paper was written in part with support 
from the research and development project Culturas indígenas y afroamericanas: Procesos iden-
titarios en la construcción de la ciudadanía. HAR2009-09766 (HIST sub-programme).|  Ramón Aizpurua
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However, these relations, both commercial and human, were 
not free of tension, especially in a time as politically conflictive as 
the eighteenth century, during which Spain and the Dutch Repub-
lic found themselves, actively or passively, mixed up in the dispute 
between England and France to rule the colonial world, at the end 
with a new contender in the ring, the United States of America. 
The Dutch Republic and Spain, and particularly Venezuela and 
Curaçao, went from being irreconcilable opponents to being broth-
ers of fortune and misfortune, or at least it appeared that way in 
high political spheres (Aizpurua 1993, Arauz 1984, Klooster 1998). 
Often, political events in Curaçao would have immediate repercus-
sions in Venezuela, and, likewise, political turmoil in Venezuela 
had immediate consequences in Curaçao.
When the Caribbean started boiling over from the events set in 
motion in the European colonies by the French and Haitian revo-
lutions, the course of political relations between Curaçao and Ven-
ezuela took an unclear and unpredictable turn. Three major social 
and political conflicts occurred in Venezuela during the period 
from 1795 to 1800, events that had ramifications on the island, and 
in turn appear to have had connections or ties to other events and 
individuals from Curaçao. Moreover, on the island, for its part, two 
social and political conflicts transpired that appear to have been 
related to events and individuals from Venezuela. Contrary to what 
might be expected, while all of this turmoil was related to the revo-
lutionary changes in the Caribbean, institutions rather than indi-
viduals played a vital role.
This contribution does not offer a detailed study of the political 
and social conflicts of both colonies, but rather attempts to discover 
the often hidden connections between the two colonies, and to dis-
entangle what role either France or England, or both, had in them.
the coro slave revolt, 17952
On Sunday night, 10 May 1795, an uprising of slaves and free blacks 
began at El Socorro plantation, in the mountains of Coro, which 
soon spread to other plantations in the area, around a small town 
called Curimagua. All that night and the following day, the upris-
2  Venezuelan historiography has been generous in studies regarding ‘Chirinos’ Insurrec-
tion’, as it is called, but this generosity has not been accompanied by serious analysis up until 
quite recently, apart from the pioneering but elementary work of Pedro Manuel Arcaya (Arcaya 
1910). Aizpurua 1985 contains a general and critical overview.5  Revolution and politics in Venezuela and Curaçao, 1795-1800  |
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ing grew as more local people joined in, mostly people of colour 
as well as some Indians from the region. Several plantations and 
houses were looted and burned, and their owners and whoever else 
was found there were killed or wounded. The morning of 12 May, a 
large party of rebels approached the town of Coro, down the moun-
tains, where, following several skirmishes, they were defeated by 
troops mustered by the town’s authorities and inhabitants. In the 
pursuit of the rebels, many were summarily ‘executed’ after state-
ments were hurriedly taken from them, if taken at all. Those who 
managed to escape the official repression were pursued for some 
time, especially the leader, José Leonardo Chirinos, who gave his 
name to the uprising and who was finally caught in mid-August and 
executed a few days later.
The number of dead, whether among the white highland land-
owners, their families or sharecroppers, or among the slaves and peo-
ple of colour who joined the insurrection, was not only larger than in 
the few previous cases of slave revolts known up until that time, but 
also showed an unusual level of violence. The deaths and brutality of 
the uprising, the maxims quoted by the rebels, and the interpreta-
tion that the local people and the town’s authorities soon gave to the 
event, led it to be identified with the events in Saint-Domingue, as 
soon as news of the uprising started reaching Coro, throughout the 
day on 11 May. The authorities immediately thought that the rebels 
were invoking the Haitian Revolution and therefore sought a con-
nection between the humble highland slaves and the French ideas 
of liberty, equality, and fraternity. Such a connection was soon found 
and, with it, another leader of the revolt, José Caridad González.
José Leonardo Chirinos (JLCh) was a zambo from the moun-
tains, son of a slave and an Indian woman, and therefore free, mar-
ried to a slave, and therefore, the father of slaves. Rumour had it 
that he enjoyed the admiration of his wife’s owner, José Tellería. On 
his plantation, Macanillas, he worked a small plot of land, known 
in Venezuela and Curaçao as a conuco. Apparently esteemed and 
trusted by Tellería, he had accompanied him on several business 
trips, probably to Curaçao, and especially to Saint-Domingue. It 
is said that during these trips, and inspired by conversations with 
Tellería or those that he would overhear between him and other 
whites, JLCh adopted the ideas of the French Republic and the 
Haitian Revolution, which he subsequently shared with his peers, 
most of them mountain slaves.
José Caridad González (JCG) had a distinctly different begin-
ning; he was a runaway slave from Curaçao who had obtained his 
freedom after fleeing the island and making it to Coro, as had a 
great number of marooned slaves before him. Most of these run-|  Ramón Aizpurua
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aways, probably over a thousand during the eighteenth century, 
ended up settling on lands granted them by the Crown, on the 
northern slopes of the Coro mountains, overlooking the town of 
Coro, in a village known as Santa María de la Chapa. Following sev-
eral lengthy lawsuits with local landholders, the village was moved 
to Macuquita, a few kilometres to the east along the same side of 
the mountains. However, a good number of the runaway slaves from 
Curaçao had settled in the town of Coro, forming a neighbourhood 
that at the time was called Guinea, now known as Curazaíto. This 
community of runaway slaves, now freedmen, had several leaders, 
and it appears that JCG was the last to join the struggle for pre-emi-
nence and prestige among these leaders, who enjoyed, in addition, 
the highest ranks in the militia of free blacks of Coro, composed of 
both free Creole blacks and free blacks from Curaçao, commonly 
known as luangos.
In the years leading up to the May 1795 insurrection, JCG had 
sued twice, once over ownership of the mountain lands, another 
time for the formation of a militia of blacks, but now exclusively of 
luangos, to be commanded by himself, which it appears he did not 
fully achieve. Thus he clashed with two totally distinct social classes 
– landowners who were well connected to the Coro town govern-
ment, and black luangos who, up until then, had been leaders of 
their community. His ties to Curaçao, a failed trip to the Court 
in Madrid demanding ownership of the land in the mountains 
(Chapa-Macuquita), and a trip to Caracas to defend his militia pro-
posal to the Caracas authorities, have led to speculation about his 
enlightened ideas and about how his failure to accomplish much 
had fanned his frustration. What is certain is that while JCG and 
his people reported to the Coro authorities at the first call to arms 
upon learning the news of the uprising in the mountains, the town’s 
authorities and ‘chieftains’ were suspicious of their offer of aid as 
militiamen. Instead of giving them the arms they were requesting 
to defend the town, they were arrested and locked up in the home 
of the governor’s lieutenant, Manuel Ramírez de Valderráin. Sev-
eral days later, while being transferred to jail, three of them, JCG 
and two of his comrades, were ‘killed while attempting to escape’.
The rest of the luango community was drawn into the affair in 
rather confusing ways. At the time, a fortification on the coast was 
under construction a few kilometres to the northeast of the port of 
Coro in a small settlement called Vela de Coro. Luangos worked 
here in two weekly crews – the mountain luangos and the town 
luangos. When the connection between JCG and JLCh was ‘estab-
lished’, the workers were surreptitiously and deceitfully called into 
town, where they were detained, though not charged, pending fur-5  Revolution and politics in Venezuela and Curaçao, 1795-1800  |
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ther investigation. In time, some sixty of them were sent to Puerto 
Cabello, to serve on the ships of the Spanish Armada that were in 
the harbour. Curiously, the former luango community leaders, José 
Domingo Rojas and Domingo Rojas (no family relation), were not 
among those arrested.
Following protracted inquiries, the colonial authorities ruled 
out any connection between the luango community and the insur-
rection in the mountains, although some of them may have par-
ticipated in it and had been executed in the first days of the revolt. 
Likewise, JCG and his comrades were exonerated, leading in the 
end, and following several years of ‘banishment’ on the Armada’s 
ships, to the luangos return to Coro and the mountains.3
A few months later the slave revolt of Curaçao erupted. This 
made the Coro authorities wonder and perhaps worry about con-
nections, but a possible relationship between the two events was 
never proved.4
the republican conspiracy of la guaira and caracas, 17975
In July 1797, a conspiracy was uncovered in Caracas, which had its 
roots in the port of La Guaira in a variegated circle of white bureau-
crats, whites involved in maritime trade, soldiers from the regular 
troops, and mulatto militiamen, primarily from the port itself. The 
plan had been devised by a retired colonel from the regular troops, 
Manuel Gual, who lived on a small plantation in the interior of the 
province of Venezuela, and a Spanish prisoner, Juan Bautista Picor-
nell, at that time imprisoned in the forts at La Guaira while await-
ing dispatch to his final destination, Veracruz. Picornell had been 
sentenced to life imprisonment for his republican conspiracy in 
Madrid, known as the San Blas conspiracy, discovered in May 1795, 
3  For everything related to this insurrection, I have used the official file of decrees drawn 
up by the Royal Audiencia of Caracas, in the Archivo General de Indias (AGI), Caracas 426, of 
the Documentos de la Insurrección 1994-97, as well as Archivo Libertador (Caracas), copied at the 
Bolivarium Archive, Universidad Simón Bolívar, Caracas, legajos 74, 145, 164, and 165. 
4  Governor Carbonell received news from Curaçao by September 1795. In fact, a commis-
sioner who had gone to the island in search of stores and provisions for the royal fleet, Antonio 
Hernández de Orta, would suggest a ban on the traffic of trade ships to the island, which Car-
bonell decreed in due course. As the governor did not think that this measure was sufficient, he 
also prohibited the entry of blacks, even those who were truly recently arrived slaves. See Archivo 
General de Indias [AGI], Estado 65, No. 19, folios 1-1v. 
5  As in the preceding case, much has been written but little analysed on the matter, except in 
the equally pioneering case of Casto Fulgencio López (López 1955). For a detailed treatment, 
see Aizpurua 2007.|  Ramón Aizpurua
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and with him in the jails of La Guaira were several of his closest col-
laborators, in particular Juan Cortés de Campomanes.
Thanks to the lax state of the ruling colonial authority in La 
Guaira, the principal port of the Venezuelan colony, the detainees 
who had arrived in Venezuela between late 1796 and early 1797 
were able to mingle with their jailers and the local people as soon 
as they arrived. The cells where they were confined soon became 
salons that drew people from all social strata of La Guaira, especially 
second-tier whites, merchants and treasury authorities, and front-
line military men and soldiers, mulatto militiamen and artisans. 
Little by little, they hatched a plan for an uprising that, inspired by 
the speeches and written proclamations of Picornell, sought to do 
away with the monarchy and establish a multiracial republic.
As  the  detainees  attempted  to  bring  more  local  discontents 
into the conspiracy, the colonial authorities caught wind of the 
plan  and  swiftly  and  efficiently  eradicated  the  movement.  They 
conducted a sweeping investigation that brought to light both the 
conspiracy and the social fabric out of which it was being stitched; 
a feeble fabric that limited the chances of success, in particular 
due to the mistrust between the whites and mulattoes. Curiously, 
the clearest and most resolute among the accused were the Creole 
mulatto militiamen and artisans as well as the low-ranking soldiers, 
all Spaniards. The white conspirators, radical when planning the 
conspiracy and the republic, were reticent about their participa-
tion once they were exposed as conspirators. One part of the white 
group was peninsular bureaucrats and traders living in La Guaira, 
who quickly dissociated themselves from the mulatto militiamen 
and Creole ‘troublemakers’. The other part was comprised of mid-
ranking active and retired military men, meeting in La Guaira to 
make  modifications  in  the  port’s  fortification  system,  although 
there were also some who came from a kind of local Creole white 
middle class. Two of the latter group lent their names to the con-
spiracy – Manuel Gual and José María España. They, for different 
reasons, not only backed down when the plan was discovered but 
also escaped from the province, and were the only two who, ini-
tially, dodged colonial justice.
The conspiracy for a republic included taking full control of 
the province of Venezuela, getting people from other cities in the 
region involved in it, and governing it by the motto of the French 
Revolution – liberty, equality, and fraternity. In the ideas set down 
in the written plans, obtained by the colonial authorities, equality 
of the ‘races’ was confusingly formulated, and among the conspira-
tors’ ideas was that of making contact with Caribbean experiments 
along  these  lines,  especially  that  of  Guadeloupe,  where  Victor 5  Revolution and politics in Venezuela and Curaçao, 1795-1800  |
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Hugues was said to have peacefully incorporated ‘people of colour’ 
into the new republic.
The entire plan fell apart, and, just as Picornell and Campo-
manes had done before in late June 1797, Gual and España escaped 
to Curaçao one month later, in late July, where they made contact 
with  local  residents  and  French  agents  on  the  island,  perhaps 
with the idea of amplifying their original plan with any aid that 
the Curaçaoans and French might provide. Once on the island, 
they soon reported to the governor of the island, Johann Rudolf 
Lauffer. They lodged in the house or inn of Felipe Piar,6 son of a 
mulatto Curaçaoan woman and a Canarian captain who travelled to 
the island. His brother was Manuel Piar, who was to have an impor-
tant role in the first years of the so-called Venezuelan War of Inde-
pendence, but ended up executed in 1817 at the orders of Simón 
Bolívar himself, following a murky trial in which racial problems 
may have been lurking.
When a commissioner, José Rafael Oberto, arrived along with 
a privateer, Captain Pedro Castillo, with the mission of transport-
ing them back to La Guaira under arrest, it seems that Gual and 
España sought protection with the French merchant Jean Baptiste 
Tierce. Lauffer attempted to find and arrest them in order to turn 
them over to Commissioner Oberto – that at least is what he told 
the Caracas government. The fugitives moved into Tierce’s house, 
where  they  even  met  with  Castillo.  Soon  after,  Castillo,  Oberto 
and José Obediente, the person commissioned by Lauffer to help 
Oberto apprehend Gual and España, were chased and harassed 
by mobs of people who followed them everywhere, insulting them 
with ‘...there goes the aristocrat who comes to take away the revolu-
tionaries, and the traitor who helps them...’7
Aided by Tierce, Gual and España had began to recruit volun-
teers for the expedition they were planning with the aim of first tak-
ing La Guaira and next assaulting Caracas to overthrow the Spanish 
authorities. From among the varied population of Curaçao – locals, 
6  Isabel Gómez, mother of the Piar brothers and a midwife by profession, was living in La 
Guaira when she was deported to Curaçao after it was detected that the fugitives were staying in 
the house of one of her children. See Archivo de la Academia Nacional de la Historia de Ven-
ezuela, Civiles:12-4750-4.
7  These were the words of Pedro Castillo, as reported to the Caracas authorities. The event 
was such common knowledge that even Tierce himself informed Governor Carbonell of it on 
30-8-1797: AGI, Audiencia de Caracas 432, pieza 79, folios 70v-71v. In the Spanish documenta-
tion, his name always appears as Tierce de Cadet, or simply Cadet, and he was considered to 
be a consul or representative of the French government of Saint-Domingue in Curaçao, but it 
appears that he was never recognized as such by the Curaçaoan authorities or by the French 
Directory; he worked as a maritime agent.|  Ramón Aizpurua
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Frenchmen, and Spaniards – many of whom were probably crew 
members on Curaçaoan ships or French corsairs, they managed to 
‘enlist’ a large number, some 400 people, among whom 100 pesos 
were distributed daily to keep them committed to the project; some 
informants spoke of local Jewish support. Some of these conspira-
tors, for example, the Frenchman Boissere, went along with the 
refugees  from  La  Guaira,  supposedly  to  learn  the  expedition’s 
intent. In a long letter to Governor Pedro Carbonell disclosing the 
conspiracy, Boissere maintained that the French were the true cap-
tains of the project, and that its ultimate aim was to seize the riches 
of the Royal Treasury in Caracas, which they thought might hold 
over 20,000 pesos.8
However, as the ‘persecution’ intensified, in November 1797 
Gual and España decide to travel to Jacmel in Saint-Domingue in 
search of more help, men and money for their invasion plan. The 
very day they were to leave for Jacmel, Picornell arrived from Gua-
deloupe with a letter of introduction from the commissioner Vic-
tor Hugues, sent to make contact with Tierce to enlist his help to 
mount an expedition that was to invade La Guaira. Tierce received 
Picornell at his home and an invasion plan was hatched, for which 
España travelled to Guadeloupe to confirm the aid that, appar-
ently, Victor Hugues had offered. The trip was unfruitful because 
the French commissioner was convinced that the pretensions of 
Picornell, whom he had met with in July of that year, as well as those 
of Gual and España, were based on fantasy – Picornell believed that 
as soon as they arrived in La Guaira, the people would rise up with 
them. España returned to Curaçao with empty hands, now accom-
panied by Cortés de Campomanes, who had initially remained on 
the French island. On the return voyage, they stopped at the Swed-
ish colony of St. Barthélemy, where España won the support of sev-
eral of the island’s merchants, from whom he obtained an offer of 
aid, something he claimed to have obtained also in Guadeloupe, 
directly from merchants on the French island.9
Upon their arrival in Curaçao late in 1798, Cortés de Campomanes 
went ashore, but España did not because he learned that Lauffer 
had issued a warrant for his arrest. He decided to leave for Saint-
Domingue, via Aruba, travelling on the ship of Juan Pedro Maduro, 
8  AGI, Audiencia de Caracas 435, documentos sueltos, folios 1-16. This also appears in a let-
ter sent to Governor Pedro Carbonell by Monsieur Boissiere, AGI, Caracas 432, pieza 81, folios 
1-15v. This case serves to show the diverse references to the affair. José María España called him 
Laboysere in his statements (see following note).
9  All this information comes from AGI, Caracas 433, pieza 91, folios 70v-82, second statement 
from José María España, 3-5-1799. 5  Revolution and politics in Venezuela and Curaçao, 1795-1800  |
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a free coloured merchant and mariner, and friend of Tierce. While 
Maduro was busy buying mules to take back to the French island, 
Gual arrived in Aruba too on a ship belonging to Pedro Brión, for 
whom Tierce had worked and whom the Frenchman considered a 
close friend. They finally left for Jacmel, where they stayed for sev-
eral days. There, Gual decided to speak with the English authorities 
of Martinique, travelled there, and subsequently went to Trinidad 
(recently conquered by the English), where he tried to sell his idea 
of invading Venezuela and making it a republic.10
España stayed in Jacmel, working with several French merchants, 
but was uncertain about his future. He travelled first to the Danish 
colony of St. Thomas and then to St. Barthélemy, seeking the help 
of his brother-in-law Kiruan, with whom he stayed for a time on the 
first island and with whom he moved to the second, helping him 
manage several plantations. When everything seemed to indicate 
that this would be the end of the adventure, he decided to go to 
La Guaira to look for his family. He travelled there via Trinidad, 
where he tried to connect with Gual. However, he did not like how 
the island’s governor, Thomas Picton, handled the situation and in 
early 1799 decided to sail on to La Guaira. There, España hid in his 
own house until his presence was exposed by one of his ex-slaves, 
who had been sold in La Guaira after all of España’s property had 
been seized in 1797. Arrested in late April 1799, long statements 
were taken from him, after which he was sentenced to death and 
executed immediately, on 6 May 1799.11
Gual’s  fate  was  no  better,  despite  having  made  contact  with 
Francisco de Miranda, who at the time was attempting in London 
to mount an expedition to invade Venezuela with support from the 
English government. He was trailed by several spies and died in 
Trinidad, apparently poisoned, in late 1800.
In hindsight, Gual, España, Picornell, and Cortés seem to have 
attempted to sell their plan for revolution to both the French, in 
Guadeloupe to Commissioner Victor Hugues and in Curaçao to 
Tierce, and to the English, in Martinique to Admiral Ralph Aber-
cromby and in Trinidad to Governor Picton, but without much suc-
cess. Perhaps indeed they would have obtained economic support 
from merchants in Guadeloupe, St. Thomas, St. Barthélemy, and 
even Curaçao, who would have viewed this aid as a sort of ‘invest-
ment’ in the future, expecting profits in the event the rich Spanish 
colony became an independent republic with their friends at the 
helm. For their part, the French and English governments were 
10  Great Britain occupied Martinique from 1794 to 1802. 
11  AGI, Caracas 433, pieza 91, folios 70v-82.|  Ramón Aizpurua
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involved in their own conflict and probably saw in these ‘imagina-
tive’ Venezuelan revolutionaries possible allies for their own plans, 
whether to capture Curaçao, still an island of economic importance 
in the thick of the privateering business, or with a view to the eco-
nomic and logistical importance and potential that Venezuela had, 
particularly after the Saint-Domingue insurrection.
It also appears that these men were ‘pawns’ in the intrigues on 
the island itself, where economic and personal interests most likely 
were clashing behind political and ideological loyalties. Otherwise 
it is hard to understand the odd behaviour of Tierce and Lauffer 
toward the Venezuelan fugitives, first inciting the expedition but 
leaving them on their own, or of hiding them from the Caracas 
authorities yet pursuing them. Lauffer, as well as Tierce and General 
Urbain Devaux, in their various letters to Carbonell and his succes-
sor Guevara y Vasconcelos, presented themselves as devoted, selfless 
allies of the Spanish Crown, requesting their aid for the trying times 
on the island in 1799, but keeping their distance from each other – 
Lauffer in one corner, and Tierce and Devaux in another. However, 
José María España declared before the Caracas authorities that he 
thought Tierce was following orders from Lauffer in supporting the 
plan for the naval expedition to La Guaira.
the conspiracy of french corsairs and creole mulattoes  
in maracaibo, 1799
Two years after the conspiracy of La Guaira, an even more tangled 
case of socio-political conflict occurred in Venezuela, this time in 
another  important  port,  Maracaibo,  in  the  colony’s  west.  Once 
again, people of colour, French corsairs, and Curaçaoan seamen 
and  logistics  joined  forces  in  a  failed  attempt  at  establishing  a 
republic on Venezuelan soil.12 Of the three cases presented here, 
this is the most obscure because it is still not clear who the instiga-
tor of the plan was. Instead, it appears to be one of those situations 
in which the sum of the circumstances obscures the essence of the 
affair and the fragility of the venture. 
12  I have not included individual references in my synopsis, which I have prepared using the 
documentation about the conspiracy in six piezas de autos issued by the Royal Audiencia of Cara-
cas, and in the Archivo General de la Nación (AGN), Diversos LXXIV, folios 242-354v, in the 
AGN, Caracas, reproduced in their entirety in the CD La sublevación intentada por los corsarios 
franceses de Puerto Príncipe, 1799-1800 (documentary compilation), annexed to the Master’s thesis 
in history submitted by Ángel Manzanillo, in Caracas, Universidad Central de Venezuela, 2000 
(CDSMbo).5  Revolution and politics in Venezuela and Curaçao, 1795-1800  |
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On the night of 6 May 1799, three ships reached port in Mara-
caibo, two corsairs from Saint-Domingue, the Bruto and the Patrulla, 
and their British prize, the Arlequín. The first two belonged to the 
Gaspar brothers, natives of Port-au-Prince, with one, Jean-Baptiste, at 
the helm of the first, and the other, Auguste, commanding the other. 
They had left Port-au-Prince bound for St. Thomas, but a storm blew 
them to the coast of Guaranao, where they seized the English ship, 
which they soon boarded and added to their group. Due to the poor 
shape they were all in, and their lack of victuals, they decided to seek 
refuge and aid in Maracaibo, and to legalize their prize.
Once in port, the boats were visited by the Maracaibo authorities, 
and with the circumstances and cargo explained, the Arlequín was 
declared good prize. For some twelve days, the crews of the privateer 
ships lived the routine port life, disembarking to eat and drink, or 
receiving local curiosity seekers on board. Meanwhile, the authorities 
had designated several individuals to mediate and monitor their stay.
Nevertheless, something out of the ordinary must have hap-
pened. Soon, the two Gaspar brothers, aided by one of their sub-
ordinates, José Romano, second captain of the Bruto, a native and 
resident of the island of St. Thomas, began talking with Francisco 
Javier Pirela, second lieutenant of the First Company of Disciplined 
Mulatto Militias of Maracaibo, a 35-year-old widower from the town, 
and a tailor by profession. Though it is difficult to know who took 
the initiative, their conversations soon came around to the idea 
of taking the town for the purpose of declaring a republic. Some 
offered their men, arms, and cannon, along with money, another 
offered the militia or those he could assemble, and they decided to 
rise up on the night of 19 May, a Sunday. 
However, as on other occasions, the uprising did not break out. 
One of the first men whom Pirela attempted to win over, Tomás de 
Ochoa, first corporal of the First Veteran Company of Maracaibo, 
informed the governor, Fernando Miyares y Gonzáles, who that 
night organized an assault on the three ships, taking their crews 
prisoner, including the Arlequín’s sailors, whose cannon had been 
loaded for an attack on the city.
The investigation did not take long and, even though those who 
gave statements claimed their innocence and blamed others, saying 
that it was ‘the rest of them’ who were trying to incite the uprising, 
some clear ideas can be extracted. The first is that once more fan-
tasy was fanning the flames of the insurrectional plans, especially 
when in the heat of argument and alcohol allies came along offer-
ing assistance that was hard to guarantee. Additionally, it is prob-
able that Pirela and Romano, who acted as interpreter between 
Pirela and the corsair captains, fell under the spell and imagined |  Ramón Aizpurua
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the formation of a republic in the city as a fait accompli, which 
would soon be linked to an uprising in the city of Cartagena. As in 
the previous case, the plan included arresting the authorities and 
murdering them, taking over the city, subjugating the population, 
especially those who did not identify with the insurrection, seizing 
the funds in the Royal Treasury, which they thought amounted to 
20,000 pesos, and appointing authorities from among the people 
of colour. 
The conspirators also thought of turning to Curaçao in search 
of more people and armaments, according to Pirela, who said that 
Romano had told him that ‘he would send to Curaçao for more 
people, armaments and munitions of war to sustain and establish 
themselves in this country’.13 Some of the privateers were Cura-
çaoans, as were some of the crewmembers of the English prize.14 
Although it seemed clear that there was a plan for an uprising, and 
the Gaspar brothers, Romano, Pirela, and several other locals and 
sailors were found guilty, there is no more information available. 
However, the case of Maracaibo does seem to demonstrate a pat-
tern in the behaviour of Saint-Domingue privateers and of Guade-
loupean and French republican officials in European colonies with 
coloured populations, as will be seen below. 
venezuelan authorities and political conflicts in curaçao, 
1799-180015
Meanwhile in Curaçao, other events were taking place that were 
related to the French and Haitian revolutions and to the strug-
13  CDSMbo, Pieza 5, folios 544-545 (folio 545), statement from Francisco Javier Pirela, 28-6-1799. 
14  Most prominent were Jacob Gómez, native and resident of the island of Curaçao, second 
captain of the Bruto, who stated he was hired by the corsairs to take them to the island; Juan 
Jeres, boatswain of the Bruto; and Silvestre Castro, native of Curaçao, aged 44 years, and pilot 
for the French corsairs, who had taken the position in Port-au-Prince, who in their declarations 
presented themselves as having been forced by circumstances to participate in the uprising plan, 
but never as leaders; for their part, from the prize were the Curaçaoans Diego Cristiano, a black 
sailor of 20 years, Julián Francisco, mulatto, sailor of some 17 years, who spoke good Spanish, and 
Juan González de Castro, a sailor of colour, aged 44 years, who stated having been excluded from 
the uprising plan and having been kept as prisoners by the corsairs until the day of the planned 
uprising, although the second one, Julián Francisco, clarified that one of the Gaspar brothers 
had offered money ‘so that he would not reveal him nor declare anything that would be to his 
detriment in the anticipated uprising’. ECMbo, Pieza 4, folios 427v-430 (folio 429v), declaration 
of Julián Francisco, sailor, mulatto, native and resident of Curaçao. Maracaibo, 1-6-1799. 
15  On the case studied here, see also Felice 1973:415-443, who used similar sources, but from 
other document collections.5  Revolution and politics in Venezuela and Curaçao, 1795-1800  |
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gles of groups of colour throughout the Caribbean. By November 
1796, following the conflict that pitted Orangists against Patriots 
in Curaçao and led to the replacement of the island’s governor 
Johannes de Veer by Jacob Beaujon, Dutch officials and sailors 
who were not supporters of the Batavian Republic began to arrive 
in Venezuela. This happened, for example, to Frederik Harrias, 
drum major of the troops, and Abraham de Pon, a sailor on one 
of the frigates of war of the new republic, forced to abandon the 
island by its governor.16
The authorities of Caracas closely followed the conflict that 
had broken out on the island and informed the authorities in 
Spain, who, in turn, instructed their ambassador in the Batavian 
Republic, José de Anduaga, to attempt to detain Tierce for the 
purpose of finishing the investigation regarding the plans of Gual 
and España.17 The governor of Caracas had already informed the 
Spanish authorities about this event, including a report from the 
lieutenant of Coro, Emilio Boggiero, who said that the advocates 
of the planned uprising had been Devaux and Tierce, and that 
they had their principal ally in naval officer Albert Kikkert, but 
that Lauffer had concealed the alliance. Also on the island at the 
time was a Jew named Isaac Sasportas,18 sent by Toussaint Louver-
ture, although Boggiero indicated that he had not taken part in 
this particular conspiracy. The plan had been uncovered by the 
new French consul on the island, Joubert, who rejected the offer 
made by Devaux to join the plot, informing Lauffer of the matter 
instead.
A few days later, on 11 September 1799, an emissary of the mili-
tary leader of the Haitian mulattoes, André Rigaud, arrived on the 
island, bringing the news that both Devaux and Sasportas had been 
sent by his rival Toussaint to incite the island. In addition, the Bri-
gade Commander and Major General of Jacmel, named Bobbay 
(according to Boggiero’s report) arrived, fleeing from Toussaint; 
he was attempting to sail for Paris to inform the Directory of the 
outrageous situation in Saint-Domingue. Boggiero also said that an 
old acquaintance from La Guaira had arrived on the island, the 
French  physician  Pierre  Canibens,  brother-in-law  of  José  María 
España, and whose detention by Lauffer and later escape appears 
16  AGI, Estado 65, No. 57, ‘Información de llegada de Curazao de militares leales al príncipe 
holandés’, 11-10-1796. The case is studied in this volume by Karwan Fatah Black.
17  AGI, Estado 71, No. 4.
18  At that time, nephew of José Obediente, lieutenant of the National Guard of Curaçao, 
interpreter and confidant of the governor of Caracas, first Pedro Carbonell and later Manuel 
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to have been behind the allegations made by Devaux and Tierce of 
‘insults’ made in Curaçao to French citizens.19
Boggiero warned the Spanish authorities of the instability of 
Curaçao:
This revolutionary endeavour, which is the fourth that has been 
discovered since the current tribulations of the French colonies, 
has been, it appears, calmed down, but as the inclination of that 
population is known, composed almost entirely of mulattoes and 
blacks, freedmen and slaves, who aspire so to equality and liberty, 
there is no doubt that it will have a hidden ferment that some day 
will come to realize its intent.20
Besides the report from lieutenant Boggiero, who received fresh 
news in Coro from the island thanks to the daily contacts with Cura-
çao,  the  governor  had  an  extensive  epistolary  relationship  with 
the island’s authorities, among whom figured Lauffer, a governor 
temporarily allied with the Spaniards. He also corresponded with 
Devaux, the local agent on the island of a nation allied with the 
Spanish Crown. This meant that the Caracas governor constantly 
kept a suspicious eye on the conflicts that had arisen on Curaçao. 
This was a dispute between allies, which for its part entailed possible 
greater conflicts among the perennial British enemy with its thirst 
to conquer Tierra Firme, revolutionary France and the emerging 
new republic in Hispaniola.
Devaux sent at least four letters to the governors of Caracas, first 
Pedro Carbonell and later Manuel Guevara y Vasconcelos. He acted 
as an agent in Curaçao for handling the prizes that French corsairs, 
or those from Saint-Domingue and Guadeloupe, took in the Carib-
bean, which they would bring to the island where they would rap-
idly deal with the legal cases resulting from the seizures. As such, he 
had complained to the governor about conflicts between Venezu-
elan authorities and French corsairs, being particularly interested 
in the case of the Gaspar brothers, who had been detained in Mara-
caibo some months earlier, accused of seditious plans. On 30 July, 
Devaux wrote to the governor of Caracas in defence of the Gaspar 
19  AGI, Estado 71 4 (1a), folios 1-2v. Pierre Canibens, brother-in-law of José María España by 
marriage to his sister Joaquina, had arrived in Curaçao from Bermuda, where he had ended up 
after the ship which was being sent under detention to Spain was taken as a prize by English 
privateers. Together with him, it seems, was the other brother-in-law of España through his wife, 
Domingo Sánchez, who worked as an amanuensis on the island. See AGI, Caracas 433, pieza 91, 
folios 1v-10v, statement from José María España, 30-4-1799.
20  AGI, Caracas 433, pieza 91, folio 2v.5  Revolution and politics in Venezuela and Curaçao, 1795-1800  |
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brothers,21 highlighting what would be the version of the corsairs. 
He explained that after the letters of marque that they had enjoyed 
had been taken away from them, they devoted themselves to trade, 
but kept their ships armed ‘to defend themselves in the event of 
being attacked’.22 About this affair, he pressured governor Guevara 
in a letter sent on 2 August 1799 by telling him that ‘several villains 
and Pirates have abused the French flag, but the French Republic is 
not involved at all in the vile deeds that are committed in its name; 
it only knows goodness and noble deeds, such are its principles and 
its intentions: It is also good and loyal and forthright, as it is a ter-
rible enemy, etc.’23
In another letter, Devaux mentioned the affair of the jailing of 
Pierre Canibens, pointing out that he did not previously know the 
French physician, but that Canibens had been detained in a man-
ner hardly consistent with international law and was going to be 
turned over to the Caracas authorities ‘to be sacrificed, as a result 
of a denunciation from his brother-in-law [José María] España’, 
which is why Devaux had contributed to his escape.24
However, Devaux had matters of more pressing concern than 
trying to mediate between the Gaspar brothers, or Tierce, and the 
Caracas authorities. Trade, both legal and illicit, between English-
men and North Americans (who acted as their middlemen) and 
the Spanish colonies did appear to cause the French agent to lose 
sleep, and for this reason he wrote to Governor Guevara in Caracas 
several times telling him how and in what waters the English were 
smuggling. He sent copies of some new instructions that the British 
king had given to his commanders for the purpose of permitting 
a sort of ‘free trade’ by enemy or allied merchants with his Carib-
bean colonies (dated 8 March 1798, revoking and expanding those 
of 27 June 1797). These favoured, in particular, Spanish traders, by 
permitting them to land at what they called English free ports in the 
Caribbean: Kingston, Savannah, Montego Bay, St. Lucia, and Port 
Antonio on the island of Jamaica; St. George’s on Granada; Roseau 
on Dominica; Nassau on the island of New Providence (Bahamas); 
and the port of St. John’s in Antigua.25 However, he intelligently 
added another royal decree that, complaining of the procedures 
of the Spanish in violent and unjustified seizures of their ships, 
21  AGI, Estado 67, No. 73 (1h), folios 1-1v (folio 1), Devaux to Guevara, Curaçao 30-7-1799.
22  AGI, Estado 67, No. 73 (1h), folio 1.
23  AGI, Estado 67, No. 73 (1g), folios 1-6v (folios 2-2v), Devaux to Guevara, Curaçao of 2-8-
1799. 
24  AGI, Estado 67, No. 73 (1j), folios 1-2, Davaux to Guevara, undated. 
25  AGI Estado 67, No. 73 (1l), ‘Instrucciones adicionales a los comandantes ingleses’, 28-3-
1798. |  Ramón Aizpurua
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ordered reprisals be taken against Spanish ships whose crews, once 
seized, were to be judged by the admiralty court.26
By doing this, Devaux pretended to draw Guevara’s attention 
to the risk entailed by the Spanish engaging in smuggling with 
English enemies, but it appears that deep down his interest ran 
in a different direction. From the very first letter that Devaux sent 
Guevara, on 22 June 1799, the Frenchman communicated his need 
to go to Caracas to take information that he could only convey in 
person since it involved a secret mission. Devaux said he wanted 
to visit the province of Venezuela accompanied by an officer, an 
interpreter, and an aid,27 which Guevara refused.28 In response to 
another request along the same lines, Guevara asked him to com-
municate the objective of his secret mission on Tierra Firme and 
the objective of his intended visit since, thought Guevara, each 
‘step that general Devaux took with me, led me involuntarily to the 
opinion that he was not being sincere with me, and that his entry 
into these provinces could be detrimental’.29
There  is  no  further  correspondence  between  Devaux  and 
Guevara since around that time the plan for insurrection against 
Lauffer  was  uncovered.  However,  a  letter  from  José  Obediente 
helps us imagine what Devaux’s secret mission was. This lieuten-
ant of the Curaçaoan National Guard said that Devaux’s intentions 
were to visit Venezuela to ask the governor to allow him to arm 
an English prize, the Hermione, and to launch an attack on Trini-
dad with the objective of recovering it with the support of Venezu-
elan privateers and a force of over 200 men. Obediente added that 
Tierce convinced Devaux that they did not have enough money to 
complete this secret mission, but that if they managed to incite the 
island to rebellion, they could do away with Lauffer. Tierce suppos-
edly added that
we will put the Marine Commander in his place, we will form a 
Directory, we will get one hundred thousand pesos out of the Jews 
for you, we will send one hundred fifty robust men out of the coun-
try, who are just some aristocrats, we will confiscate all the Americans 
who we find here, and their boats, we will cut Obediente’s throat, 
because he is a swine and protector of the tyrant Spanish govern-
ment, we will cut the throats of the crown attorney and nephew of 
the governor, because they are very villainous and depraved men, 
26  AGI Estado 67, No. 73 (1m), ‘Otro tanto’, Bermuda, 24-6-1799. 
27  AGI Estado 67, No. 73 (1), folios 1-10v (2v). 
28  AGI Estado 67, No. 73 (1), folio 3v.
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we will put people of our liking in the jobs, I have some of the 
National Guard up my sleeve, I will return to my position as artil-
leryman to win over the locals, I will take the castle, and you will 
take the Castle of the Republic, which is the one that rules over the 
whole island. After this is done, you will be able to continue on to 
Trinidad with greater satisfaction since there you will find all the 
American ships, French corsairs, and riches at your disposal.30
And here Governor Lauffer in Curaçao comes into play. On 11 Sep-
tember 1799, he wrote Guevara describing the planned uprising by 
Tierce and his allies, adding that were these plans to triumph, ‘not 
only would this colony be completely destroyed, but the security 
of your government and the public peace of the western coast will 
also be exposed to the most appalling dangers’.31 Lauffer told gov-
ernor Guevara that in the event the two sides clashed he would be 
in need of aid because of the superiority of the French forces. He 
calculated that only with 500 disciplined men added to his troops 
would he be able to counter the French. Hence, Lauffer asked Gue-
vara to let him know if he would be willing to aid him with 500 men 
from his troops, explaining, ‘In the event that Your Excellency is 
willing to grant me this entreaty, I beg of you to have them soon 
at my disposition in the port of La Guaira or of Cabello. In case 
of necessity, I will send for them with an express messenger, or if 
circumstances force me to go to extremes, I myself will come for 
them. […] Perhaps this is the only way to save [...] this colony, the 
last possession of the Batavian Republic in this hemisphere, from 
its complete destruction, as well as to protect your government, and 
the Spanish possessions of the neighbouring coasts, from the dan-
ger that threatens them’.32
Guevara responded eleven days later, lamenting not being able 
to make indiscriminate use of his troops without the express orders 
of his superiors on the peninsula and asking Lauffer for details 
on the project of Tierce and Devaux, especially with regard to the 
‘number that they have within the island, and their quality, espe-
cially from the military class on land or sea’.33 Guevara was already 
30  AGI, Estado 67, No. 73 (1u), folios 1-3 (folio 1v), José Obediente to Governor Carbonell, 
Curaçao, 15-9-1799. By then, the governor was no longer Pedro Carbonell but rather Manuel 
Guevara y Vasconcelos. Probably, in giving this information, Obediente was following instruc-
tions from Lauffer himself on the matter.
31  AGI, Estado 67, No. 73 (1r), folios 1-2 (folio 1), Governor Johann Rudolf Lauffer to Gover-
nor Guevara, Curaçao, 11-9-1799. 
32  AGI, Estado 67, No. 73 (1r), folio 1v and 2.
33  AGI, Estado 67, No. 73 (1s), folios 1-2, Governor Guevara to Governor Lauffer of Curaçao, 
Caracas, 22-9-1799.|  Ramón Aizpurua
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aware of the expulsion of Devaux and the jailing of Tierce, which 
is why he was more concerned about the issue of the political and 
social unrest on the island and its repercussions on Tierra Firme.
Guevara also had information gathered by Spanish informants 
on the island commissioned by the Caracas authorities. Thus, Man-
uel Farfán de los Godos, who had gone there for that purpose at 
the request of the Regent of the Royal Audiencia, the highest legal 
authority of Venezuela, had already sent a report of the events on 
the island.34 He detailed how he had managed to infiltrate Devaux’s 
party, finding out that Devaux had made a list of the wealthiest 
men on the island and of how he had gotten Commander Kikkert 
to join his faction, and that he had won over all the French on the 
island, with the approval of Tierce, to later use the jailing of Pierre 
Canibens as an excuse to inflame spirits over Lauffer’s alleged anti-
French posture. According to Farfán’s telling, 
once  this  was  achieved,  they  would  make  the  aforesaid  Marine 
Commander [Kikkert] into the interim governor, using as a motive 
for this entire action and its incidents that said governor [Lauffer] 
wanted to surrender this island to the English, and that exposed by 
these people, they had killed him and his confederates because of 
that, and then, with the course of action produced by said general 
and his party, he himself [Kikkert] would go to Holland to report 
on the happenings, gain merit, and achieve ownership of this gov-
ernment for the aforementioned Marine Commander, as he had 
contributed with the arms at his command to the felicity that the 
surrender of this island to the English did not take place.35
With the governor dead, along with those the French conspirators 
called aristocrats, and in possession of their property and money, 
they would divide it among the revolutionaries. Farfán reported 
that after learning the nature and strategy of the plan of insurrec-
tion, he spoke with Lauffer, telling him everything.36
It is impossible to ascertain whether the information provided 
by Farfán is reliable or if he is reproducing the comments of Lauffer 
or of his assistant Obediente. If it is reliable indeed, quite possibly 
the plan of Tierce and Devaux was not a consequence of the orders 
that Devaux supposedly brought with him to the island, but rather 
34  AGI, Estado 67 73 (1t), folios 1-2v, Manuel Farfán de los Godos to Regent López Quintana, 
Curaçao, 6-9-1799. 
35  AGI, Estado 67 73 (1t), folio 1v.
36  It seems curious that several people claim to have informed Governor Lauffer of the French 
plan: Obediente, Farfán, and the new French consul on the island, Jaubert.5  Revolution and politics in Venezuela and Curaçao, 1795-1800  |
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represented a reaction to the turn of events on the island, which 
Lauffer then interpreted to his benefit to make way for his reaction.
Guevara also received a letter sent from Puerto Cabello on 18 
September, with the latest news that had come in from the island 
on several ships, emphasizing that among the documents seized 
from the conspirators a sheet of paper was found that said that 
Obediente’s head must roll because he was a protector of the Cath-
olics and persecutor of the French. The letter revealed that the 
governor of Suriname had surrendered his colony to the English 
after some French corsairs had arrived in port and managed to get 
the colony’s slaves to join their camp.37
Thus, in addition, if there is truth to a conspiracy carried out by 
French corsairs and agents, the events in Maracaibo in May of that 
same year would have to be seen as part of a more general plan, how-
ever informal it may have been – not just a consequence of circum-
stances or happenstance – to connect the interests and proclamations 
of the French and Haitian corsairs in the Caribbean with the worries 
of the communities of various non-French colonies in the Caribbean, 
whether Spanish, English, or Dutch. A similar case appears to be the 
conspiracy that occurred in Cartagena in April 1799. Some contem-
poraries linked this conspiracy to the Maracaibo affair, but the Span-
ish authorities did not lend great weight to this interpretation. An 
uprising was planned for 2 April of that year, comprised of the black 
slaves of French officials and recently arrived black slaves who were 
prisoners, apparently backed by a gunnery sergeant of the black mili-
tia named Jorge Guzmán. Eight of the black men were arrested and 
gave confusing statements. The alleged complot was revealed by a first 
corporal of the mulatto volunteers, Manuel Iturén, who learned of it 
from a black Creole slave. The conspirators were apparently thinking 
of killing the whites and looting public and private property.38
As a result of this affair, the correspondence between Lauffer 
and Guevara increased once again, but on this occasion the issues 
were even more serious. Guevara learned of a new conflict on the 
island from the commander of Puerto Cabello, Manuel Marmión, 
who wrote him on 8 September 1800 saying that a schooner com-
ing from Curaçao had just reached port and had left the island 
two days earlier together with twelve or thirteen Spanish ships with 
permission from Lauffer after he had received information from 
a negotiator that the French would return as enemies ‘to bring 
37  AGI, Estado 67 No. 73(1v), folios 1-1v (1v), Miguel Martínez to Governor Guevara, Puerto 
Cabello, 18-9-1799. 
38  AGI, Estado 53, No. 77. The plan to capture a port city, kill the whites, and steal public and 
private property seems to have been the norm in these attempted rebellions.|  Ramón Aizpurua
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everything down in fire and blood’.39 Guevara also had news of the 
arrival on the island of a brother of Rigaud, who was fleeing Saint-
Domingue and might have offered his packet boat and people to 
the French. He also reported that the island was ‘in the greatest 
confusion due to distrust of the slaves, and that the French might 
be successful in their intent to incite them’.40
Additionally,  the  lieutenant  from  Coro,  the  abovementioned 
Emilio Boggiero, sent a similar letter to Guevara on the same 8 Sep-
tember, informing him of the arrival in the port of Coro of a canoe 
that had returned from Curaçao, where it had gone with a letter for 
Lauffer. He added to what Marmión said with news of the arrival 
of two boats loaded with people coming from the island – women, 
children, and some old people – as well as the news that other Span-
ish ships were doing the same, leaving Curaçao bound for Puerto 
Cabello and La Guaira, after Lauffer had given his permission for 
this on 6 September. From the explanation the canoe’s captain 
gave to Lieutenant Boggiero, it could be deduced that the French 
had put together ten ships from among those that had left the port 
and those that had arrived from Guadeloupe, and had taken the 
castle of Sint Michiel by deception, and that the black slaves of the 
estates in the area had been liberated by the French, who had taken 
them into their ranks. He added that such a thing frightened him 
since ‘with all the people they have in Curaçao, those that are flee-
ing from Guadeloupe, and those who would come from Les Cayes 
[in Saint-Domingue], they are in condition to work quickly and 
take firm hold on these coasts, from whence perhaps they shall not 
again leave’.41
The following day, the administrator of the Royal Treasury of Río 
de Tocuyo, a small coastal town between Coro and Puerto Cabello, 
informed  Marmión  that  several  individuals  from  the  island  had 
arrived in Hueque, another coastal town, saying that part of the 
island had been taken over by the French and that by then the island 
was probably in their power. With this news, Marmión informed Gue-
vara of the affair, adding that it would be wise not to ship to the island 
the provisions and refreshments that he had prepared, including cat-
tle, which he had not done for fear that such aid might fall ‘into the 
hands of the French and English who were crisscrossing the island’.42
39  AGI, Estado 67, No. 87, folios 3v-5v (folio 4), Manuel Marmión to Governor Guevara, 
Puerto Cabello, 08-09-1800. 
40  AGI, Estado 67, No. 87, folio 5. This must be Joseph Rigaud, in custody.
41  AGI, Estado 67, No. 87 (1a), folios 6a-10v (folio 7b), Andrés Boggiero to Governor Guevara, 
Coro, 08-09-1800. 
42  AGI, Estado 67, No. 87 (1a), folios 11v-14v (folio 13b), Manuel Marmión to Governor Gue-
vara, Puerto Cabello, 14-09-1800. 5  Revolution and politics in Venezuela and Curaçao, 1795-1800  |
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In addition, in another letter that same day, Marmión informed 
Governor  Guevara  that  several  ships  had  just  arrived  in  Puerto 
Cabello  with  a  considerable  number  of  émigrés,  some  ninety, 
including several of the island’s Jewish merchant families and some 
free mulatto women, and that he had parcelled them out among 
his trading acquaintances. Most belonged to the Enríquez and Del 
Valle clans, with several of their slaves. The widow and daughter of 
an old acquaintance of the Venezuelan authorities, the merchant 
David Morales, had also arrived.43
On an uncertain date, though it must have been close in time, 
news also arrived from Paraguaná, the coastal region of Venezu-
ela nearest to Curaçao and Aruba. Several Curaçaoan families and 
some Frenchmen who were aboard an English schooner were not 
welcomed in Aruba, so the English thought of leaving them on 
Tierra Firme. It was known that a boat had arrived ‘with nine blacks 
and three whites, one from San Sebastián, another from San Juan 
de Cruz, and one American, the latter ones armed, and according 
to the inquiry, they were found to be with the French’.44 All were 
detained except four of the blacks and they were referred to the 
Coro authorities. To the consternation of the city’s authorities, it 
appears that the four fugitives, after being found and their partici-
pation in the band of Frenchmen confirmed, were walking freely 
about the city.45
This situation entailed an additional problem for the Venezue-
lan authorities: Christian charity called on them to receive the émi-
grés with open arms, most of them being known to the merchants 
of Puerto Cabello and La Guaira. However, the fact that they were 
Jews expelled from Spain and its empire required additional care 
to be taken beyond what the law required for all foreigners without 
naturalization papers, apart from the fact that, once more, the fac-
tions that were fighting among themselves on the island were, at 
the time, allies of Spain.
The affair was studied by the Royal Audiencia which, surrepti-
tiously, decreed that the émigrés ran no additional risk on the island 
and therefore should be returned forthwith to Curaçao, and that no 
more émigrés should be accepted, who ‘will have to suffer [...] the 
43  AGI, Estado 67, No. 87, folios 17v-20v.
44  AGI, Caracas 486, ‘Papeleta de noticias acompañando a carta del Intendente Interino de 
Ejército de Caracas’, Caracas, 7-10-1800. On 1-9-1800 news had been sent to Coro from the 
town of Santa Ana, on the Paraguaná peninsula, about the arrival of 54 persons, probably com-
prised of French families from Curaçao, who were sent to Coro and were distributed ‘among the 
houses of honourable citizens who would watch over and observe their conduct’ as their designs 
were unknown (González 1997:145).
45  AGI, Caracas 486, Manuel Carrera to Francisco de Sojo, Coro, 27-9-1800. |  Ramón Aizpurua
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usual discomforts and losses of comparable cases, but no explicit per-
secution against the lives and properties of the citizens. They shall 
obey whoever shall ultimately be declared Ruler of the island and 
shall remain in their houses and possessions, as they were before, 
since it is not credible that a movement of this nature have as its 
objective robbery, pillage, and the destruction of private citizens’.46 
The Venezuelan authorities were to ‘protect the inhabitants of these 
provinces from the infection that could spread through the religious 
and political order’.47 Guevara immediately sent a communication 
with the resolution of the Royal Audiencia to the highest authorities 
of Coro and Puerto Cabello, so that they would act accordingly.48
A  trader  from  Puerto  Cabello,  José  Antonio  Martel,  gave  a 
detailed description of the conflict that lasted from the 3rd to the 14th 
of September to Francisco de Sojo, treasurer of the Royal Treasury 
in Puerto Cabello. Martel had been on a Spanish boat that could 
not come into port in Willemstad, but did make port in Caracas-
baai on 17 September. Martel told Sojo that they had lived through 
eight days of combat, with neither side showing an advantage. If the 
governor had given permission to leave the island, it would already 
have been empty of ‘families’, but he did not because many hidden 
men went along with the women and children. Martel said that 
he had lost his house and over 2,000 pesos, and that on the island 
more than one million pesos had been lost.49
Martel states in his account that on 4 September, after the French 
had left, ‘the citizens and traders spent the entire day in revelry, feast-
ing and rejoicing, for the sake of seeing that they were free of them, 
without attending to any other thing except to this entertainment’. 
One of those who deceived the guards of the Fort Sint Michiel was a 
son of Pedro Brión.50 The French schooners that remained watching 
over the coast of Curaçao seized several ships from the coast that were 
coming with provisions or to engage in business. Those that could 
avoid the French, in general loaded with maize and bananas, dis-
embarked in Caracasbaai, where they sold their cargo and returned 
to the coast. On 8 September, Lauffer sent several officials in a boat 
from Coro, with news of the incidents on the English frigate Nereida. 
On the 9th, an American schooner arrived carrying provisions.51 Mar-
46  AGI, Estado 67, No. 87, folios 21v-24v (folios 22v-23), decree of the Royal Audiencia, Cara-
cas, 20-9-1800. 
47  AGI, Estado 67, No. 87, folio 22v.
48  AGI, Estado 67, No. 87, folio 24v, circular of Governor Guevara, Caracas, 20-9-1800.
49  AGI, Caracas 486, José Antonio Martel to Francisco Sojo, Curaçao, 14-9-1800, folio 1.
50  This quite probably was Luis Brión, later Admiral of the Venezuelan navy, during the war of 
independence. At the time, he was working as a translator for the French.
51  AGI, Caracas 486, folios 1-4v. 5  Revolution and politics in Venezuela and Curaçao, 1795-1800  |
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tel provided details not only of the daily skirmishes, but also of the 
actions of the English, about whom, in another letter that continues 
with the account of the incidents, he says
English vessels are expected all the time, and troops of the same; 
therefore, I believe, and ensure, that this, when it remains for the 
English, they will pay them much money which is why they aid in 
her defence; the English frigate does not forsake us and the offi-
cers come to shore as guards every day to the fort. They have taken 
account of all the ships that there are in port, and the governor 
[Lauffer] does not let any Spanish boat leave despite all insistence, 
nor gives license to any person, no matter how much they protest. 
This is how we all are, most on their ships and others outside the 
city, awaiting the end of this.
Even though this place is very strong, and that it is impossible that 
these four Frenchmen could take it, if it were not for the English 
commander  [of  the  frigate  Nereida],  it  appears  to  me  that  they 
would have already surrendered, but the Englishman does not con-
sent to it and the governor is working feverishly.52
When a negotiator sent to the island by Guevara to talk to Lauffer 
returned from the island, the news he brought is that no one rec-
ognized  the  governor’s  authority  anymore  since  the  captain  of 
the English frigate did not allow it, ‘repeating that [Curaçao] is 
a possession of Great Britain’.53 To some extent, the concern of 
the Venezuelan authorities was already drifting away from the after-
effects of the social and regional revolts, and was focusing on the 
English, who, according to the interim intendant and regent of the 
Royal Audiencia of Caracas, would inundate the Venezuelan coast-
line with contraband products and seditious papers, to ‘deceive 
and delude the vassals of Your Majesty, as they have done since the 
beginning of this war, and in particular since they occupied the 
island of Trinidad. This, disregarding the effect that could come 
from the threats by said captain to invade Tierra Firme with a great 
armed force.’54
52  AGI, Caracas 486, folios 1-1v, José Antonio Martel to Francisco de Sojo, Curaçao, 19-9-1800, 
in which Martel brings the information up to date regarding the five days from the 15th to the 
19th of that month, although without the diligence of the previous report.
53  AGI, Caracas 486, folios 1-1v, ‘El Intendente Interino de Ejército de Caracas Remite copias 
de las últimas noticias que ha tenido de los sucesos de la isla de Curazao, e indica los perjuicios 
que pueden causar más fácilmente los enemigos que la ocupan’, Caracas, 27-10-1800. The 
bearer of the news was Telésforo de Orea, negotiator send to Curaçao by Governor Guevara.
54  AGI, Caracas 486, folio 1v.|  Ramón Aizpurua
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conclusion
With the information that the Venezuelan authorities and, there-
fore,  the  Spanish  authorities  had  at  their  disposal,  the  events 
occurring  between  June  1797  and  September  1800  in  Curaçao 
are difficult to understand and interpret. Tierce and Devaux are 
presented as two perfidious and dangerous rebels who wanted to 
use  Venezuelan  fugitives  and  revolutionaries  for  their  own  per-
sonal objectives of throwing Venezuela into confusion and gaining 
access to the colony’s wealth. The history of the insurrections and 
conspiracies of prior years led the colonial authorities to think this 
way, from the dangerous Coro insurrection in 1795, to the con-
spiracy of La Guaira in 1797, to the fruitless projects to subvert the 
order in Maracaibo and Cartagena in 1799. They thought that the 
French, from their own possessions or from their new stronghold 
in Curaçao, were behind such conflicts, with the purpose of help-
ing to spread the ‘pernicious’ republican and egalitarian ideas in 
the Spanish colonies in the Americas, and/or to support local, 
often  non-white  revolutionaries.  But  the  authorities  in  Caracas 
also feared that the French, in the end, would seize Curaçao and, 
despite being allied at the moment in their common war against 
the English, would set foot on Tierra Firme or at least spread their 
revolutionary ideas, causing social and political chaos in the Span-
ish colonies of the Americas. 
The  Spanish  authorities  –  colonial  or  central  –  had  a  very 
uncomfortable ally in the French, as much or more so than their 
eternal enemy Great Britain, which they distrusted not only for hav-
ing taken over in 1797 the promising island of Trinidad, off of east-
ern Venezuela, but also for British expansionism elsewhere in the 
Caribbean, including now towards Curaçao, the threshold to Ven-
ezuela. The words of the commander of Puerto Cabello cannot bet-
ter describe what the Venezuelan authorities were thinking when 
he wrote about ‘the deplorable state of that colony [Curaçao], des-
tined to be victim of the greed and ambition of the French, or to 
pass perhaps under the English yoke, each extreme worse than the 
other’.55
Seen from this perspective, the least dangerous of Spain’s ‘adver-
saries’ were, in the end, the Dutch, including the Dutch regime in 
Curaçao. The former intimate enemy became a bit more of a friend 
who, even if mistrusted, was always there, sharing the present and 
the future. To some extent, both Governor Lauffer and Governor 
55  AGI, Estado 67, No. 87, folios 13v-14v (folios 13v-14), Puerto Cabello, 14-9-1800. 5  Revolution and politics in Venezuela and Curaçao, 1795-1800  |
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Guevara were explicit on this. But both English and French aggres-
sion upset the situation.
It  is  not  evident  that  a  coordinated  plan  existed  to  subvert 
peoples subject to the colonial connection, in political-economic 
and in social terms, a scheme having its origin in Haiti or in the 
French colonies of the Caribbean. And yet it is tempting to ‘see’ in 
the very complex conflicts sketched above a certain ‘teleology’, in 
tune with the ‘nature’ of the times. But questions abound. Thus the 
documents and information of the period, from different sources 
and with different perspectives, may make it difficult to accept that 
Tierce and Devaux were indeed seeking to bring about a ‘coup 
d’état’ in Curaçao in September 1799, privileging the manoeuvr-
ing of Governor Lauffer as decisive instead. But there is no hard 
evidence to corroborate either interpretation. It does seem clear 
though that, aside from whatever conspiracies and orders, little was 
needed in those days and places to ignite revolts among the ‘people 
of colour’. After all, revolutions often do not present themselves 
as such immediately, but are the often unanticipated outcome of 
a process. And indeed, there was no inevitable outcome of the 
confusing objectives and actions of Tierce, Devaux, and Lauffer, 
to name only three of the important protagonists: not necessarily a 
social revolution or the surrender of the colony to an ally or enemy.
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The Patriot coup d’état in Curaçao, 1796
Karwan Fatah-Black
introduction1
Slavery and race were not the only contentious issues shaking up 
Curaçao in the Age of Revolutions. Violent confrontations between 
the military and the urban free whites and coloureds of Willemstad 
had preceded the 1795 slave revolt. In the years following the revolt, 
urban oppositional movements had a profound impact on island 
politics. These conflicts highlight the depth of the political instabil-
ity on Curaçao in an uncertain geopolitical context. By sketching 
the broader political turmoil of the time, this article aims to contex-
tualize the slave revolt as part of a series of struggles aiming at social 
and political change.
In December 1796 a coalition of Curaçaoans carried out a coup 
d’état.  With  substantial  popular  support,  the  Military  Committee 
replaced the acting representative of the Batavian Republic Jan Jacob 
Beaujon with Johan Rudolph Lauffer. Beaujon had been appointed 
as acting governor in August of that year. This came after Governor 
Johannes de Veer had stepped down, refusing to swear loyalty to the 
Batavian Republic. The quick succession of governors in 1796, due to 
political conflict, was uncommon on Curaçao. The island had long 
been ruled by the same governor, who directly represented the Dutch 
West India Company (WIC). Even after the company’s charter was 
not renewed in 1791 and the Dutch state assumed the administra-
tion of the WIC’s domains, the organizational structure had been left 
unaltered and personnel had stayed in place (Van Goor 1994:173). 
With the French occupation of the Netherlands in 1795, the Dutch 
Patriot movement came to power and founded the Batavian Republic. 
1  Research for this paper was done as part of a Master’s thesis in social history at the Uni-
versity of Amsterdam in 2008 with Dr. Marjolein ’t Hart. Special thanks go out to all those who 
participated so generously in the seminar on Curaçao in the Age of Revolutions.|  Karwan Fatah-Black
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The Dutch Patriots did not plan to change anything about the gover-
nance of their colony (Schutte 1974:15). Only very few politicians in 
the metropolis had the idea that something needed to change in how 
the island was governed. On Curaçao, however, a popular movement 
pushed for a change in the colony’s government and policies. The 
result of this was the coup d’état carried out by the Military Commit-
tee and Johann Rudolph Lauffer in December 1796.
In the months before the great slave revolt of 1795 there was a 
rapid increase in civil unrest on the island. Fights broke out between 
the garrison and the free whites and mulattoes in the city (Hamel-
berg 1897:25). While the slave revolt temporarily pushed the urban 
citizenry back into the fold, the conflicts escalated again in 1796. 
The National Assembly of the Batavian Republic was warned of the 
situation and sent Vice-Admiral Braak to the West Indies to ensure 
the colonies would not change sides and join the former stadholder 
William V and the English. In August 1796 the governor and coun-
cil of Curaçao were asked to take an oath of allegiance to the newly 
formed Republic.2 Because Governor Johannes de Veer and two 
other dignitaries refused this, the state apparatus entered a crisis. 
A substantial number of people in the military did not approve of 
the officials’ resignation. They saw it as a surrender of the Oran-
gists to the Patriots. Soldiers and officers openly contested the new 
power holders. It seemed uncertain if the governor and council 
would be able to hold on to their positions. The unstable state of 
affairs existed for four months from 10 August 1796 until 1 Decem-
ber 1796. During this period a substantial section the Curaçaoan 
population developed a set of demands and political leadership 
independent of the metropolis. This movement, labelled here as 
that of ‘the Curaçao Patriots’, headed a coalition that ousted the 
official representative of the Republic in December 1796.
The political power struggle of 1796 was very much a local affair. 
In this sense it was strikingly similar to the contemporaneous strug-
gles in Dutch cities, where engaged and quite radical movements 
also proliferated (Prak 1991; Jourdan 2006). However, the context 
of slavery, racism and intense imperial competition in the region 
did give the Patriot movement a very specific form on the island.
Historians have reduced the political conflict on the island at the 
time to a brawl between Patriots and Orangists or pro-French and pro-
2  The Dutch Republic was defeated during the Coalition Wars against revolutionary France. 
Aided by a French invasion the Dutch Patriot movement took power and founded the Batavian 
Republic. The former stadholder fled to England, from where he unsuccessfully tried to mount 
a resistance by, among other things, sending a letter to the colonies asking them to surrender to 
the English.6  The Patriot coup d’état in Curaçao, 1796  |
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English forces (Hamelberg 1897; Hartog 1961; Goslinga 1990). The 
division between Orangists and Patriots was copied from the major 
political conflict that existed in the Dutch Republic between 1780 
and 1787. Dutch Patriot agitation had focused on the need for eco-
nomic, political and cultural nationalism. Those who did not believe 
in revolutionary change rallied behind stadholder William V, mem-
ber of the House of Orange, and were subsequently called Orangists. 
The Patriot movement managed to control several city councils and 
mounted a considerable threat to the status quo. On behalf of the 
Orangists, the Prussian army invaded to restore order. This forced 
many Patriots into exile. Anticipating renewed support in Dutch cit-
ies and with the help from the invading French revolutionary army, 
they returned to the country and came to power in January 1795. 
Under the slogan ‘Vrijheid, Gelijkheid en Broederschap’ (freedom, 
equality and fraternity) they founded the French-leaning Batavian 
Republic. The Batavian Republic was politically divided between the 
Moderates,  Unitarians  (radicals),  and  Federalists  (conservatives). 
These factions clashed regularly in the National Assembly on many 
issues, but on the colonies, the Patriots had very little to say. They 
certainly  did  not  nurture  many  revolutionary  plans.  Meanwhile, 
popular support for the Batavian Republic and its French patrons 
waned as the French occupation became an ever bigger burden on 
the population in the form of taxation and conscription. 
On Curaçao the anti-Orangist opposition had substantial local 
roots. The urban citizenry participated actively in the events of 1796 
and the years that followed. Their actions in the militia, combined 
with the political demands they voiced in petitions helped the Cura-
çao Patriots come to power. The moderates wanted better defences 
for the harbour and a neutral position in international relations so 
as not to scare away ships from any particular nation. The radicals 
(both coloured and white) pushed for a more fundamental trans-
formation supported by a French invasion. This article focuses on 
the political divisions on the island, and the coming to power of the 
Curaçao Patriots. It examines the political content of the conflicts 
on the island and frames these in their Atlantic context.
representatives of the republic 
After the bankruptcy of the Dutch West India Company in 1791, the 
Dutch States General took over the company and its domains (Den 
Heijer 1994:187). Curaçao became the direct responsibility of the 
States General through the directly subordinate institution of the |  Karwan Fatah-Black
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Council for Colonies in America and the Possessions of the State 
in Africa (Hartog 1961:322). With the transfer of power, nothing 
changed in the formal structure of the colony and the personnel 
working for the local state apparatus. The governor ruled the island 
together with the Political Council, which decided on policy matters 
as well as on criminal cases. The council was made up of the gover-
nor, the commanders of the navy frigates, the commander of the 
garrison, the commissioner for the slave trade and the militia cap-
tain. While Curaçao’s ruling council had initially been an entirely 
military body, by the end of the eighteenth century, islanders could 
be co-opted into the council by the governor. The West India Com-
pany would then ratify the decision (Goslinga 1990:337). Neverthe-
less, the military remained a dominant element in the council.
Johannes de Veer was governor of Curaçao at the time the West 
India Company ceased to exist. De Veer had been part of the island’s 
bureaucracy since the late 1750s (Krafft 1951:250). He worked as 
the accountant of the garrison3 and later as secretary of the island’s 
political council.4 He became governor in 1782. The commanders 
of the two frigates Medea and Ceres played an important role in local 
politics. They participated in the meetings of the Political Council, 
the main governing body of the colony. F.S. Wierts was commander 
of the frigate Medea of 36 cannons and 800 tons. Albert Kikkert was 
colonel and captain at sea of the frigate Ceres of 40 cannons and 860 
tons. The crews of both ships were in a bad state. Many had died or 
were in hospital, and the rest were hungry and poor. Wierts had left 
the Republic in July 1793. During his stay in Willemstad the state of 
the navy vessels deteriorated (Milo 1936:326). Kikkert was one of 
the military commanders who kept his position after the Batavian 
Republic was founded. As leader of an important part of the mili-
tary, he played a major role during the disturbances in the 1790s. He 
would also prove to be very capable of surviving political ruptures. 
After the founding of Kingdom Holland under Louis Napoleon, 
Kikkert received a high ranking position in the navy. Under King 
William I, he returned to Curaçao as governor.
Military  power  on  the  island  was  exercised  by  the  garrison, 
the navy ships, and the civil militia. The ships played a significant 
role, as they were armed with a substantial number of canons, and 
were supposed to be able to deflect threats to the city of Willems-
tad. During domestic disturbances, the cannons on the Ceres were 
3  Instructions for Johannes de Veer Abrahamszoon, installed as accountant of the garrison 
on the island of Curaçao (Schiltkamp & De Smidt 1978, I:333).
4  Instructions for a new captain-lieutenant of the Artillery (Schiltkamp & De Smidt 1978, 
I:343-351).6  The Patriot coup d’état in Curaçao, 1796  |
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often loaded and aimed not at sea but at the city. Kikkert men-
tions that he loaded them with shrapnel when news of the slave 
revolt arrived. He also threatened to bombard the garrison during 
a conflict in 1796 (Milo 1936). The commanders of both ships were 
not transients in the city but an integral part of the ruling elite on 
the island. Kikkert and Wierts were supposed to work together, but 
there are many reports of them falling out with each other and hav-
ing considerable arguments about political decisions. In July 1796 
Kikkert took temporary command of both ships while Wierts recov-
ered from an attack by an armed group of men ‘wearing French 
national  cockades’.  During  this  incident  captain  Robert  Minors 
died and Wierts was severely wounded (Hamelberg 1897:28). 
political radicalism and the broader opposition movement
It was quite common for conflicts in the wider Atlantic World to be 
imported to the island. When the American War of Independence 
(1775-1783) broke out, the Curaçaoan government had to take 
measures to prevent citizens of the warring nations from provoking 
and violently clashing with each other in the city. Enthusiasm for 
the ideology of the French Revolution was countered in a similar 
way in 1789 (Schiltkamp and De Smidt 1978:381). An ordinance 
was issued that forbade the singing of French revolutionary songs 
and the wearing of decorations with French revolutionary slogans 
(Hartog 1961:322; Schiltkamp and De Smidt 1978:389). That same 
year a commission from the States General visited Curaçao to inves-
tigate what had caused animosity between the local government 
and the colony’s inhabitants (De Gaay Fortman 1919:442). By 1793 
the revolutionary undercurrent was led by Jan Hendrik Hansz and 
Cornelis Berch. Their speeches prompted a ban on public speak-
ing against the House of Orange on 21 May of that year. Attend-
ing these speeches was forbidden, and those who did and failed to 
inform public prosecutor Van Teijlingen were to be punished.
The Revolutionaries were accused of playing a key role at the 
start of the slave revolt of 1795. The governor sent letters to the 
Netherlands complaining about the behaviour of the radicals. Har-
tog writes that clashes between the soldiers and citizenry intensi-
fied after the news arrived that the Netherlands had been liberated 
(or occupied, according to one’s point of view) by the French. On 
4 August 1795 an ordinance was issued forbidding freemen and 
‘Negroes’ to walk with sticks and clubs. Soldiers below the rank 
of officer were banned from wearing their weapons when not on |  Karwan Fatah-Black
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call, and sailors, except those from the frigates, were summoned 
to gather in the harbour after nine p.m. At that hour the pubs and 
dance halls had to close as well (Hartog 1961:324).
Hansz played an important role in focusing the attention of the 
National Assembly on the disloyal attitude of the rulers of Curaçao. 
A letter from Hansz was read in which he complained about the 
ban on wearing the alliance cockade (Wagenaar 1806:306-9).5 The 
National Assembly was unhappy about the ban on wearing revolu-
tionary cockades. From the floor of the assembly it was said that Jan 
Hendrik Hansz was known to the Patriots as being a good man, and 
the Curaçao government was ordered to protect him.6
While vocal opposition was largely restricted to the Revolution-
aries in the years preceding the slave revolt, thereafter and par-
ticularly during 1796 an opposition movement grew amongst the 
island’s  middle  class.  Uniting  behind  the  leadership  of  Johann 
Rudolph Lauffer, these Curaçaoan Patriots handed in several peti-
tions demanding from the government both a change in policy as 
well as a change of personnel. One of these petitions stated that 
‘this island’s sole source of wealth is trade’. The petitioners com-
plained that Jewish brokers monopolised contacts with captains 
who arrived from abroad, which allegedly hurt the trade of the gen-
tile merchants on the island, preventing them from making deals 
with foreign captains. The petitioners also wanted to ban foreign 
competitors by levying a five per cent tax on trade not conducted 
by inhabitants of the island. This was supposed to increase trade 
and ban the ‘deception by foreign merchants’. The final request 
was to install a port pilot to promote the safety of the harbour.7
Johann Rudolf Lauffer was one of the central figures in a move-
ment that might be seen as the Curaçaoan version of the Patriot 
movement. Together with fellow islanders he handed in numer-
ous requests defending the position of specific merchants or more 
general requests like the one cited above. Lauffer had arrived as a 
common soldier in 1776 on the island. What we know about the 
period before his arrival on Curaçao is based on his own account, 
in which he depicts himself as an idealistic young man from Switzer-
land, who was inspired by ‘Voltaire, Rousseau, d’Alembert, Diderot, 
and the other encyclopaedists’. How much of this is true we do not 
know, but it is at least telling of the kind of man Lauffer aspired to 
be (Van Meeteren 1944:13).
5  Dagverhaal der Nationale Vergadering, session 20-5-1796, nr. 67, and session 23 May 1796, 
nr. 533.
6  Dagverhaal der Nationale Vergadering, session 4-7- 1795, nr. 110. 
7  OAC 138, ‘Request for improvements of trade and the harbour’, first half 1796.6  The Patriot coup d’état in Curaçao, 1796  |
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During the slave revolt Lauffer did not play any notable role. 
In the period following the revolt he became a respected person 
amongst the Willemstad citizenry. After the changing of the oath 
on 10 August 1796, the white civil militia demanded that they elect 
a new Captain to replace the disliked Orangist Bernardus Anthony 
Cancrijn, who had stepped down in the meeting where the oath to 
the Batavian Republic had to be taken. The militia elected Lauffer 
to be their Captain.8 He immediately started to collect weapons 
from the inhabitants to increase the militia’s strength. Lauffer’s 
choices suggest a grand plan to make Willemstad regain its reputa-
tion as a neutral port to do business. In order to accomplish this, 
reliable armed forces were needed, as well as strong defences, and 
discipline among slaves and the white lower classes in the city. The 
Orangist elements in the local government seemed an obstacle to 
accomplish this, and had to be removed from office. While this 
could have been done quite easily if the French were invited to land 
and disarm the Orangists, the Curaçao Patriots were not interested 
in a French take-over. 
Within the council there was a heated debate about whether or 
not the French should be allowed more influence on the island. 
Illustrative was the discussion about flying the French flag next to 
the Dutch one from the fortress in Willemstad. Should the French 
flag be there permanently or only if ships from other nations were 
approaching? In this debate, the Curaçao Patriots only wanted to 
use the threat of French military power to scare away others by rais-
ing the French flag on strategic moments. However, they did not 
want it to interfere with the island’s autonomy.9
In petitions to the council in support of Lauffer there was a sig-
nificant shift in the identity of signatories. The people who signed 
the petitions proposed a tax on goods taken from prize ships, which 
could be used by Lauffer to aid the construction of better defence 
works.10 In the first petition (157 signers) the radicals Hansz and 
Berch are found at the top. Their political allies Jean Baptiste Tierce 
Cadet – a remarkable figure discussed at length in Han Jordaan’s 
contribution to this volume – and P. Duyckinck were not far behind 
them.11 On the second petition (132 signers), Berch is still leading 
the list, but a large group of Jews had been added to their ranks.
8  OAC 106, ‘Minutes’, 15-8-1796.
9  OAC 106, ‘Combined Council’, nr.8 on 12-9-1796.
10  OAC 138, ‘Petition for the improvement of the defense under the command of Lauffer’, 
nr.104 between 28-10 and 4-11-1796. The building of the fortress ‘Republic’, seen by historians 
as the only success of the period, was attributed to the leadership of Lauffer.
11  OAC 138, ‘Petition in support of Lauffer 24-9-1796’, nr.105 24-9-1796.|  Karwan Fatah-Black
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A considerable section of the island’s Jews became interested 
in the ideas of the French Revolution.12 The island was tradition-
ally home to a Jewish community heavily engaged in both trade 
and shipping. The Jewish community in the Republic was strongly 
divided  between  Orangists  and  Patriots.  Impoverished  Jews  in 
Curaçao showed an interest in the ideals of equality, fraternity, and 
freedom of the French Revolution. The Jews who congregated in 
the Neve Shalom synagogue tried to break with the metropolitan 
community in Amsterdam and were generally more sympathetic 
to the revolution. Among them were Moses Frois (Emmanuel and 
Emmanuel 1970:286) and the French agent Isaac Sasportas.
There were hardly any plantation owners amongst those who 
signed, although many of those on the list would obtain a planta-
tion in the years after the revolution.13 The content of the petitions 
did not differ very much, except that the second one was more 
radical in its demands, requesting for all military responsibility to 
be taken away from Beaujon and handed to Lauffer and Kikkert.14 
revolt in the armed forces
In 1796, the newly formed Batavian Republic sent Vice-Admiral 
Adriaan Braak to the West Indies to assert the power of the new 
Republic over its West Indian domains. Braak was granted the mis-
sion to dismiss all colonial officials from their oath to the stadholder 
– who had sent a letter from Kew asking the colonies to follow him 
and join the English against the French and against the Batavian 
Republic – and have them swear loyalty to the Batavian Republic. 
Braak’s intervention was not supposed to upset the power structure 
or replace any officials. The Dutch Patriots were not interested in 
changing the economic and social structures or in purging Oran-
gist elements in the colonies, but the situation on Curaçao proved 
to have a dynamic they could not control. 
Governor De Veer refused to go to the council’s extraordinary 
meeting where loyalty to the Batavian Republic had to be declared. 
He said he felt ill and wanted to use this opportunity to resign. De 
12  The Jews on the island, who had strong ties to the Amsterdam community, were only eman-
cipated as late as 1825. Publicatie en provisioneel Regelement Van Zijne Hoogheid den Heere Prince van 
Oranje Nassau, etc. (Den Haag 1750) 7; cited in Kaplan 1982:203, 207.
13  The names on the petition have been checked against the list of plantation owners in Van 
der Lee 1989. The family of Cornelis Berch did own some land, but the signers who were able to 
acquire land at some stage in their lives did so after the events of 1796.
14  OAC 138, ‘Petition in support of Lauffer 4-11-1796’, nr. 104.6  The Patriot coup d’état in Curaçao, 1796  |
131
Veer had been part of the local bureaucracy since the 1750s and 
had notified the council before about his wish to step down. It was 
decided that power would be handed to a provisional governor who 
could later be approved by the States General. During that same 
meeting where the governor was absent, secretary Petrus Bernardus 
van Starkenborgh and captain of the civil militia Bernardus Anthony 
Cancrijn stepped down.15 This opened the floodgates of revolt. All 
of a sudden a group of senior officials arose, openly contesting the 
sovereignty of the Batavian Republic on the island. Following the 
example of the defectors in government, several army officers also 
started to refuse the new oath, and with them parts of the garrison 
as well (Wagenaar 1806:306). The Patriots sought to make good use 
of this walkout by electing Patriots to the now vacant positions. The 
new – provisional – governor was not elected. A sealed letter received 
from Holland named Beaujon as De Veer’s provisional successor. 
The Patriots initially trusted him because he had received approval 
from the Batavian Republic’s Committee for Colonial Affairs. 
During  this  same  council  session  a  revolt  was  brewing  in  Fort 
Amsterdam, the island’s main fort. The officer who received the orders 
to organize the ceremony whereby the provisional governor would 
have to present himself to the citizens strongly advised against arming 
the garrison for the event. He had sensed the atmosphere amongst 
the troops well. When Beaujon showed himself on the balcony of the 
fortress, the soldiers and several officers shouted ‘Orange on top’, 
and riots occurred. On the frigate Ceres cannons were loaded to fire at 
the rioters (Milo 1936:329). Parading the new governor through the 
streets was quickly cancelled.16 Resigned of the oath to the stadholder, 
but armed and decorated with orange ribbons, the soldiers roamed 
through the streets and fortress. What started out as a quick advance 
for the Patriots soon turned into a crisis during which the Patriots were 
holding office, but their auxiliaries were outside of their control. 
Multiple contenders were claiming to be in charge of the island 
while they only controlled part of the state apparatus. The militia 
was in Patriot hands, while the allegiance of the garrison and the 
crews on board the navy vessels was uncertain, but they were pos-
sibly Orangists.17 The council and governor feared for their safety 
15  OAC 106, ‘Extraordinaire politie raad’, 11-8-1796.
16  OAC 106, ‘Extraordinaire politie raad’, 11-8-1796.
17  Later it became clear that Patriot officers were also in the army, but due to the isolation of 
the Patriot voice in the armed forces, they kept silent. After the protests by the Orangists in the 
garrison, Lieutenant Colonel Huische was asked to help restore order amongst the troops. He 
said that was impossible as long as the officers had not sworn loyalty to the Batavian Republic. 
OAC 223, Plakaten, Publicaties, edictale citaties, vrijbrieven, paspoorten, zeebrieven, commissies, instruc-
ties en eden van ambtenaren, 1722-1803, nr. 450-550.|  Karwan Fatah-Black
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and fled to the Ceres. While the crew accepted them on board, 
they used the opportunity to demand their pay, arguing that they 
needed their wages earned under the old oath, before they could 
accept a new one. The crew on the other navy vessel, the Medea, 
also disobeyed orders, demanding their wages and threatening to 
mutiny (Milo 1936:330). The Patriots had no choice but to respond 
to the rebellion in the armed forces. The Orangists had a very real 
possibility  to  return  to  power  through  a  counter-revolutionary 
coup with the support of the mobilized armed forces. To buy off 
the impending mutiny, the Patriots increased the army’s rations.18 
This defused the immediate threat of mutiny of the armed forces. 
The officers who refused to re-enter the service boarded a U.S. brig 
and left the island.19 
Undoubtedly with the recent slave revolt in mind, one of the first 
actions of the new council was to invite the captains of the Free Negro 
Corps and the Free Mulatto Corps to make sure that they would 
keep quiet during the regime change.20 Ensuring this was important 
since their loyalty had been questioned during the black revolt in 
1795, when they had only mobilized a few men (Paula 1974:299). 
After the initial chaos in early August the council got some room to 
breathe. Not that order was restored, but the direct threat to their 
position seemed to have passed. There were still many disturbances 
in the city, and curfews were issued for slaves, soldiers, and sailors. 
Inns were closed, and the selling of drink was restricted.21
The French ‘allies’ now tried to assert their control over the 
island  from  Guadeloupe.  This  followed  logically  from  the  strat-
egy of the revolutionary governor of Guadeloupe, Victor Hugues. 
Hugues had been appointed by the Jacobins to bring the decree of 
slave emancipation to Guadeloupe and capture the island from the 
English. Besides his great influence on race relations on the island, 
Hugues also turned Guadeloupe into a French military stronghold 
against the English in the Caribbean (Dubois 1999). The Curaçao 
Patriots – despite their trouble holding on to power – were not 
eager to allow French meddling. They thought they could fend for 
themselves and did not need interference, let alone occupation.22 
Only the French suggestion to restructure the militia was followed, 
as it overlapped with the plans of the Curaçao Patriots to strengthen 
the island’s defences. 
18  OAC 106, 15-8-1796.
19  OAC 106, nr.2, 11-8-1796.
20  OAC 106, ‘Extraordinary meeting of the political council’, nr. 2, 11-8-1796.
21  OAC 106, ‘Minutes’, 20-8-1796.
22  They complied with some suggestions: OAC 106, ‘Minutes’, 17-8-1796.6  The Patriot coup d’état in Curaçao, 1796  |
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the breestraat meeting
The organized response from the Orangists in the military against 
the advance of the Curaçao Patriots and Revolutionaries came in 
late August 1796. A number of high ranking officers were angry 
about the way they had been excluded from the decisions made by 
the council in the period around the change of power. In a letter 
they threatened the council that peace could only be maintained 
if the Orangist officials De Veer, Cancrijn and Van Starckenborgh 
were returned to office.23 If that did not happen ‘the undersigned 
would take no responsibility for what would follow’.24 This threat 
came at a time when the atmosphere in the council was tense due 
to a conflict over the appointment of a new secretary.
The intended appointment of J.M. Brunnings as secretary to the 
council caused a first moment of polarisation between provisional 
Governor Beaujon and the Curaçao Patriots and Revolutionaries. 
Lauffer, as captain of the Civil Militia, used the threats of distur-
bances from the armed citizenry to put pressure on Beaujon and the 
council.25 Beaujon was stringent in his defence of the appointment. 
He said ‘that there is no popular vote here, if the council wished 
to listen to the voice of the people, his lordship [Beaujon himself] 
will resign from office’. Beaujon went on the offensive because ‘his 
lordship had found a willing commander to escort [the new secre-
tary] during the presentation through the city’. Protesting at the 
presentation of newly appointed officials was a recurring element 
of oppositional movements. For the governor and council these 
moments were important to affirm their position. It looked as if 
Beaujon was planning to use the parading of the new secretary as a 
test of the relative strength of the Orangist army and the opposing 
citizenry. And he apparently had found part of the army willing to 
enter in this confrontation. Lauffer and the other Patriots did not 
like this idea at all and managed to postpone the event. The parade 
of Brunnings could proceed only after Lauffer had convinced the 
wider opposition movement not to resist the appointment. He then 
notified the council that ‘the largest and best part of the Citizens 
supported the presentation’.26 Lauffer had thus removed the fuse 
from the powder keg by pacifying the citizens and therewith had 
ensured that Beaujon did not get the confrontation that he was 
23  At around the same time, Van Starckenborgh was accused of being pro-English. He denied 
this, emphasizing that he resigned because he did not agree with the new constitution.
24  OAC 106, between 20-8-1796 and 31-8-1796.
25  OAC 106, 23-8-1796.
26  OAC 106, 23-8-1796 and 24-8-1796.|  Karwan Fatah-Black
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looking for. That way Lauffer reaffirmed his position as a central 
figure within local politics. 
While Beaujon was mustering his forces in the army, the armed 
and more radical part of the anti-Orangist movement – excluding 
Lauffer – came to the fore. They had been leading the petition 
movement, but were looking for stronger measures as well. They 
met after a meeting of the militia where they had voiced their 
opposition to Beaujon. Their plan was to elect commissioners to 
take control over the defences of the island (Hamelberg 1897:30). 
Beaujon, on the other hand, was starting to show his true colours. 
He was ready to unleash the Orangist army on the subversive meet-
ing, and this time not under the pretension of safeguarding the 
parading of the new secretary, but to directly break up the meeting 
representing the radical side of the opposition movement.27 
Captain  Kikkert  and  Captain  Lieutenant  Heshusius28  urged 
Beaujon not to let the ‘armed forces march against the citizenry’. 
They undoubtedly thought that once the military had been released, 
they would not stop at smashing the rebellious citizens, but would 
also attack the council and restore the Orangists to power. Wierts 
threatened to fire the cannons of his frigate Ceres on the garrison if 
they would march out to the meeting in the Breestraat (Hamelberg 
1897:30). Again Lauffer prevented a confrontation with the garri-
son. He succeeded in convincing Beaujon not to march the troops 
against the armed civilians. The next day a publication was issued by 
the governor and council in response to the events of that day. The 
oprokken van het gemeen (agitating the commoners) was denounced 
in strong language. The authorities especially condemned that civil-
ians ‘used weapons that were handed to the good citizens and inhab-
itants solely for maintaining peace and order, and for the defence 
against an enemy that seeks to attack this land from outside’.29 
The  ‘extraordinary  and  serious  publication’  also  prohibited 
‘Clubs’.30 The reason for this addition to the public announcement is 
somewhat mysterious. Clubs formed a central element of the Patriot 
movement in the Netherlands and had been of more significance 
to the Batavian revolt than the mythical cold winter of 1794-1795. 
Whether there were revolutionary clubs on Curaçao is not certain, 
and maybe they were only imagined by the government trying to 
vilify the movement or explain the salience of the street protest.
27  OAC 106, ‘Extraordinary meeting of the Council of Policy’, nr. 11, 27-9-1796.
28  He had sailed with Braak to the West Indies, and was sent by Braak to Curacao to secure the 
island.
29  OAC 223, ‘Regulations for maintaining order and peace’, nr. 24, 2-9-1796.
30  OAC 106, 31-8-1796.6  The Patriot coup d’état in Curaçao, 1796  |
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According to Lauffer this publication was ill received by the citi-
zenry.31 Counterrevolution had been evaded, but neither the Oran-
gists not the Revolutionaries had gained victory. The confrontation 
was a success for the Curaçao Patriots and especially Lauffer. He 
had shown Beaujon that he could control the radicals, and to the 
citizens he had illustrated that he could control Beaujon. To accom-
modate the citizens after the incident of 30 August, a sixth division 
of the militia was formed. Kikkert and Heshusius told Beaujon that 
their ships would not attack the city, and surely not the citizens. 
The conflict of 30 August had ended as a victory for the moder-
ate Curaçao Patriots. The Revolutionaries lost their rights to have 
clubs and meetings and were reprimanded for their agitation. The 
civil militia was expanded with an extra division, and Beaujon was 
put on the defensive. Kikkert and Heshusius justified their refusal 
to leave the ships on the basis that the ‘persons of Colour’ who 
would see the whites in open confrontation with each other might 
‘try to strengthen the rebellious movements’ and could easily cap-
ture the frigate Medea.32 It is possible that Kikkert and Heshusius 
really feared that this might happen. Normally they were not the 
ones scaremongering in the council. The atmosphere of fear was 
mostly created by Lauffer, who warned the council about the unrest 
amongst  the  populace,  and  used  it  as  a  lever  to  push  through 
reforms in the military and the general defence of the island.33
taking power
As the Curaçao Patriots and Revolutionaries moved closer to power, 
the  fundamental  split  within  their  broad  opposition  movement 
became clear. The split was between those who tried to make the 
island neutral, and those who sought to import the French Revolu-
tion through an invasion by the French if necessary. After French 
support had been declined by sending a letter to their command-
ers, the French kept insisting on ‘helping’ the islanders. The Cura-
çao Patriots kept arguing that the ‘assistance’ by the French should 
be refused. Those who still sympathized with the Orangists agreed 
with them on that point. The revolutionary captain of the artillery, 
Johannes Hendrik Gravenhorst, used the discussion about the rais-
ing of the flags to affirm that French assistance should not have been 
31  OAC 106, ‘Minutes’, 27-9-1796.
32  OAC 106, ‘Letter from the frigate Medea’, 31-8-1796.
33  OAC 106, ‘Extraordinary meeting of the Political Council’, nr. 11, 27-9-1796.|  Karwan Fatah-Black
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declined in the first place. He wanted to keep a French ship in the 
harbour on a permanent basis.34 Gravenhorst was a member of the 
council but also operated in various other circles. Since the council 
had refused the assistance from the French, he, Berch, Hansz, and 
some others asked the French Colonel Thomas to land and remove 
the council (including the Curaçao Patriots) from office (Hartog 
1961:469). In late September a group of mulattoes also sent a del-
egation to French navy vessels in the harbour, requesting them to 
intervene on the island. Not much later they sent a similar request 
to them in writing. The letter and the French response were read in 
the council, but their contents seem to have been lost.35 
On 20 October Commander M. Valteau of the French national 
frigate La Pensée co-authored a plan for the general defence of the 
island.36 He was sent from Guadeloupe and arrived on Curaçao in 
early October to make new overtures by requesting the formation of 
a Military Committee (MC).37 This special committee was to deal with 
all military matters. That same day, citizens of Willemstad handed in a 
similar proposition to that of the council. Beaujon was furious. When 
he was unable to prevent a decision on this issue from being made 
during a council session, he tried to become president of the commit-
tee. However, both Beaujon and Wierts were kept out of the commit-
tee because they were not allowed to leave their posts. The letter of 
the French contained a list of suitable Patriot candidates for the MC.38
The Patriots controlled the MC and started to work on the city’s 
defences. They organized the National Guard, and built a fortress 
appropriately named Fortress Republic. The infantry was expanded 
and a four-division-strong cavalry was founded. The artillery was put 
in the hands of Gravenhorst. With all military matters in anti-Oran-
gist hands, the takeover of the island was almost complete. The navy, 
garrison, and National Guard were now under the command of the 
Military Committee.39 It was only a small step to remove Beaujon. The 
anti-Orangist  coalition  had  succeeded  in  gaining  military  control 
after they had initially met with resistance in August. The corps of free 
blacks and free mulattoes was already under Lauffer’s command.40 
34  OAC 106, 12-9-1796.
35  OAC 106, ‘Extraordinary meeting of the Political Council’, 5-10-1796.
36  OAC 106, ‘Meeting of the Combined Councils held in Fortress Amsterdam’, 20-10-1796.
37  OAC 223, 20-10-1796.
38  OAC 223, ‘Letter from the French with directions how to form a Military Committee’, 
20-10-1796.
39  OAC 106, ‘Meeting of the Combined Councils held in Fortress Amsterdam’, 20-10-1796. 
Kikkert announced this, and the other councilors agreed.
40  OAC 106, ‘Extraordinary meeting of the Council held after the meeting of the Combined 
Council’, 12-9-1796. 6  The Patriot coup d’état in Curaçao, 1796  |
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The Military Committee was the institution that would complete 
the coup d’état. After its installation it started working on discred-
iting Beaujon. The members of the committee had access to the 
official papers of the previous governor and started to collect accu-
sations against Beaujon. He was painted as a corrupt Orangist who 
had conspired with the English and the former stadholder, and 
had failed to inform the islanders of the founding of the Batavian 
Republic when he arrived on the island in 1795. He was also said 
to have convinced his brother, the governor of Demerara, to sur-
render to the English. Furthermore, he had bought orange decora-
tions with public funds.41
His  defence  before  the  Military  Committee  was  fruitless.  On 
1  December,  Lauffer  took  power  with  the  support  of  moderate 
Patriots, the pro-French Revolutionaries, the revolutionary Jews, the 
armed forces, and the French from Guadeloupe. Lauffer replaced 
Beaujon as provisional governor and also held on to his military 
functions (Hartog 1961:467).42 On 6 December, the news was made 
public with a declaration that opened with the slogan ‘Freedom, 
Equality, Fraternity’.43 
conclusion
The metropolitan authorities of the Dutch West India Company, 
the  States  General,  and  the  National  Assembly  of  the  Batavian 
Republic had a static view of colonial government. None of them 
wanted to see any substantial change, neither in the organisational 
structure nor in the personnel on the ground. Even though great 
changes were demanded and enforced by the Batavian Republic in 
the Netherlands itself, the Dutch Patriots did not think the colonies 
should have a part in these transformations. Influential islanders, 
on the other hand, did look to implement specific policies mainly 
to restore the position of Willemstad as a successful nodal point in 
regional inter-imperial trade.
Robin Blackburn has made a distinction between the power of 
the metropolis over the colonies and the power of the colonists 
over their colony. He notes that the first turned out to be fragile at 
the end of the eighteenth century, while the second was growing 
stronger (Blackburn 1988:3-4). In the case of Curaçao, this mani-
41  OAC 106, ‘Accusations against Beaujon’, late November 1796.
42  OAC 106, 1-12-1796.
43  OAC 223, nr.44, 6-12-1796.|  Karwan Fatah-Black
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fested itself as a conflict between three main positions. The Cura-
çao Patriots wanted autonomy of the island’s governing council. 
The Revolutionaries (both white and coloured) tried to import the 
French Revolution. And the Orangists remained loyal to the House 
of Orange and the former stadholder, who had called on the colo-
nies to surrender to the English. This division was quite similar to 
rifts in other parts of the colonial Americas.
John Adams – second president of the United States and signer 
of the Declaration of Independence – had a keen eye for spotting 
political differences in the North American colonies in the period 
of the revolutionary upheavals. He wrote that many of those in poli-
tics were quite new to ‘public business’ and often opposed the revo-
lution ‘at least in the beginning’. Assessing the division between the 
various currents in the United States, he said there were three more 
or less equal groups. One third was in favour of the French, one 
third sided with England, and the ‘middle third, composed princi-
pally of the yeomanry, the soundest part of the nation, and always 
averse to war, were rather lukewarm both to England and France’ 
(Adams 1856:110-1). This division was also seen in Spanish America. 
The imperial powers France and England tried to rally supporters 
there, but a substantial section of the colonial populations seems 
to have been unconvinced they needed either of them (Adelman 
2010:71). Instead of being split between Patriots and Orangists, the 
Curaçaoans seem to have been divided along very similar lines. 
People’s allegiance and political strategies could change rapidly 
in the tumultuous years at the end of the eighteenth century. How-
ever, some clear trends can be distinguished. The Orangists or pro-
English on the island were mostly the old power holders who had 
ruled the island in the period when it was still governed by the West 
India Company. They seem to have wanted a quiet return to the sta-
tus quo ante and were generally opposed to any of the revolutionary 
quirks. Another group in favour of stability was one section of the 
high-ranking military, who were loyal to the stadholder. The Cura-
çaoan Patriots and the supporters of Lauffer were local citizens look-
ing for ways to deal with military and economic changes in the wider 
Atlantic at the time. The pro-French Revolutionaries integrated fully 
into Lauffer’s movement during the period of the coup d’état. Only 
when the coup was over did the Revolutionaries mount indepen-
dent opposition. In view of the disintegrating Dutch mercantile and 
military power, the Curaçao Patriots tried to keep the island neutral 
between the other powers and wanted local control over the island’s 
defences in the form of a National Guard and a Military Committee. 
And as the history of the coup shows, they were willing to oust official 
metropolitan representatives to achieve their objectives.6  The Patriot coup d’état in Curaçao, 1796  |
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Patriots, privateers and international politics:
The myth of the conspiracy of Jean Baptiste Tierce Cadet
Han Jordaan
In  September  1799,  two  French  agents  from  Saint-Domingue, 
Urbain Devaux and Isaac Sasportas, together with a resident French 
merchant, Jean Baptiste Tierce Cadet, were arrested in Curaçao for 
conspiring to overthrow the island’s government and to liberate the 
slaves. They were deported without trial. Allegedly this conspiracy, 
of which Tierce Cadet was accused of being the local ringleader, 
was part of a much wider scheme initiated in Saint-Domingue: the 
liberation of the slaves in all the colonies of the Caribbean Basin. 
A year later an expeditionary force from Guadeloupe tried to take 
over Curaçao militarily, supported by most of the island’s slaves and 
other segments of the local population.
Roberto Palacios sees a connection between the slave revolt that 
erupted in Curaçao in 1795 and the events of 1799-1800 (Palacios 
1983).  From  mainly  primary  sources  he  construes  a  revolution-
ary movement of Jacobin signature, centred around Tierce and 
actively supported by forces from the French colonies. David Geg-
gus and Anne Pérotin-Dumon, in contrast, both have doubted the 
existence of any proselytizing efforts to establish a region-wide lib-
eration of the slaves during this period, instigated from either Saint-
Domingue or Guadeloupe (Geggus 1987; Pérotin-Dumon 1988). 
Who is right? To understand the (alleged) conspiracy of 1799 and 
the  Guadeloupean  expedition  of  1800,  these  events  should  be 
understood against the background of international political devel-
opments, especially the undeclared Quasi-War between the United 
States and France (1798-1800), and the commercial and military 
interests of the respective actors.
In this paper the focus will be on the development of Franco-
Curaçaoan relations and the complicated situation that emerged 
when French privateers started to seize American ships on a large 
scale, using the port of Curaçao as an operational base and pro-
voking an American naval response. The Curaçao government was |  Han Jordaan
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caught between conflicting international political and commercial 
interests,  between  heavy  American  diplomatic  pressure  and  the 
fears of the French ally of losing the island as a privateering base. It 
will be argued that the existence of a conspiracy, initiated in either 
Saint-Domingue or Guadeloupe, to liberate the slaves in Curaçao is 
not very likely, let alone the existence of a plan for the liberation of 
the slaves in the whole region, as acting Curaçao Governor Johann 
Rudolf Lauffer later asserted. Nor is there any solid documentary 
proof for the occurrence of a multi-class rising with similar objec-
tives in the wake of, and purposely supported by, the Guadelou-
pean expedition in 1800.
At the same time Governor Lauffer might have had good rea-
sons to capitalize on the fear entertained both in Curaçao and in 
the mother country, of a violent local attempt to follow the exam-
ple of the French Caribbean colonies of freeing and emancipat-
ing the non-white masses. Clearly he had an interest in destroying 
any ambitions for emancipation among the island’s free non-white 
population. But Lauffer may also have had a more personal inter-
est, that is, diverting the attention of his metropolitan superiors 
from serious American accusations regarding the involvement of 
Curaçao’s government in privateering against American shipping. 
the events of 1799 and 1800
On 8 September 1799, Acting Governor Lauffer of Curaçao sum-
moned an extraordinary session of the island’s council in which he 
disclosed the existence of a conspiracy. The French agent, General 
Devaux, sent to Curaçao from Saint-Domingue as receveur of the 
proceeds from the sale of prizes brought into the Curaçao harbour 
by French privateers, was accused by Lauffer of being the leader of 
a group that plotted to bring down the island’s government and to 
instigate a general revolt among the slaves. With the consent of the 
council Devaux was invited to join the meeting and apprehended 
as soon as he passed the gates of Fort Amsterdam. Later that day 
another French agent from Saint-Domingue, a civilian called Isaac 
Sasportas, was also arrested (Hamelberg 1985:53-7).
It was reported to Lauffer that on his arrest Sasportas behaved 
suspiciously  and  that  he  tried  to  hide  a  document.  Lauffer 
demanded  to  see  this  document  to  which  Sasportas  reluctantly 
conceded, and only under the condition that the governor alone 
would take note of its contents. Lauffer received the document in 
a sealed envelope and retreated into another room to read it. After 7  Patriots, privateers and international politics  |
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returning into the meeting room he informed the council that he 
could not disclose the exact contents of the document, but that 
it contained instructions for a secret expedition to be carried out 
by Devaux and Sasportas, a mission, according to Lauffer, which 
could have dangerous consequences for Curaçao. In another coun-
cil meeting Lauffer declared that after he had given the affair more 
thought, he had decided that it was no longer justified to leave the 
council in the dark about the contents of the document. The gover-
nor was now convinced of the huge danger that the mission posed 
not only for Curaçao but for all of the Caribbean. After the council-
lors had promised strict secrecy the governor showed a copy of the 
instruction that he had made himself. Together with the council the 
governor concluded that the document contained ‘insoluble con-
tradictions’ and that the (geographical) names mentioned must 
be feigned: the expedition was, it was concluded, directly targeted 
against no other place than Curaçao, and it was clearly the inten-
tion of the agents from Saint-Domingue to spread the spirit of gen-
eral freedom across the entire Gulf of Mexico and to have all of the 
Caribbean follow the path of Saint-Domingue. Meanwhile, Lauffer 
had identified Jean Baptiste Tierce as the local ringleader and had 
him arrested. Governor and councillors went to Tierce’s house to 
look for evidence, but none was found (Hamelberg 1985:58-60). 
Lauffer, however, managed to produce a number of statements 
to incriminate all three Frenchmen. In a written statement, José 
Obediente,  an  officer  in  the  National  Guard  and  confidant  of 
Lauffer,1  together  with  Abraham  Rodriguez  Pimentel  disclosed 
that Devaux had planned to kill Lauffer. Sasportas, after his arrest, 
stated that he knew that naval Captain Albert Kikkert and a Cura-
çaoan  citizen  named  Jan  Schotborgh  were  dissatisfied  with  the 
colony’s government. A Frenchman called Renaud stated that he 
had overheard a conversation between Tierce and Devaux in which 
the first mentioned details regarding his plans for a take-over of 
the government. Tierce also disclosed the beheading of Lauffer, 
Obediente, and several others and argued that Kikkert was to take 
Lauffer’s place as governor.2 The plan to overthrow the govern-
ment included the ransoming of the Jews and the confiscation of 
American ships and other property. In yet another statement it was 
said that Devaux had advised Schotborgh to sell his plantation and 
all his slaves and that he had boasted that he had 400 Frenchmen at 
his disposal (Emmanuel 1970:285; Hamelberg 1985:58).
1  For José Obediente Jr., see the chapter by Ramón Aizpurua.
2  Nationaal Archief, Den Haag (NA), access no. 2.01.28.01, West-Indisch Comité 1795-1800 
(WICom), inv. no. 137, no. 22, copy of a statement by Renaud dated 10-9-1799.|  Han Jordaan
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Tierce, according to Lauffer, had not only involved himself in 
the secret expedition of Devaux and Sasportas, but he also had 
been the leader and instigator of the plan that was only to be exe-
cuted after the Curaçao government had been toppled by igniting 
a general revolt. The governor judged it too dangerous to start offi-
cial criminal judicial procedures against the alleged conspirators 
because these would include public inquiries that he feared would 
be perilous to the order and security of the colony. He asked the 
council to formulate a political resolution. The three men were 
deported without a trial (Hamelberg 1985:60-2).
The following year, on the morning of 23 July, five ships under 
French flag and carrying a large number of mainly black soldiers 
suddenly arrived at Curaçao. The expedition was sent from Guade-
loupe, its leader Maurice-Henri Bresseau explained, to help defend 
the island against the common enemy: according to intelligence 
received by the Guadeloupe agency, the British were preparing an 
expedition against Curaçao. Lauffer told them that he did not need 
any reinforcements and that he was very capable of defending the 
island with the troops he had at his disposal. The governor was sus-
picious from the start about the real intentions of this French force 
and only reluctantly allowed the troops to disembark.
Soon it became clear that the French also had a list of com-
plaints against Curaçao’s government, including the arrest and the 
extradition of Tierce, and the accusation of siding with the Ameri-
cans regarding the seizure of American prizes by French privateers. 
A very tense period, which lasted for weeks, followed. The Curaçao 
defences were kept in a permanent state of alert, with the guns in 
Fort Amsterdam trimmed at the Guadeloupean ships and troops. 
Finally, on 3 September, and only after receiving ample supplies 
and a large sum of money, the Guadeloupeans left.
The next day, however, it was reported that the French ships 
had anchored in St. Michiel’s Bay, just a few miles to the west of 
Willemstad,  and  that  the  troops  had  landed  and  taken  posses-
sion of the local fort. Lauffer prepared for battle, but when the 
French  attacked,  his  defence  collapsed  almost  immediately;  his 
troops fled in blind panic at the sight of the approaching enemy. 
Lauffer was forced to hastily retreat across St. Anna Bay, and the 
French started a siege. The French troops were joined by most of 
the colony’s slaves and soon controlled a large part of the island, 
while privateers blockaded the harbour. After a week a British frig-
ate appeared before the harbour and broke the French blockade. 
Being short of supplies governor and council saw no alternative 
but to ask the British enemy for protection against the French ally. 
After the arrival of two American warships on 22 September, the 7  Patriots, privateers and international politics  |
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French gave up their siege and evacuated the island during the 
night; Curaçao came under British rule (Hamelberg 1985:72-86).
curaçao as a centre of revolutionary activity?
In his article ‘Ansia de libertad’, Roberto Palacios paints a heroic 
and romantic picture of a Curaçaoan revolutionary movement in 
the late 1790s and the struggle of the slaves and free non-whites 
for emancipation and equality, connecting the events of 1799 and 
1800, and depicting Tierce as a revolutionary hero with Jacobin 
convictions: 
…[H]e believed firmly in the ideals of the French Revolution and 
its logical extension of Liberty, Equality and Fraternity among all, 
without distinction according to race. […] [H]e cherished the ideal 
to advance the establishment of a truly revolutionary government 
in Curacao which would decree the most absolute racial equality 
and freedom and liberate the slaves. (Palacios 1983:22, my transla-
tion).
Palacios also attempts to prove Tierce’s political conviction by 
pointing out that he actively supported the seizure of power in the 
colony by the Patriots in August 1796 and that he offered protec-
tion and housing to the leaders of an abortive Republican rebellion 
in Venezuela in 1797 who had fled to Curaçao: Manuel Gual, José 
Maria Espanã, and their inspirator Juan Bautista Picornell.3 
The attempt in the summer of 1800 of the French expedition-
ary force to take over the government of the island militarily was 
actively supported by Curaçaoan slaves and, according to Palacios, 
the partisans of Tierce: free blacks and coloureds and young white 
Jacobins among whom was Luis Brion, Simón Bolívar’s future admi-
ral and comrade in arms. Palacios states:
Despite the arrest and expulsion of Jean Baptiste Tierce Cadet from 
Curacao in December 1799 for plotting the abolishment of slavery 
among other objectives, his partisans did not leave it at revolution-
ary intentions, and in September of the following year fomented 
3  See the chapter by Ramón Aizpurua. Palacios bases his arguments almost completely on 
primary sources kept in the national archives of the Netherlands and the United Kingdom (Pala-
cios 1983).|  Han Jordaan
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the insurrection of the Curaçaoan blacks with the support of over 
a thousand black soldiers from Guadeloupe and Haiti, under com-
mand of black and some white officers, urged by the Curaçaoan 
revolutionary  followers  of  Tierce  Cadet.  (Palacios  1984:23;  my 
translation).
The  interpretation  of  Palacios  that  ideological  motives  must 
have been at the root of the 1799-1800 events is doubted by both 
David Geggus and Anne Pérotin-Dumon (Geggus 1987; Pérotin-
Dumon 1988). Geggus argues that Toussaint Louverture in 1799 
certainly  had  no  intention  to  export  the  Haitian  Revolution.  A 
plan to invade Jamaica actually did exist, but this was initiated by 
the French government, not by Toussaint. Commissioner Philippe 
Roume in November 1799 sent spies to Jamaica to prepare the 
operation,  but  they  were  soon  arrested  by  the  British:  secretly 
betrayed by Toussaint himself. Toussaint, at this time entangled in 
an armed struggle with the mulatto leader André Rigaud over the 
command of the southern part of Saint-Domingue, and depending 
on Britain and the U.S. for supplying his army, had no interest in a 
military adventure against Jamaica and opposed the plan (Geggus 
1987:287-8).
Together with the British General Thomas Maitland and the 
U.S.  Consul  Edward  Stevens,  Toussaint  worked  out  a  three-way 
treaty in July 1799. Both the British and the Americans were inter-
ested in trade with Saint-Domingue, and Toussaint was willing to 
give them access to the ports in the part of the colony that he con-
trolled. At the same time he demanded that the ports occupied by 
Rigaud would be excluded; Toussaint would have access to supplies 
while blockading his opponent. The United States, however, had 
an additional interest: in 1798 hostilities between the French and 
the Americans had started that became known as the undeclared 
Quasi-War (1798-1800), which was fought almost entirely at sea, 
largely in the Caribbean. Irritation regarding American approaches 
to their British enemy, culminating it the signing of the Jay Treaty 
in 1794, which was viewed as a violation of the 1778 Treaty of Alli-
ance between France and the American colonists, prompted the 
French to allow their navy and privateers to seize American ships 
trading with British ports. As part of the deal with Toussaint, the 
Americans  demanded  protection  against  attack  by  privateers  in 
Saint-Domingue’s waters.4 
4  Fick 2004:201-2; see for more detailed information regarding the process of the negotiations 
between Toussaint and the Americans and the British: ‘Letters of Toussaint Louverture’, 1910: 
64-101.7  Patriots, privateers and international politics  |
147
Toussaint had absolutely nothing to do with the French expedi-
tion in 1800, which was initiated from Guadeloupe. The undertaking 
was organized by the agents Bresseau and Nicolas Georges Jeannet-
Oudin who afterwards had to account for their actions to their supe-
riors.5 According to Anne Pérotin-Dumon, the aims seem to have 
been  primarily  military  and  commercial.  No  evidence  has  been 
found in French sources to support any complicity from Guade-
loupe in the execution of a mission to liberate the slaves. During the 
Quasi-War, Guadeloupean privateers experienced prosperous times 
hunting and seizing American vessels, and it was important that they 
could count on all the operational bases at their disposal, including 
Curaçao. At the same time the Batavian Republic had no dispute 
with the Americans, and Curaçao always attracted large numbers of 
American carriers; in fact, it depended largely on supplies brought 
in by the Americans. The principal objective of the Guadeloupean 
expedition was, according to Pérotin-Dumon (1988:300-1), to ascer-
tain the loyalty of the Curaçao government and to secure the island’s 
port as a French privateering base. So much for Jacobin ideals.
Furthermore,  after  1798  the  ideals  of  general  freedom  and 
equality introduced by Victor Hugues were waning. Hugues arrived 
in Guadeloupe in 1794, leading an expedition to recapture the 
island from the British and bringing the news that the metropolis 
had officially abolished slavery in the colonies. But in 1798, Hugues 
was replaced by Etienne Desfourneaux, who set himself to the task 
of forcing the ex-slaves back to work on the plantations. Desfour-
neaux was deposed within a year by a group of insurgents and sent 
back to France. But at that time three new administrators, sent by 
the metropolis, were already on their way to the colony. In May 
1800, the commissioners, Étienne Lavaux, René-Gaston Baco, and 
Nicolas Georges Jeannet-Oudin arrived in Guadeloupe with clear 
orders from Bonaparte to get the plantations operating again and 
make  them  generate  income.  Laurent  Dubois  makes  clear  that 
around  1800,  the  ex-slaves  in  Guadeloupe  were  not  optimistic 
about their future; there was justifiable fear that the days of free-
dom were numbered (Dubois 2004:327-48). In sum, neither Saint-
Domingue nor Guadeloupe was a likely candidate for organizing a 
revolution in Curaçao.
But what about the idealism of Tierce Cadet? Pérotin-Dumon 
cites Tierce as stating that it was irrational to think that rich colo-
5  Archives Nationales d’Outre Mer, Aix-en-Provence, France (FR ANOM), 2400 COL127/3, 
Mémoire de Bresseau et Jeannet en réponse au courrier du ministre de la Marine et des colo-
nies leur demandant des explications sur leur expédition (18-2-1801). See the online inventory: 
http://anom.archivesnationales.culture.gouv.fr/ir?c=FRANOM_00092,1.5.6.2.2.3.|  Han Jordaan
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nists like Kikkert and himself had knowingly sacrificed their for-
tunes and their families, and risked terrible odds by causing a revolt 
of  blacks.6  Like  most  well-to-do  Curaçaoans,  Tierce  was  a  slave-
owner himself; only a few months before his arrest he had bought 
a mulatto boy from the councillor Gerardus Duijckinck.7 Besides, 
four years earlier Tierce had actively taken part in the crushing of 
the slave revolt (Homan 1976:2). Luis Brion, writing from Cura-
çao to a business partner of his late father’s in Amsterdam about 
Tierce’s arrest and expulsion, appeared puzzled: there had been 
no reason whatsoever to put Tierce, who had been not only his late 
father’s best friend but who was also a cornerstone of the island’s 
community, in criminal detention. Governor Lauffer and the coun-
cil had designated Tierce as a dangerous man, but he himself was 
never interrogated. Brion wrote:
He [Tierce] is accused by some people that he would have wanted 
to liberate the blacks, but this is not true, for in the year 94 [sic], 
when the negroes rose, he was the man who himself helped to quell 
the revolt. But time will learn us who is guilty. The man [Tierce] 
even wanted to litigate, but this was not permitted to him for rea-
son, it was said, that the time and the circumstances as well as the 
laws of the island did not allow it. And so this man was banned from 
the island without being able to speak to anyone.8
Eight months after being deported from Curaçao, Tierce, en 
route to France, arrived in the Batavian Republic. He was travelling 
with an officer of the Batavian navy, Jan Hendrik Quast, who served 
under Kikkert in Curaçao. Both men were arrested and questioned. 
The Batavian authorities intended to put Tierce on trial for trying 
to overthrow the Curaçao government and plotting to liberate the 
slaves, but it appeared very difficult to produce the necessary evi-
dence against him. All the papers found in the possession of both 
Tierce and Quast were confiscated and studied, but these contained 
6  Pérotin-Dumon 1988:301. Unfortunately Pérotin-Dumon does not mention the source of 
this citation. See for Tierce’s protetsts against Lauffer: FR ANOM, 2400 COL127/3, Documents 
produits devant la commission, parmi lesquels une correspondance du capitaine de vaisseau 
Valteau en faveur du délégué des agents français à Curaçao, Jean-Baptiste Tierce, et les réclama-
tions de celui-ci contre le gouverneur hollandais Lauffer (1800-1801). See online inventory: 
http://anom.archivesnationales.culture.gouv.fr/ir?c=FRANOM_00092,1.5.6.2.2.3.
7  NA, 1.05.12.01, Curaçao to 1828 (OAC), protocol of notarial deeds, inv. no. 1001, no. 249, 
deed of conveyance of a slave dated 12-6-1799. 
8  NA, 2.01.28.02, Raad der Amerikaanse Bezittingen, 1795-1806 (RAB), inv. no. 189, Docu-
ments regarding the case of J.B. Tierce Cadet in Curaçao, 1796-1804, fol. 62vo., extract of a letter 
from T.L. Brion in Curaçao to Messrs. Tonella and Comp. in Amsterdam. 7  Patriots, privateers and international politics  |
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no information that could be used against them. Although the attor-
ney-general pointed to the fact that from his confiscated correspon-
dence it had become clear that as maritime agent Tierce had been 
in contact with well known people like Victor Hugues, Léger-Félicité 
Sonthonax, Philippe Roume, and Toussaint, who had played a ‘dubi-
ous role’ in the French colonies, the Court of Holland judged that 
there was absolutely no evidence for the accusations against him 
and that both Tierce and Quast were to be released from criminal 
arrest. This happened, but on the orders of the Executive Directory 
(Uitvoerend Bewind), Tierce was now placed under civil arrest.9
Thus,  there  was  only  Lauffer’s  story  without  any  substantial 
supporting documentary proof. Lauffer had reported extensively 
to the authorities in the Batavian Republic about the conspiracy, 
and although he stated that he was in the possession of irrefutable 
evidence, his superiors for the time being had to believe him on 
his word. For, according to the governor, the nature of the docu-
ment in his possession was such that it was too dangerous to send it 
over. If it would fall into the hands of the British, they would most 
certainly have a reason to attack Curaçao. Still, the West Indian 
Committee (West-Indisch Comité), the governmental body for the 
administration of the Caribbean colonies and possessions in Africa 
established by the States-General in 1795, urgently requested him 
to send authorized copies of all the documentary proof in his pos-
session as soon as possible. But this request, dated 1 August 1800, 
probably never reached Lauffer, for two months later Curaçao was 
occupied by the British and communications were severed.10
In the end Lauffer’s most important evidence, the instructions 
for Devaux and Sasportas drawn up by Roume, did fall into British 
hands. Lauffer probably handed it to them after the capitulation 
of Curaçao. A copy is kept in The National Archives in Kew.11 In 
these instructions, however, no mention is made about starting a 
9  NA, 3.03.01.01, Hof van Holland 1428-1811 (HvH); inv. no. 360, minutes of the Court of 
Holland, 15, 24, 29 and 31-7-1800; inv. no. 5608, Criminal papers, process files of criminal cases, 
file no. 34, marked M, 1800. Among Tierce’s papers, copies can be found of his correspondence 
with officials in Saint-Domingue, including Philippe Roume, General Thomas Hédouville, and 
Julien Raimond. These were made and officially authenticated by Kikkert after Tierce’s arrest 
and sent to him in Saint-Domingue during his stay there. Copies of these documents can also be 
found in NA, access no. 2.01.28.02, RAB, inv. no 189, file regarding the case J.B. Tierce Cadet.
10  NA, 2.01.28.02, RAB, inv. no. 189, West-Indische Comité to governor and councillors of 
Curaçao, 1-8-1800, fol. 84.
11  The National Archives, Kew (TNA), War Office (WO), 1/98, Correspondence from Cura-
çao, 126r-127v., ‘Instruction donné par l’Agent du Directoire Exécutif à St. Domingue aux 
Citoijens Sasportas, negociant du Cap, et Devaux, adjudant général dans les armées françaises, 
actuellement à l’isle de Curaçao’. A contemporary English translation can be found in fols. 123-
124vo.|  Han Jordaan
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region-wide slave revolt and using Curaçao as an operational base 
for this purpose. After a long and bombastic introduction that boils 
down to a flood of abuse against the British and their ‘imbécile 
monarque’, the agents are instructed, according to the contem-
porary English translation of their commission, to ‘lett [sic] your 
ideas fall entirely on Jamaica’, to ‘Electrify the heads & enflame the 
hearts of the Africans with the […] fire of liberty’ and to ‘Promise 
them in the name of the agent of [the] directory in St. Domingo, 
that as soon as they have compleated [sic] the insurrection the lib-
erty of our new brethren the Jamaicans is to be proclaimed in the 
name of the French people’.12
Toussaint  Louverture  would  then,  it  was  promised,  come  to 
their assistance. Sasportas was to go to Jamaica as soon as possible; 
Devaux was to stay in Curaçao to make preparations to support the 
insurrection in Jamaica. He was to join Sasportas the moment that 
he heard of the ‘explosion’, that is, the Jamaican slave revolt.13
The chance for the operation to succeed was apparently con-
sidered great. For it was also stated that when during future peace 
negotiations it would be decided that Jamaica was to be returned 
to Great Britain, it would only be under the condition that gen-
eral liberty was to be guaranteed. Devaux and Sasportas were held 
responsible for any unnecessary harm caused by their orders, but at 
the same time they were entrusted with power to take any measures 
they thought necessary.14
Lauffer never showed the original commission that he received 
from Sasportas but only a copy that he had fabricated himself. No 
copy of this document, however, has been found in the Curaçao 
governmental  archives.  It  is  striking  that  when  in  1803,  shortly 
after the British returned the colony to the Batavian Republic, the 
French commissioner Duny was sent to Curaçao to investigate the 
events of 1799-1800, and the council could not answer his questions 
regarding the alleged conspiracy led by Tierce; they had to refer to 
Lauffer because he was the only one who had the information.15 
12  Ibid, fol. 123vo.The transcription of the same passage in the original French document (fol. 
126vo) reads in full: ‘Occupez vous uniquement de la Jamaicque, car chacune des isles du vent 
offrirait autant de difficulté à vaincre et vous n’y trouveriez pas les [moyens] d’attacque et de 
defenses qu’offre la Jamaicque. Electrisez toutes les têtes, enflammez tous les cœurs africaines 
du feu de la liberté, promettez au nom de l’agence du Directoire á St Domingue qui , qu’elle 
apprendre l’insurrection, elle fera proclamée au nom du Peuple français la liberté de nos nou-
veaux frères les jamaicains…’. Part from the same fragment is also cited in a Spanish translation 
by Palacios; see Palacios 1983:23
13  TNA, WO 1/98, fol. 126vo-127r.
14  Ibid. 127r-127v.
15  NA, 2.01.28.02, RAB, inv. no 189, 247r-247v., copy of a letter by the Commissioners C. Berch 
and A de Veer to former governor Lauffer, 15-8-1803.7  Patriots, privateers and international politics  |
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Lauffer at that time no longer held any public office. He left for the 
metropolis in May 1804 to appear before a Batavian court martial 
to account for the capitulation of the colony to the British, but was 
acquitted of all the charges brought against him (Van Meeteren 
1944:14).
Of course, during his interrogations Tierce Cadet denied any 
involvement in a conspiracy to bring down the government and to 
liberate the slaves.16 He was kept in custody in The Hague for sev-
eral months, causing a lot of diplomatic activity. The French ambas-
sador claimed that Tierce, as a French citizen who also had been 
employed in an official Republican function at Curaçao, was enti-
tled to French protection. But this was contested by the Batavian 
government with the argument that Tierce by his long residence 
in Curaçao (1784-1799) and his service as an officer in the island’s 
National Guard had become a Dutch citizen, while his official func-
tions of receveur and consul were never recognized. The Spanish 
ambassador pleaded for prolongation of Tierce’s detention until 
Spanish authorities could question him on his possible complicity 
with the Gual and España conspiracy.17
In October 1800, Tierce ‘escaped’ while being transferred from 
one prison to another. According to G.H. Homan the escape was 
very probably staged; Tierce had become more and more of an 
embarrassment to the Batavian authorities. He went to Paris where 
he circulated a printed pamphlet in December 1800, titled ‘Au 
gouvernement batave’, in which he vindicated himself and asked 
permission to return to Curaçao in order to attend to his trading 
and shipping business. The Batavian government refused. One 
year later Tierce Cadet returned to the Batavian Republic, pos-
sibly in another attempt to obtain permission to return to Cura-
çao. He was arrested again, however, and immediately deported. 
He returned to his native France and never saw Curaçao again 
(Homan 1976:8-9). These efforts of Tierce to restore his reputa-
tion and the risks he took by going to the Batavian Republic sug-
gest that he was innocent.
It is therefore unlikely that Tierce was the Jacobin zealot con-
vinced of the ideal of slave liberation and realizing full racial equal-
ity, as depicted by Palacios. But he might still have been involved 
with a group of people who, discontented with Lauffer’s adminis-
tration, were planning to bring him down. During his interroga-
tions he stated that many people in Curaçao were unhappy with 
16  NA, 2.01.12, Binnenlandse Zaken (BZ), inv. no. 222, interrogations J.B. Tierce, 22 and 29-5-
1800, pp. 100-8 and 122-33. 
17  See the chapter by Ramón Aizpurua.|  Han Jordaan
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Lauffer’s regime, which they labelled despotic.18 During the 1790s 
there was almost continuous social unrest in the colony, surfacing 
in the form of riots, fights between adherents of opposing political 
factions, and mutinous behaviour within the defence forces. Most 
of the unrest was concentrated in and around the port of Willem-
stad. Was there a group that can be identified as Tierce’s partisans? 
Palacios mentions a number of young whites, among whom was 
Luis Brion. But this was apparently only a small group compared to 
the roughly 300 prisoners who were taken after the Guadeloupeans 
gave up their siege and left (Palacios 1983:26). If there was such a 
large group of followers of Tierce, they were most likely to be found 
among the free coloureds.
the port, the free coloureds, and the ‘french connection’
At the end of the eighteenth century, Curaçao had a relatively 
large free non-white community. In 1789 over 20,000 people lived 
on the island, including nearly 13,000 slaves, about 3,600 whites, 
and approximately 3,700 free blacks and coloureds. A little over 
half of the population lived in Willemstad and its immediate sur-
roundings: 40 % of the slaves, 95 % of the whites, and 95 % of the 
free non-whites. Many, if not most of those living in Willemstad 
and its suburbs, were directly or indirectly involved in the com-
mercial and maritime branches of the colony’s economy (Klooster 
1994:286, 289).
Similar to the American colonies of other European powers, 
Curaçao’s free blacks and coloureds were regarded by whites with a 
mixture of suspicion and fear and subject to repressive and discrim-
inatory treatment. The general idea among the white population 
was that the free blacks and coloureds had to be kept in strict con-
trol. This resulted in a series of locally issued laws, mainly for the 
purpose of maintaining law and order, in which the free non-whites 
were usually bracketed together with the slaves. Officially, accord-
ing to the laws declared applicable in the colony by the States-Gen-
eral, the free non-whites, unlike the slaves, did not form a distinct 
legal category. But in daily practice free non-whites were treated 
like they were. For instance, testimony of a free non-white against 
a white was not accepted in court. On the other hand, unlike many 
of the neighbouring colonies, there were almost no legal impedi-
ments to their economic development (Jordaan 2010). 
18  NA, 2.01.12, BZ, inv. no. 222, interrogations J.B. Tierce, 22 and 29-5-1800, pp. 100-8 and 122-33. 7  Patriots, privateers and international politics  |
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Apart from a symbiotic relationship with the Spanish colonies 
on the nearby mainland, Curaçao also had long established close 
ties with the French colonies in the northern and north-eastern 
Caribbean, especially with the southern part of Saint-Domingue. 
With their coloured and black crews of freedmen and slaves, Cura-
çaoan vessels regularly attended ports like Aquin, Les Cayes, and 
St. Louis. During the Seven Years’ War (1756-1763), Curaçaoan 
merchants were the most important suppliers of provisions. A com-
modity from Saint-Domingue that was much in demand by Curaçao 
merchants was indigo. Especially well suited for the cultivation of 
this crop was the southern part of Saint-Domingue, where many 
free coloureds became successful indigo planters. Among them was 
Julien Raimond, political pamphlettist and prominent advocate in 
the fight for racial reform during the 1780s and early 1790s, who, 
as an indigo planter, had extensive commercial relations with Cura-
çao. Business contacts were strengthened by the forging of fam-
ily  networks,  locally  and  inter-colonial:  there  was  intermarriage 
between the well-to-do coloured families of both colonies (Garrigus 
1993:244-5, 246, 250, 253-4; Garrigus 2007:4)
Also residing in Curaçao, from the middle of the eighteenth 
century onwards, was a sizable French colonial community consist-
ing of both whites and free coloureds. Around 1790 the number of 
Frenchmen was estimated to be 400 (Homan 1976:1). Many if not 
most of the French were Roman Catholics, as was the majority of 
the Curaçao non-white population. As a result, the Roman Catholic 
Church, unlike the almost exclusively white Protestant Church, was 
racially mixed. This must have played a role in bringing French and 
Curaçaoans, whites and coloureds, into close contact. Tierce Cadet, 
as a well-to-do and prominent member of society, was a church war-
den of the Catholic church, and he was also living with a mulatto 
woman called Dorothea, with whom he had children.19
Close ties with the French colonies are also noticeable through 
the relatively high incidence of manumissions by French slave-own-
ers registered in Curaçao. There was a peak of French manumis-
sions during the 1790s, which should be attributed to the many 
refugees from Saint-Domingue that came to Curaçao after 1791, 
often together with their slaves.20 
After the outbreak of the slave revolt in Saint-Domingue, the 
continuing relations with that colony and the growing number of 
refugees arriving from there apparently did not immediately alarm 
the Curaçao government. The fiscal (public prosecutor) P.Th. van 
19  NA, 2.01.28.02, RAB, inv. No. 189, Lauffer to Duny, 9-11-1803, 237v. 
20  See for an overview of manumissions in Curaçao: Van der Lee 1998. |  Han Jordaan
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Teijlingen seemed to be the only official who was worried about the 
growing number of people coming from Saint-Domingue, and he 
repeatedly asked the council for clear orders on how to deal with 
them. Van Teijlingen feared that their numbers would rise signifi-
cantly as soon as one of the contesting parties in Saint-Domingue 
would gain the upper hand. He expected that especially free non-
whites would come to Curaçao since these would not be admitted in 
the British or any of the other of the neighbouring colonies.21 After 
the news arrived in 1793 that war had broken out between France 
and the United Provinces, the only measure that was taken was to 
order the French on the island to report to the fiscal within four 
days to be registered. An earlier decision to order all the French to 
leave Curaçao within three weeks was reversed by the governor.22
In 1795 the French Republic and the newly proclaimed Batavian 
Republic signed a pact of friendship and alliance, and in early July 
of that year the first French privateer appeared in the Willemstad 
harbour, soon to be followed by more.23 Earlier, in January 1793, the 
French National Convention had passed a decree in which citizens 
were invited to arm privateers. In France as well as in its colonial 
ports ships were fitted out and commissioned with letters of marque. 
Victor Hugues started to arm corsairs not long after his re-conquest 
of Guadeloupe in 1794. The number of Guadeloupean privateers 
grew from 21 at the end of 1795 to 121 at the end of Hugues’ regime 
in 1798. To illustrate the importance of privateering for this col-
ony: during this four year period 1,800 ships were either seized or 
destroyed by Guadeloupean privateers (Dubois 2004:241-2).
The crews of the corsairs consisted predominately of non-white 
sailors, many of them ex-slaves. The multiracial crews of these pri-
vateers, according to Laurent Dubois, became ‘a symbol as clear 
as the Republican tricolor’. Many captains were also men of Afri-
can descent, drawn from the free coloured class. Privateers were 
armed by the Republican administration as well as by private indi-
viduals. Between 1794 and 1796 the latter were still a minority, but 
in 1798 there were 114 privately owned corsairs against only seven 
directly fitted out by the Republican authorities. Most of the ship 
owners and investors were whites. Hugues himself invested in pri-
vateers. It was lucrative business for both ship owners and crews 
21  NA, 2.05.12.01, OAC 233, ‘Representatie … aan Gouverneur en Raden gedaan … 19 janu-
ari 1792’, pp. 4; no. 14, copy of a note of Van Teijlingen, 28-2-1792; no. 30, Van Teijlingen to the 
council, 5-6-1792.
22  J.A. Schiltkamp and J.Th. De Smidt 1978,, no. 414, pp. 491, no. 2, publication 5/8-4-1793; 
No. 415, publication 12-4-1793.
23  NA, 2.01.29.03, Departement van Marine, 1795-1813, Aanhangsel II (DvM II), inv. no. 73, 
Journal of the frigate Ceres, kept by A. Kikkert, 1795-1799, 8-7-1795; 23-3,1-7-1795.7  Patriots, privateers and international politics  |
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and it became an important branch of the Guadeloupean economy 
(Dubois 2004:242-6).
In Curaçao the presence of the privateers and their black and 
coloured crews had an enormous effect on the island’s non-white 
population. In early August 1795, only two weeks before the out-
break of the slave revolt, naval captain Albert Kikkert, command-
ing the frigate Ceres anchored in the harbour, noted in his journal: 
‘[Since] the negroes here, because of the presence of the many 
French free negroes or citoijens, now also are committing mischief, 
we loaded our guns with balls and grapeshot and erected two small 
batteries…’.24 ‘Negroes and mulattoes’ reportedly held gatherings in 
Otrobanda and sang provocative songs. There was recurrent fighting 
between the French sailors and the garrison’s Orangist soldiers.25 
After the crushing of the slave revolt and the execution of its 
leaders,  social  unrest  remained  and  the  government  became 
increasingly unhappy with the French privateers who were now call-
ing on a regular basis. In December there was fear for a new slave 
revolt.26 As a consequence, crews of the privateers were ordered 
not to have contact with the island’s blacks.27 But this had hardly 
any effect. A day before Christmas, sailors of the French privateers 
provocatively paraded through the streets with banners and drawn 
sabres, and with hundreds of Curaçaoan blacks in their wake.28 
the 1796 coup and its aftermath
The change of power in the metropolis did not immediately lead 
to changes in the local colonial administration and military com-
mand; the civil and military personnel commissioned under the 
old regime remained in function. At the same time political strife 
between the stadholder’s supporters and the pro-French Patriots 
intensified immediately after the crushing of the slave revolt and 
plunged Curaçao into a state of near chaos. Not only the popula-
tion and the members of the colonial administration were divided, 
also within the defence force, formed by the navy, the militia, and 
the garrison, there were political controversies. This regularly led 
to severe clashes and riots involving the local population, sailors, 
soldiers, and the crews of the French privateers.
24  NA, 2.01.29.03, DvM II, inv. no. 731, 6-8-1795.
25  NA, 2.01.28.01, WICom, 139, Governor’s journal, 4, 5 en 1/2-8-1795, 3-8-1795.
26  NA, 2.01.28.01, WICom, 139, Governor’s journal, 4, 5 en 1/2-8-1795, 9-12-1795.
27  NA, 2.01.28.01, WICom, 139, Governor’s journal, 4, 5 en 1/2-8-1795, 12-12-1795.
28  NA, 2.01.28.01, WICom, 139, Governor’s journal, 4, 5 en 1/2-8-1795, 24-12-1795.|  Han Jordaan
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Only in early August 1796 was word received that all civil and 
military personnel were relieved from the allegiance to the stad-
holder and order was given that a new oath had to be taken. Some 
of the civil servants, the captain of the militia, and most of the offi-
cers of the garrison refused, while Governor De Veer requested his 
resignation because of his bad health. He was succeeded by book-
keeper-general Jan Jacob Beaujon as acting governor. To cope with 
the unrest among the soldiers the garrison was dismissed, while the 
militia under the newly-elected Captain Johann Rudoph Lauffer 
took possession of Fort Amsterdam. After mediation by Jean Bap-
tiste Tierce the crews of the Dutch warships were reinforced with 
men  from  the  French  privateers.  The  Orangist  officers  left  the 
island the following day.29 The transition from a colonial govern-
ment of the old regime to a Batavian government was realized with-
out any bloodshed, but the situation was far from stable.
French  naval  presence  would  further  contribute  to  the  con-
solidation of the new regime. Since Guadeloupe as well as Saint-
Domingue had an interest in securing Curaçao as a naval base, 
warships were sent from both colonies (Pérotin-Dumon 1988:295-
296). Victor Hugues, informed that Curaçao was still in danger of 
surrendering to the British, sent a letter in which he offered mili-
tary assistance and at the same time threatened with armed inter-
vention in case the governor and councillors would not behave like 
‘good patriots’. A few days after the receipt of this letter the French 
warships arrived (Hamelberg 1985:31-2).
At the same time Hugues had given explicit instructions that 
it should be communicated to the governor and councillors that 
the French did not have any intent whatsoever to interfere with 
the existing social order. Still, Acting Governor Beaujon remained 
deeply suspicious. While the French warships were moored in the 
harbour, the fifth anniversary of the French constitution of 1791 
was celebrated. On this occasion the commanding officer from 
Saint-Domingue, much to the horror of Beaujon, drank, sang, and 
danced with free coloureds, and even embraced some of them. But 
what worried the Curaçao authorities most was that he appeared to 
be sympathetic to a petition from a delegation of free coloureds, in 
which they asked for his support in gaining equality to the whites 
in all regards.30
29  Hamelberg 1985: 28-29; NA, 2.01.28.01, WICom, inv. no. 136, no. 12, Beaujon to West 
Indisch  Comité,  9-9-1796,  f  93r-94r,  ;  inv.  no.  141A,  undated  anonymous  document  titled 
‘Relatie’; DvM II, inv. no. 73, Journal Kikkert, 15-8-1796; WIPC, II, no. 448. 
30  NA, 2.01.28.01, WICom, inv. no. 136, nr. 13, 113-115, Beaujon to West-Indisch Comité, 
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Rumours regarding French attempts to change the social order 
in Curaçao surfaced again in August 1797, when a former military 
commander  of  Curaçao,  Abraham  Perret  Gentil,  who  was  now 
engaged as an officer in Saint-Domingue, returned to the island. 
Soon a story circulated that Perret had written a letter to Saint-
Domingue asking for troops to help liberate the slaves in Curaçao.31
Lauffer, who had succeeded Beaujon in December 1796 as act-
ing governor, seemed to have followed a deliberate policy aimed to 
control the free blacks and coloureds by incorporating them into 
the restructured defence forces. He maintained the two existing 
segregated companies of free blacks and free mulattoes, respec-
tively 260 and 157 men strong, which were directly under his com-
mand. The former white militia was renamed the National Guard 
and greatly extended, now comprising about 1,100 officers and 
men, organized in six companies of infantry, three companies of 
cavalry, and four companies of artillery.32 The latter largely con-
sisted of free blacks and coloureds. Under pressure of time and the 
need to man the cannons in the forts with experienced gunners, 
Lauffer decided to recruit men among the coloured and black sea-
faring population of the island. Sailors were usually familiar with 
the handling of the canons aboard the ships. In order to stimulate 
the Curaçao mariners to join the National Guard, ship’s captains, 
who were often light coloured ‘mustees’, were given officer’s ranks. 
It was hoped that these men would stimulate their crews to join the 
National Guard.33 According to Lauffer, by dispersing a large num-
ber of free non-whites over various units, he had effectively reduced 
the influence and the power of the respective captains of the ‘free 
negroes’ and the ‘free mulattoes’.34 
Lauffer reported these changes to his superiors and asked for 
their approval. At the same time he warned the authorities in the 
metropolis to be extremely cautious when issuing laws or regu-
lations with any reference to general freedom and equality. The 
introduction of general equality to the free coloured people or the 
granting of political influence to them was extremely dangerous 
and could ultimately lead to the total destruction of the colony. 
Lauffer at that time – late August 1797 – was already convinced of 
the existence of a ‘cabale’ consisting of people who, ‘hiding behind 
the mask of patriotism’, were only out to overthrow the existing 
31  NA, 2.01.28.01, WICom, inv. no. 139, 19-8-1797.
32  NA, 2.01.28.01, WICom, inv. no. 136, Lauffer to West Indisch Comité, 15-9-1797, enclosure 
no. 29.
33  NA, 2.01.28.01, WICom, inv. no. 136, Lauffer to West Indisch Comité, 21-8-1797, nr. 27, 168-169.
34  NA, 2.01.28.01, WICom, inv. no. 136, 171-172.|  Han Jordaan
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order and play one population group against another in order to 
attain their own goals.35 
Only a few weeks later Lauffer had to report on a potentially 
dangerous situation when a large number of free coloured militia-
men from the artillery companies of the National Guard, during a 
formal parade, suddenly drew their sabres and, cursing and shout-
ing wildly, stormed forward in an apparent attempt to provoke a 
reaction from the infantry units. Thanks to the fact that the mili-
tia men in the infantry were too astonished to react, the event did 
not end in a bloodbath. The immediate cause was the reading of a 
court martial sentence against a captain of the infantry for disobe-
dience.36
Lauffer  was  vague  about  the  causes  of  this  near  mutiny.  He 
stated,  however,  that  the  free  coloureds  should  not  be  blamed. 
They had been misled by false rumours; they should be seen rather 
as victims that were used as an instrument by malicious elements 
to cause unrest. Still, the coloured officers held responsible for 
the incident were dishonourably discharged. One was banished 
from the colony; he immediately departed for Les Cayes.37 The real 
cause may have had to do with the presence in Curaçao of Gual and 
España, the leaders of the failed revolt in Caracas.38 
Although  after  this  incident  no  further  serious  disturbances 
occurred, this did not mean that there was no discontent. Just a few 
months before Lauffer had accused Tierce, Devaux, and Sasportas, 
a placard was issued against the circulation of pamphlets that criti-
cized the government.39 But at the same time Lauffer seemed to 
35  NA, 2.01.28.01, WICom, inv. no. 136, 172-174.
36  NA, 2.01.28.01, WICom, inv. no. 13., 30-9-1797; inv. no. 136, no 32, fol. 190-197, Lauffer to 
West-Indisch Comité, 22-10-1797; no. 33, fol. 229, Lauffer to West-Indisch Comité, 30-11-1797.
37  NA, 2.01.28.01, WICom, inv. no. 139, Governor’s journal, 30-9-1797; ibid, inv. no. 136, 
no. 32, fol. 190-197, Lauffer to West-Indisch Comité, 22-10-1797; ibid., no. 33, fol. 229, Lauffer 
to West-Indisch Comité, 30-11-1797.
38  See for the Gual and España conspiracy the chapter by Ramón Aizpurua. The Spanish 
authorities knew that Gual and España were in Curaçao. They even knew in what house they 
were staying. Apparently part of the Curaçao population felt sympathy for the Spanish revolu-
tionaries. The arrival of a representative from the Spanish colonial authorities who demanded 
their arrest and extradition caused much unrest among the population; there were even stones 
and dirt thrown at him. See for a report on these events: NA, 3.03.01.01, HvH, inv. no. 5608, 
copy of a statement in Spanish by Don Raphael Diego Merida, 30-9-1799, with Dutch trans-
lation of 30-4-1800. The officer of the National Guard who was convicted for disobedience, 
Anthony Leopold Lange, later reproached Lauffer for deliberately not complying with the Span-
ish demands and the risk of a breach in the relations with Venezuela that he thereby took. See 
Archivo General de Indias, Estado 71 4 (17b), translation from a letter in Dutch by A.L. Lange 
and J.P. Amalry to the Spanish ambassador in The Hague, dated 16-4-1798 (I am grateful to 
Ramón Aizpurua for supplying me with this information).
39  NA, 1.05.12.01, OAC, inv. no. 110, minutes of the meetings of the council, 30-5-1799, pp. 274-8.7  Patriots, privateers and international politics  |
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be totally confident that he was in control and clearly did not fear 
the free blacks and coloureds. Only weeks before the arrest of the 
alleged conspirators, Lauffer had allowed a drill with the artillery 
in Fort Amsterdam by principally black and coloured troops, while 
only a handful of white soldiers from the garrison were present: an 
ideal opportunity for the non-whites, it was feared by Kikkert and 
others who witnessed this, to take command of the fortress. When 
criticized for this by some of his officers, Lauffer replied that he 
knew these people and that he trusted them, adding that the offi-
cers were ignorant and that the situation in Curaçao could not be 
compared to that in Saint-Domingue (Milo 1936:488).
curaçao and the repercussions of the quasi-war
From 1797 onwards, French privateers started to hunt and seize 
American ships on an increasing scale. Of the 29 prizes brought 
into Curaçao’s port during that year, 19 were American ships. The 
Americans of course complained, and fewer American ships started 
calling at Curaçao. At the same time the number of French priva-
teers arriving steadily rose. Captain Kikkert recorded in his journal 
the arrival of six French privateers in 1796, 11 in 1797, 23 in 1798, 
and 30 in 1800 (Milo 1936:336, 484).
Curaçao’s government found itself in a difficult situation. On 
the one hand, the island benefitted from the privateering busi-
ness, as did of course the French ally, officially represented by the 
maritime agent and receveur Tierce Cadet. On the other hand, the 
Americans were long-time and valued customers – in fact the island 
depended considerably on the supply of provisions from North 
America – while there was no conflict between the Batavian Repub-
lic and the United States. From early 1799 onwards, more and more 
incidents occurred regarding American ships seized by privateers 
in the direct vicinity of Curaçao. This forced the government to 
undertake action. At the end of January 1799, an American schoo-
ner was seized by a French privateer under the reach of the canons 
of the fort at Fuikbaai. The latter had left the harbour of Curaçao 
a day earlier for Guadeloupe, but stayed in the neighbourhood to 
prey on American ships. The seizure was considered to be against 
the treaty of friendship between the United States and the Batavian 
Republic, so an armed vessel was sent by the governor with orders 
to  recapture  the  American  ship,  which  succeeded.  The  council 
decided to file a complaint with the Guadeloupean authorities, 
and the privateer was ordered to sail to Guadeloupe without any |  Han Jordaan
160
further delay.40 In February 1799, a provisional regulation regard-
ing the sale of ships seized by French and Batavian privateers was 
issued, which supplemented a regulation dating from August 1798, 
enacted  by  the  Intermediary  Executive  Authority  (Intermediair 
Uitvoerend Bewind) of the Batavian Republic. It mainly contained 
instructions for procedures that were to be followed after a prize 
was brought into port.41
Early July, the American ship Nautilus was seized after a battle 
in the vicinity of Bonaire by the French privateer Trois Amis, and 
taken to Curaçao, a seizure that would have serious repercussions. 
Despite suspicion that irregularities had been committed by the 
privateer, the council decided that the seizure could not be dis-
puted; it was impossible, it was stated, to determine whether or not 
the Nautilus was attacked within the colony’s jurisdictional limits, 
for it was impossible to say how far off the coast of Bonaire the inci-
dent had taken place.42 
In  August  1799,  U.S.  Secretary  of  State  Timothy  Pickering, 
informed  the  Batavian  diplomatic  representative  in  the  United 
States, R.G. van Polanen, ‘There is ground to suspect that the Admin-
istration at Curaçao is interested in the privateers fitted out there 
with French commissions; and hence the countenance & protection 
yielded to the pirates’.43 The privateer Trois Amis, responsible for the 
seizure of the schooner Nautilus, according to the Americans, was fit-
ted out in Curaçao. The incident was taken very seriously because on 
the occasion of the seizure the American captain and four of his crew 
had been murdered. The privateer was, according to the secretary of 
state, protected by the island’s government. It was said to have sailed 
under a pirate’s flag with skull and crossbones painted on a dark 
background, ‘and what is most extraordinary, with this piratical, mur-
derous ensign hoisted, was saluted by the Dutch frigate Ceres, Captain 
Albert Kickert!’44 The American consul in Curaçao, B.H. Philips, had 
already addressed himself in a letter of 21 June to the governor and 
council of Curaçao, but never received any answer.45 
40  NA, 2.05.12.01, OAC, inv. no. 110, nos. 1-2, minutes of the meetings of the council, 30 and 
31-1-1799.
41  WIPC, II, no. 485, pp. 573-7 publication 28-2-1799, articles 24-25.
42  WIPC, II, no. 485, minutes 10-7-1799, pp. 311-6; see also Van Meeteren 1944: 39-40.
43  Claude A. Swanson and Dudley W. Knox , 1935-1938, (further referred to as ND), Opera-
tions August-December 1799, 83, Secretary of State Timothy Pickering to Minister Resident 
from the Batavian Republic Van Polanen, 16-8-1799.
44  ND, Operations August-December 1799, 83, Secretary of State Timothy Pickering to Minis-
ter Resident from the Batavian Republic Van Polanen, 16-8-1799.
45  ND, Operations August-December 1799, 83, Secretary of State Timothy Pickering to Minis-
ter Resident from the Batavian Republic Van Polanen, 16-8-1799.7  Patriots, privateers and international politics  |
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Van Polanen answered Pickering that ‘as early as the beginning 
of the year 1797, I had received sufficient proof that the government 
of that Island was in improper hands, the Governor being a low bred 
and illiterate German as also are the majority of the Council’.46 He 
immediately also wrote a letter to Lauffer in which he bluntly stated 
that the conduct of Curaçao’s administration during the war, and 
especially during the past two years with regard to the arming of pri-
vateers, the seizing and condemning of American ships, and the con-
doning of illegal practices by privateers gave ample ground to suspect 
that the government officials themselves were directly interested. 
And if there were any doubts, these had certainly been removed after 
the receipt of ‘certain reports’ from Curaçao and after the affair with 
the Nautilus. Curaçao’s government would be held responsible, and 
the governor could be certain that complaints would be filed with 
the Batavian government. Consequently, an official inquiry was to be 
expected, and those officials who would be found guilty of neglecting 
their duties for personal gain could at the least expect to be liable to 
pay extensive damages. Van Polanen asserted that he was in the pos-
session of documents sent by informants in Curaçao, and that he was 
certain that there would still be ‘decent people’ on the island who 
would be willing to testify.47 Van Polanen also informed the authori-
ties in the Batavian Republic about the matter.48 It is interesting to 
note that not a single reference regarding these serious American 
claims and accusations is to be found in the minutes of the council. 
That the Americans were taking the incidents very seriously is under-
lined by the fact that President John Adams informed the secretary 
of state that ‘if any legal evidence can be produced to prove that Gov-
ernor and Council are, more or less, concerned in the privateers, it 
would be a ground for Serious representations to their Superiors’.49 
Little is known about the involvement of Curaçao’s seafaring 
population and local investors in French privateers. It is certain 
that privateers were locally armed and that they sailed with both 
French and Batavian letters of marque, but it is not clear on what 
scale  (Milo1936:487;  Van  Meeteren  1944:29,  36-37).  Already  in 
1797 and 1798 there were reports of direct Curaçaoan involvement 
in the seizure of the American ships.50
46  NA, 2.01.08, Buitenlandse Zaken, 1795-1813 (BuZa), inv. no. 358, Van Polanen to Picker-
ing, 16-8-1799.
47  NA, 2.01.08, BuZa, inv. no. 358, Van Polanen to Lauffer, 17-8-1799.
48  NA, 2.01.08, BuZa, inv. no. 358, Van Polanen to the Agent for Foreign Affairs (Agent tot de 
Buitenlandse Betrekkingen), 18-8-1799.
49  ND, Operations August-December 1799, 121, John Adams to secretary of state, 24-8-1799.
50  ND, Operations February 1797-Ocober 1798, 22, Consular letters by B.H. Philips, 21-6- and 
3-8-1797; 241, Declaration of Thomas Smith, master of Schooner Lemmon, 24-9-1798.|  Han Jordaan
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Since a large part of the population, especially the free non-
white segment, was directly or indirectly involved in the maritime 
branch of the island’s economy, and since privateering could be 
a very profitable business, it may be expected that many tried to 
benefit from it. In the beginning of 1797 Captain Kikkert appeared 
to have invested money in two privateers (Milo1936:332). Historian 
Van Meeteren mentions the issuing of a Dutch letter of marque 
on  28  June  1799  to  the  captain  of  the  privateer  Drie  Vrienden, 
which, he suggests, is possibly the same ship as the Trois Amis (Van 
Meeteren 1944:36). It is not unlikely that the privateer sailed with 
both a French and a Batavian commission. The name of the ship 
suggests that there were three ship-owners or investors. One could 
be retrieved from the notarial archives of Curaçao: it was Tierce.51
The American accusations with regard to the incident with the 
Nautilus must have made Lauffer feel very uncomfortable. And at 
the same time the authorities in Saint-Domingue were also putting 
pressure on the Curaçao government but regarding a different mat-
ter. In the minutes of 5 September 1799, the receipt of a letter from 
Commissioner Roume is mentioned, with a request to prohibit the 
trade between Curaçao and the ports controlled by André Rigaud. 
Devaux, who had just arrived, and soon afterwards requested the 
council to issue a ban on the export of provisions to the southern part 
of Saint-Domingue. The council decided not to become involved in 
the dispute between Toussaint and Rigaud. Devaux also asked for the 
payment of 12.5 % duties on the sale of the American prize Cleopatra. 
He informed the council that he needed the money for the execu-
tion of an operation, but the council was not willing to honour this 
request.52 Then Devaux asked the council for a loan of 5,000 pesos, 
which request was also declined since there were insufficient funds.53 
The next day, Lauffer informed the council of the existence of a con-
spiracy, followed by the arrests of Devaux and Sasportas.54
On 17 September 1799, just a few days after the arrest of Tierce, 
the American consul again addressed himself to governor Lauffer 
regarding the capture of the Nautilus:
I am now under the necessity to enlarge, & in the name of the 
United States of America to call on you as Commander in chief & 
Governor of this Island & its dependencies & for the reasons which 
51  NA, 1.05.12.01, OAC, inv. no. 1001, protocol of notarial deeds, no. 259, fol. 777r-778r, guar-
antee for the sum of 10,000 guilders by Pierre Martin in favor of Jean Baptiste Tierce, owner of 
the privateer Drie Vrienden, 26-6-1799.
52  NA, 1.05.12.01, OAC inv. no. 110, minutes council meeting 5-9-1799, pp. 356; 356-7; 357-60.
53  NA, 1.05.12.01, OAC inv. no. 110, minutes 6-9-1799, pp. 370-1; 372; 374-5.
54  NA, 1.05.12.01, OAC inv. no. 110, minutes 8-9-1799, pp. 376-378; 391-392.7  Patriots, privateers and international politics  |
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I will state to you to demand immediate restitution & indemnifica-
tion for the property so illegally siezed [sic] & taken, & competent 
satisfaction on the Persons of the Officers & Crew who committed 
the Murders of Captain Dixon, his mate, Boatswain & Two of his 
Sailors and also for maiming, stabing [sic] & plundering Four oth-
ers of his Sailors.55 
Once again it was made clear that the complaints against Curaçao’s 
government were very serious: the Trois Amis had sailed from Cura-
çao flying a flag that not only was ‘indicative to its bloody inten-
tions’ but was not allowed to be carried by the laws of any nation. 
The seized Nautilus had been taken to Curaçao, and the privateer 
had  on  its  return  officially  been  saluted  by  the  Dutch  man-of-
war moored in the port. The seizure was a violation of the treaty 
between the United States and the Dutch. The cargo of the Nautilus 
had been sold before a prize court pronounced a sentence. Phil-
ips added that he had received orders ‘to make the demand […] 
not Only for the Nautilus, the property & Lives lost, but for redress 
of every injury wh. has been permitted under the direction of your 
Government’. The United States Government was to be respected 
and required that the rights of its citizens would not again be vio-
lated.56 Again, nothing regarding this letter is recorded in the min-
utes. But a day later Lauffer communicated to the Council in an 
extraordinary meeting that he was convinced of the existence of a 
plan to make Curaçao the centre of a region-wide attempt to free 
all the slaves.57
Shortly  after  the  arrest  of  Devaux,  the  U.S.  consul  urgently 
requested two American warships. This was necessary, he explained, 
to protect the lives and property of U.S. citizens in Curaçao. The 
secretary of the navy thereupon ordered two warships be sent to 
Curaçao, not only to secure the safety of American citizens, but 
also with orders to apprehend the captain and crew of the Trois 
Amis and take them to the United States to be tried for piracy. 
The secretary of state informed the American consul of this. He 
expected that, since the discovery of the conspiracy, Lauffer might 
be more willing to hand over the captain and crew of the Trois Amis. 
If the island’s government wished, Pickering wrote, the American 
warships were allowed to assist to counter the machinations of the 
French, provided it would not be too inconvenient or hazardous to 
the immediate object of sending them there. The ships arrived at 
55  ND, Operations August-September 1799, B.H. Philips to J.R. Lauffer, 17-9-1799, 199-200.
56  ND, Operations August-September 1799, B.H. Philips to J.R. Lauffer, 17-9-1799, 200.
57  NA, 1.05.12.01, OAC, inv. no. 110, minutes council meeting 18-9-1799, 410-5.|  Han Jordaan
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Curaçao in November 1799 and stayed until they were recalled in 
April 1800.58
A few months later, soon after the arrival of the expeditionary 
force from Guadeloupe, a letter was received from the Batavian 
Republic  communicating  the  American  complaints  regarding 
Curaçao. The Batavian government ordered a complete ban on 
the admitting privateers to the port of Willemstad. The reaction of   
council, as recorded in the minutes, was that the American com-
plaints were based on ‘false and mendacious reports’ regarding 
‘certain events’, supplied by ‘hot headed’ persons. The complaints 
would be disproved as soon as possible. Banning privateers from 
the harbour was not feasible because of the presence of the expedi-
tion from Guadeloupe.59
On  6  September,  immediately  after  the  French  landed  at 
St. Michiel’s Bay, Philips sent out an emergency call for U.S. naval 
assistance. It was feared that the Americans and their property were 
in great danger: ‘I am well assured that in case of success on the 
part of the Guadeloupe Adventurers, that our persons & property 
will be sacrificed. I conceive a frigate and a Ship of 20 Guns or two 
frigates wou’d relieve us in 14 days & might make many prizes, but 
they must come speedily or we are lost’.60
From their station at St. Kitts the American warships Merri-
mack and Patapsco were sent, which arrived at Curaçao on 22 Sep-
tember. On their arrival the Americans found the British frigate 
Nereide anchored just outside the harbour, and they learned that 
the island’s government had already capitulated to the British. 
The  situation  on  the  island  was  still  precarious.  Many  of  the 
Americans staying at Curaçao had volunteered to man the for-
tresses  to  help  defend  the  colony  against  a  French  take-over. 
Since the British had landed only twenty marines and refused 
to undertake any further action until reinforcements arrived, it 
was decided that the Patapsco would sail into port in an attempt 
to break the French siege. The action succeeded, and seventy 
American troops were landed. It was expected that the French 
would try to undertake an assault during the night, but instead 
they evacuated the island. After hearing the news of the French 
58  ND, Operations August-December 1799, 187, B.H. Hammel to Secretary of State, 14-9-1799; 
287, Navy Department to Captain Richard V. Morris, Commanding officer on the Guadeloupe 
Station, 15-10-1799; 288, Secretary of State to B.H. Philips, 15-10-1799; 403, B.H. Philips to the 
Secretary of State, 15-11-1799; Operations January-May 1800, 379, Secretary of the Navy to Cap-
tain Stephen Decatur, 3-4-1800.
59  NA, 2.05.12.01, OAC inv. no. 111, minutes extra ordinary meeting of the council on 14-8-
1800, 437-438. The letter from the Batavian Republic was dated 18-3-1800.
60  ND, Operations June-November 1800, 322-323, B.H. Philips to the Commander in Chief of 
the U.S. squadron on the Guadeloupe station, or to ship commanders, 6-9-1800.7  Patriots, privateers and international politics  |
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departure, the British captain Watkins sailed into port and took 
possession of the island.61
After the French departure, a few hundred prisoners were taken. 
The majority were considered prisoners of war and handed over to 
the British. Curaçaoan citizens suspected of treason and collaborat-
ing with the French were interrogated. The problem was that in most 
cases it was hard to prove that a person had actually sided with the 
French. Because of the fast collapse of Lauffer’s defence and the hasty 
retreat on Willemstad, many people suddenly found themselves in the 
French-controlled part of the island without any possibility of reach-
ing the other side of the St. Anna Bay. Most of the people interrogated 
appeared to have had convincing arguments why they remained on 
the French side, while it could not be proven that they had actu-
ally taken up arms. The original accusations appeared to have been 
founded largely on hearsay. Nowhere in the judicial records can any 
proof be found for the existence of a massive pro-French movement 
of Jacobin persuasion coming to the assistance of the Guadeloupeans. 
All those suspected of siding with the French were released except for 
one person: a French mulatto by the name of Joseph Rigaud, who was 
found guilty of treason and sentenced to be hanged. The sentence 
was carried out immediately after it was pronounced.62
In the Curaçaoan archives, no references were found to the 
identity of Joseph Rigaud and whether he was related to André 
Rigaud, but from other sources it can gleaned that he most likely 
was one of André’s brothers. Two of André Rigaud’s brothers were 
even on Curaçao in September 1800. The other one, François, was 
also arrested, but considered a prisoner of war.63 Although the judi-
61  ND, Operations June-November 1800, 337-341, William D. Robinson to Secretary of State, 10-9-
1800; 341-342, Letter to a merchant in New York concerning surrender of Curaçao to Great Britain, 
18-10-1800; Extract from a letter from an officer on board U.S. Sloop Patapsco, to his friend in 
Philadelphia, 23-9-1800, published in the Connecticut Journal, 26-11-1800; 423-424, Captain Thomas 
Truxtun to Secretary of the Navy, 2-10-1800; 451-452, B.H. Philips to the commander of the U.S. 
Squadron, Guadeloupe, dated 10-10-1800; 481-482, B.H. Philips to the Secretary of State, 18-10-1800; 
508-509, Captain Thomas Truxtun to William Patterson, merchant in Baltimore, Md., 28-10-1800.
62  NA, 01.05.12.01, OAC inv. no. 111, minutes extra ordinary meeting 21-11-1800, 603-5; extra 
ordinary meeting 9-12-1800, 645-6; inv. no. 127, resolution no. 36 and attachments, fols. 277-283; 
attachment La A, undated document from fiscal Spencer, fol. 284v; Spencer to Van Starcken-
borg, 9-11-1800, fols. 189-90v.
63  Joseph Rigaud was probably already on the island in August 1800. In a deed of conveyance 
of a ship, dated 25-8-1800, a Joseph Rigaud from Les Cayes is mentioned as the selling party. See: 
NA, 01.05.12.01, OAC inv. no. 1004, no. 45, fo. 110r-110v. See also: Alejandro Enrique Gómez 
Pernía, Le Syndrome de Saint-Domingue. Perceptions et representations de la Révolution haïti-
enne dans le Monde Atlantique, 1790-1886, unpublished doctoral thesis, 2010, École des Hautes 
Études en Sciences Sociales, Ecole Doctorale d’Histoire et Civilisations, pp. 302; AGI, Caracas 
486, no. 4, ‘Diario de lo acaecido en Curazao…’ (Diary regarding what happened in Curaçao…); 
AGI, Caracas 486, attachment to a document No. 1, ‘Noticia comunicada de Paraguaná’ (News 
from Paraguana). I am grateful to Ramón Aizpurua for supplying me with this information.|  Han Jordaan
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cial papers regarding all the other suspects have been preserved, 
almost no documents pertaining to Rigaud’s trial were found. It 
was recorded only that he had served in a French cavalry unit. He 
was left behind when the Guadeloupeans evacuated the island, but 
together with two companions he managed to flee to Aruba where 
he was apprehended.64 
The  British,  for  intelligence  purposes,  had  all  the  letters 
that were sent from Curaçao to Europe in early October 1800 
opened, copied, and translated. Of the 31 letters investigated 
only five contained information regarding people who allegedly 
joined the French, information that again was mainly based on 
rumours and that was also contradictory. While according to one 
letter all the blacks and the greatest part of the people of colour 
defected to the side of the Guadeloupean invaders, another let-
ter mentions that the free blacks and free coloureds sided with 
the inhabitants and fought well. Only Luis Brion and a Jan Smit 
are explicitly mentioned as having joined the French, allegedly 
as interpreters. One of the letters states somewhat vaguely that 
‘many of the inhabitants’ sided with the French. The letters con-
firm that most of the slaves did support the French, and some 
of the slaves were said to still be armed and hiding in the coun-
tryside. Finally, mention is made of the hanging of ‘a mulatto 
named Joseph Rigo’.65
conclusion
It is unlikely that the alleged 1799 conspiracy and the Guadelou-
pean expedition in 1800 are related to any region-wide scheme 
to liberate the slaves and establish racial equality. A plan did exist 
in 1799 to invade Jamaica and ignite a slave revolt in that colony 
in preparation for a French attack, and indeed the French agents 
Devaux and Sasportas were commissioned to carry it out. But this 
plan was not supported by Toussaint Louverture, who at that time 
had just concluded a treaty with the British and the Americans and 
was fighting André Rigaud; it was initiated in France. Neither is 
there indication that Tierce had any radical Jacobin ideas regard-
64  NA, 01.05.12.01, OAC inv. no. 167, minutes of the meetings of the councillors commis-
sioned to facilitate judicial procedures (raden-commissarissen tot het houden der dingtalen), 6-10-
1800, 337-8.
65  TNA, Records of the Admiralty, Adm 1/250, Letters from senior officers, Jamaica, 1800.7  Patriots, privateers and international politics  |
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ing liberty and equality, nor that the Guadeloupean expedition in 
1800 was sent with the purpose of freeing the slaves.
Tierce was a rich slave owner, who was actively involved in the 
crushing of the 1795 revolt, and who after his extradition tried 
to have his good reputation and his fortune restored. Curaçao 
became an object of international politics. The Guadeloupeans 
were interested in securing Curaçao as an important privateering 
base and were no doubt alarmed by signs that by late 1799 the 
attitude of the Curaçao government towards French privateering 
seemed to be changing in favour of the Americans. Lauffer was 
under enormous pressure from the United States. The American 
accusations after the incident with the Nautilus that the island gov-
ernment had a direct interest in the arming of privateers cannot 
be proven, but it is likely that there was at least some truth in the 
allegations. By creating the myth of the Tierce Cadet conspiracy, 
Lauffer at once could divert the attention of his superiors away 
from this embarrassing matter, pacify the Americans, and get rid 
of the French and especially of Tierce as one of the owners of 
the privateer Trois Amis/Drie Vrienden. The general atmosphere of 
fear for revolt and subversion, both in Curaçao and in the mother 
country, as related by the spectre of the events in Saint-Domingue 
made  Lauffer’s  accusations  convincing.  This  in  turn  provoked 
the reaction from Guadeloupe a year later, an intervention with a 
geopolitical rather than an idealistic agenda. The Guadeloupeans 
were actively supported by Curaçaoan slaves who may well have 
hoped for liberation, but there is no evidence whatsoever for the 
existence of a radical revolutionary movement among the slave 
population, nor among free blacks and coloureds, nor among the 
whites.
The  Curaçaoan  free  non-whites,  however,  must  have  wel-
comed the principles of the French Revolution. There is proof 
that they actively sought French support for their emancipatory 
ambitions, but in the end they remained loyal to the island’s 
government, even if the latter was not inclined to give in to any 
ideas regarding full equality. But then again, a slave revolt and 
the chaos that would almost certainly result from it were not in 
the interest of free population either. The Curaçaoan free blacks 
and coloureds, due to the close relations many of them had with 
the southern part of Saint-Domingue, probably felt more affili-
ation with André Rigaud than with Toussaint Louverture. The 
hanging of the ‘free mulatto’ Joseph Rigaud in the aftermath 
of the events of 1800 might have served, whether or not inten-
tionally, as a governmental warning to them not to indulge in 
subversive ideas.|  Han Jordaan
168
bibliography
Dubois, Laurent
2004  A colony of citizens: Revolution and slave emancipation in the 
French  Caribbean,  1787-1804.  Chapel  Hill:  University  of 
North Carolina Press.
Emmanuel, Isaac S. and Suzanne A. Emmanuel
1970  History of the Jews of the Netherlands Antilles. Cincinnati: Amer-
ican Jewish Archives.
Fick, Carolyn E
1990  The making of Haiti: The Saint-Domingue Revolution from below. 
Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press.
Garrigus, John D.
1993  ‘Blue and brown: Contraband indigo and the rise of a free 
coloured  planter  class  in  French  Saint-Domingue’,  The 
Americas, 50:233-63.
2007  ‘Opportunist or patriot? Julien Raimond (1744-1801) and 
the Haitian Revolution’, Slavery and Abolition, 28:1-21.
Geggus, David
1987  ‘The enigma of Jamaica in the 1790s: New light on the 
causes  of  slave  rebellions’,  William  and  Mary  Quarterly 
44:274-99.
Hamelberg, J.H.J.
1985  ‘Een  veel  bewogen  tijdperk:  Een  achttal  jaren  uit  de 
geschiedenis  van  Curaçao  1796-1804’,  Eerste  jaarlijksch 
verslag  van  het  geschied-,  taal-  en  volkenkundig  genootschap 
gevestigd  the  Willemstad  Curaçao,  pp.  24-88.  Amsterdam: 
S. Emmering. [Photo mechanical reprint of original from 
1896.]
Homan, Gerlof H.
1976  ‘Jean Baptiste Tierce and the Batavian Republic’, Nieuwe 
West-Indische Gids 51:1-12.
Jordaan, Han
2010  ‘Free blacks and coloureds and the administration of jus-
tice in eighteenth-century Curaçao’, New West Indian Guide 
84:63-86.
Klooster, Wim
1994  ‘Subordinate but proud: Curaçao’s free blacks and mulat-
toes  in  the  eighteenth  century’,  New  West  Indian  Guide 
68:283-300.7  Patriots, privateers and international politics  |
169
Lee, To van der
1998  Curaçaose vrijbrieven 1722-1863: Met indices op namen van 
vrijgelatenenen  hun  voormalige  eigenaren.  Den  Haag:  Alge-
meen Rijksarchief.
Letters of Toussaint Louverture 
1910  ‘Letters of Toussaint Louverture and Edward Stevens, 1798-
1800’, American Historical Review, 16-4:64-101.
Meeteren, Nicolaas van
1944   Noodlotsdagen: Grepen uit de geschiedenis van Curaçao, 1799-
1800. Willemstad: Drukkerij De Stad N.V.
Milo, T.H.
1936  ‘De Bataafsche Marine in Curaçao, 1795-1800’, Marineblad, 
51-1:326-45, 482-96.
Palacios, Roberto
1983  ‘Ansia de libertad’, Lantèrnu, 1-1:20-7.
Pérotin-Dumon, Anne
1988  ‘Les Jacobins des Antilles ou l’esprit de liberté dans les 
Isles-du-Vent’,  Revue  d’Histoire  Moderne  et  Contemporaine 
35:275-304.
Schiltkamp, J.A. and J.Th. de Smidt (eds)
1978  West Indisch plakaatboek. Nederlandse Antillen, Benedenwinden: 
Publikaties en andere wetten alsmede de oudste resoluties betrek-
king hebbende op Curaçao, Aruba, Bonaire, 1782 – 1816. Vol. 2. 
Amsterdam: S. Emmering.
Swanson, Claude A. and Dudley W. Knox (eds)
1935-38  Naval  documents  related  to  the  Quasi-War  between  the  United 
States and France, Washington, DC: Government Printing 
Office.Contributors
Ramón Aizpurua studied history in Caracas and Barcelona and was 
full professor in colonial history at the Universidad Central de Ven-
ezuela until his retirement. His most recent books are En busca de 
la libertad: la fuga de esclavos holandeses a la Provincia de Venezuela en el 
siglo XVIII (Bogotá, 2002) and La conspiración por dentro: un análisis 
de las declaraciones de la Conspiración de La Guaira de 1797 (Caracas, 
2007).
Karwan Fatah-Black is a PhD candidate at the Institute for History 
of Leiden University. As a member of the project ‘Dutch Atlantic 
Connections: The Circulation of People, Goods and Ideas, 1670-
1800’, he studies the role of Paramaribo as a node in the Dutch 
circuit of Atlantic trade. He graduated as a research master in his-
tory at the University of Amsterdam with a thesis on the political 
movements on Curaçao during the Age of Revolutions.
David Geggus was educated at Oxford, London, and York Universi-
ties in England. He has been professor of history at the University of 
Florida, Gainesville, since 1983. His research interests include Carib-
bean slavery, the Atlantic slave trade and the Haitian Revolution. His 
most recent books include Haitian revolutionary studies (2002) and 
(with Norman Fiering) The world of the Haitian Revolution (2009).
Han Jordaan studied history at Leiden University and fine arts at 
the Royal Academy of Art in The Hague. Between 2004 and 2006 
he coordinated the project ‘The Atlantic World and the Dutch, 
1500-2000’ (AWAD). As a researcher at the KITLV and the Huy-
gens Institute of Netherlands History in The Hague, he completed 
his dissertation on the free black and coloured population in eigh-
teenth-century Curaçao in 2011. He has published various articles 
on slavery and race relations in Curaçao.
Wim Klooster is associate professor at Clark University, Worcester, 
Massachusetts, USA, where he has taught since 2003. He earned |  Contributors
172
his PhD at the University of Leiden in 1995 and has been the Inter-
Americas Mellon Fellow at the John Carter Brown Library and a 
Charles Warren Fellow at Harvard University. Among his research 
interests are Atlantic trade, especially smuggling, the Dutch Atlan-
tic,  and  the  age  of  revolutions.  He  has  published  seven  other 
books, including Revolutions in the Atlantic world: A comparative his-
tory (2009) and Illicit riches: Dutch trade in the Caribbean, 1648-1795 
(1998).
Gert Oostindie is director of the KITLV/Royal Netherlands Insti-
tute of Southeast Asian and Carabbean Studies in Leiden and pro-
fessor of Caribbean history at Leiden University. His recent books 
include Postcolonial Netherlands: Sixty-five years of forgetting, commem-
orating,  silencing  (2011),  Dutch  colonialism,  migration  and  cultural 
heritage (ed., 2008), and Paradise overseas: The Dutch Caribbean - colo-
nialism and its transatlantic legacies (2005).
Linda M. Rupert is assistant professor, Atlantic World, at Univer-
sity of North Carolina, Greensboro. She holds a PhD from Duke 
University (history, 2006). Her publications include ‘Marronage, 
manumission, and maritime trade in the early modern Caribbean’ 
(Slavery & Abolition 2009) and ‘Contraband trade and the shaping 
of colonial societies’ (Itinerario 2006). She was a visiting Fulbright 
Scholar at KITLV in fall 2009.Abercromby, Ralph 105
Adams, John 138, 161 
Africa 10, 38, 68, 79
Afro-Curaçaoans 67-8, 81-2, 85-6, 
91-2
Afro-Venezuelans 85
America(s) vii, 15, 26, 29, 34-5, 39, 
60, 63, 87, 91, 120, 138
  –British 63
  –North 3, 23, 25, 28, 159
  –South vii
  –Spanish 13, 58-9, 78, 83, 138
American Revolution vii, 15, 28-9, 60
American War of Independence 
127
Andresote (Andrés López del Rosa-
rio) 89
Anduaga, José de 109
Antigua 66, 111
Aponte conspiracy 32-3, 37-9
Aponte, José Antonio 29, 32, 38
Aquin 67, 153
Arlequín 107
Armada 101
Aruba 3, 16, 77, 104-5, 117, 166
Atlantic slave trade 11, 26, 39
Baco, René-Gaston 147 
Bahamas 33, 111
Bahia 25-6, 33-4, 36
Bailly, Pedro 60
Bande du Sud 32
Barbados 26, 32, 35
Barlovento 83
Batavian Republic ix, 9, 11-2, 32, 
66, 109, 113, 123-6, 129-31, 137, 
147-51, 154, 159, 160-1, 164
Batavian revolt 134
Beaujon, Jan Jacob 12, 109, 123, 
130-1, 133-7, 156-7
Bellair, Gabriel 61
Berbice 3, 6
Berch, Cornelis 127, 129-30, 136 
Bermuda 63, 110
Biassou, Georges 61
Bishopric of Caracas 78, 88
Bishopric of Coro 78
Black Caribs 24
Boey, W.C. 5
Boggiero, Emilio 109-10, 116
Bolívar, Simón 13, 32, 39, 103, 145
Bolivia 36
Bonaire 3, 77, 160
Bonaparte, Napoleon 39, 147
Boni 24
Braak, Adriaan 124, 130, 134 
Brazil 23-5, 26, 36, 37-9
  –Dutch 2
Bresseau, Maurice-Henri 13, 144, 
147
Brión, Luis 13, 67, 118, 145, 148, 
152, 166 
Index|  Index
174
Brión, Pedro 105, 118
Brion, Pierre 67
Brunnings, J.M. 133
Bruto 107-8
Buenos Aires 30, 35-6
Cádiz 36, 64
Cancrijn, Bernardus Anthony 129, 
131, 133
Canga 67
Canibens, Pierre 109-11, 114
Cap Français 61
Capaya 64
Caracas 59, 60, 64, 69, 78, 87-8, 97, 
100-1, 103-4, 106, 109-13, 119-20, 
158
Caracas Company 88-9 
Caracasbaai 118
Carbonell, Pedro 101, 103-4, 106, 
109-10, 113
Caribbean
  –British 25, 27, 30, 35-7, 58, 64
  –Dutch 1, 4, 6, 7, 17
  –French 9, 10, 13, 15, 24, 30, 33, 
142
Greater viii, 57, 65, 69
  –Spanish 9, 36
Cartagena 33, 39, 108, 115, 120
Cartagena conspiracy 38
Casimir, Alexis 38
Castillo, Pedro 103 
Catholicism 59, 68, 82
Caucagua 64
Ceres 126, 131-2, 134, 155, 160
Charles IV 57, 64-5
Charleston 24, 32, 38
Chirinos insurrection 98 see also 
Coro revolt
Chirinos, José Leonardo (JLCh) 
92, 99
Christianization 79
Christmas rebellion 25, 33
Christophe, Henry 36
Cleopatra 162
Coalition Wars 124
Cobreros 24
Cocofío 65, 68, 90
Código Negro 35
Cofradía del Carmen 87
Committee for Colonial Affairs 131
conspiracies (rebellions, revolts)
  –Aponte conspiracy 32-3, 37-9
  –Batavian revolt 134
  –Cartagena conspiracy 38
  –Chirinos insurrection 98
  –Christmas rebellion 25, 33
  –Coro revolt 58, 66, 92
  –Escalera conspiracy 24, 36, 38
  –Ladder conspiracy 32-3, 38
  –Malé revolt 33
  –Maracaibo conspiracy 39, 106-8
  –Martinique rebellion 38
  –Nat Turner rebellion 46
  –Pointe Coupée conspiracy 65, 67
  –San Blas conspiracy 101
  –Tailors’ rebellion 34, 38
  –Vesey plot 32, 36
Coro ix, 7-9, 16, 27, 30-4, 37-8, 57-8, 
65-9, 75, 77-8, 81-8, 91-2, 97-101, 
109-10, 116-8, 120
Coro revolt 58, 66, 92
Cortés de Campomanes, Juan 102, 
104-5
Council for Colonies in America 
and the Possessions of the State 
in Africa 126Index  |
175
Court of Holland 149
Criollo elite 13, 15
Cristiano, Diego 108 
Cuba 24-6, 29, 33-4, 36-9, 58, 62-3, 67
Curaçao Patriots see Patriots
Curaçaoan National Guard 109, 
112-3, 136, 138, 143, 151, 157-8
Curazaíto 100
Curazao, José María 67
Curiepe 64, 69, 83, 85-6
Curimagua 98
De Fuijk 8
De Knip 8
Declaration of the Rights of Man 
and Citizen viii, 57-62
Declouet, Luis 60
Del Valle clan 117
Demerara 3, 9, 26, 30, 35, 39, 137
Denmark 6, 39, 40
Desfourneaux, Etienne 147
Deslondes, Charles 33
Dessalines, Jean-Jacques 29, 34
Devaux, Urbain 106, 109-14, 120-1, 
141-4, 149-50, 158, 162-3, 166
Dia di lucha pa libertat 1
Dominica 9, 24, 36, 38, 111
Drie Vrienden  see Trois Amis
Duijckinck, Gerardus 148 
Dunmore, John Murray 4th Earl 
of 29
Dutch Republic 12, 66, 91, 97-8, 124-5
Dutch West India Company (WIC) 
3, 76-8, 87, 123, 125, 137
Duyckinck, P. 129
El Socorro 98
Elmina 3, 7
Emancipation 4, 9
Emancipation Day 1
Emancipation decree 64-5, 68
Enlightenment 39
Enríquez clan 117
Escalera conspiracy 24, 36, 38
España, José María 102-6, 109-11, 
145, 151, 158
Essequibo 3
Europe viii, 9, 63, 77, 166
Farfán de los Godos, Manuel 114
First Company of Disciplined 
Mulatto Militias of Maracaibo 107
First Veteran Company of Mara-
caibo 107
Fort Amsterdam 76, 131, 142, 144, 
156, 159
Fort Sint Michiel 118
Fortress Republic 136
France vii, ix, 2, 9, 11, 13-4, 16, 
27-9, 31, 35, 37, 39, 57-8, 61-2, 65, 
98, 99, 106, 110-1, 124, 138, 141, 
146-8, 151, 154, 166
Francisco, Julián 168
Free Mulatto Corps 132
Free Negro Corps 132
French National Assembly viii
French National Convention 65, 154
French Revolution 9, 11, 15, 27-31, 
34, 38, 40, 57-60, 62, 90-1, 98, 102, 
108, 127, 130, 135, 138, 145, 167
French Revolutionary War 37
Frois, Moses 130 
Fuikbaai 159
Gabriel 29, 37
Gaspar, Auguste 107-8, 110-1|  Index
176
Gaspar, Jean-Baptiste 107-8, 110-1
Gómez, Isabel 103 
Gómez, Jacob 108
González de Castro, Juan 108
González, José Caridad (JCG) 33, 
68-9, 91-2, 99
Goyrand, Gaspard 30
Granada 76, 111
Gravenhorst, Johannes Hendrik 
135-6 
Great Britain 5
Grenada 24-5, 38, 62
Grigg, Nanny 32
Grovestins, W.A.S. 5
Guadeloupe viii, ix, 2, 9, 13, 15-6, 
24, 30, 36, 39, 65, 67, 102, 104-5, 
110, 116, 132, 136-7, 141-2, 144, 
146-7, 154, 156, 159, 164-5, 167
Gual, Manuel 101-5, 109, 145, 151, 
158 
Guaranao 107
Guevara y Vasconcelos, Manuel  
106, 109, 110-9, 121
Guianas 3, 25
Guinea 85, 100
Gulf of Mexico 143
Guyane 39
Guzmán, Jorge 115 
Haiti vii, 14-6, 26, 28, 31, 33-4, 36, 
91, 121, 146
Haitian Revolution vii, 1, 2, 6, 9, 
11, 13, 15, 17-8, 26-8, 31, 33-4, 
38-40, 57, 62, 67, 90-1, 98, 99, 
180, 146
Hansz, Jan Hendrik 127-9, 136
Harrias, Frederik 109 
Havana 32, 34, 38, 60, 64
Haynes, Lemuel 60-1
Hermione 112
Hernández de Orta, Antonio 101
Heshusius, Georgius J.H. 135
Hispaniola 76, 110
House of Orange 11, 125, 127, 138
Hueque 116
Hugues, Victor 30, 65, 103-5, 132, 
147, 149, 154, 156
Iturén, Manuel 115 
Jacmel 6, 67, 104-5, 109
Jacobin 14, 141, 145, 147, 151, 
165-6
Jacobins 132, 145
Jamaica 24-7, 31, 33-5, 37, 39, 67, 
111, 146, 150, 166
Jay Treaty 146
Jean-François 33, 37
Jeannet-Oudin, Nicolas Georges 
147
Jews 4, 112, 117, 129-30, 137, 143
Kentucky 36
Kikkert, Albert 12, 109, 114, 126-7, 
130, 134-6, 143, 148-9, 155, 159
Kingdom Holland 126
Kingdom of the Netherlands 12
Kingston 111
La Guaira 34, 101-6, 109, 113, 116-
7, 120
La Pensée 136
Ladder conspiracy 32-3, 38
Lauffer, Johann Rudolf 11-4, 103-4, 
106, 109-16, 118-21, 123-4, 128-38, 
142-4, 148-53, 156-9, 161-3, 165, 167Index  |
177
Lavaux, Étienne 147
Les Cayes 6, 67, 116, 153, 158, 165
Loango 68-9, 91 see also Luangos
Louisiana 25-6, 29, 30, 33, 35, 58, 
60, 65, 67
Louverture, Toussaint 14, 29-32, 
34, 38, 109, 146, 150, 166-7
Luangos 100-1
Macanillas 99
Macuquita 100
Madrid 87, 100-1
Maduro, Juan Pedro 104-5
Maitland, Thomas 146 
Malé revolt 33
Mandinga 67
Maracaibo 31, 38-9, 66, 106-8, 110, 
115, 120
Maracaibo conspiracy 39, 106-8
Maranhão 36
Marie Galante 33
Marmión, Manuel 115-7
Martel, José Antonio 118-9
Martinique 9, 30, 33, 35-6, 40, 67, 105
Martinique rebellion 38
Massachusetts 28, 60-1
Medea 126, 132, 135
Mercier 10
Merrimack 164
Military Committee (MC) ix, 123-4, 
136-8
Mina 67
Minors, Robert 127 
Miranda, Francisco de 32, 105
Miyares y Gonzáles, Fernando 107
Monte, Manuel del 32-3
Montego Bay 111
Morales, David 117
Napoleon, Louis 126 
Napoleonic Wars 4, 13, 37
Nassau 111
Nat Turner rebellion 46
Nautilus 160-3, 167
Nereide 13, 164
Netherlands 5, 10-2, 66, 123, 127, 
134, 137, 145
Neve Shalom 130
New England 29
New Netherland 2
New Providence 111
Northern Plain 25, 30
Obediente, José 103, 109, 112-5, 
143
Oberto, José Rafael 103
Ochoa, Tomás de 107
Olivares, Juan Bautista 59, 60
Orangists 11-2, 14, 109, 124-5, 129-
38, 155
Paraguaná Peninsula 77, 82, 117
pardos 59
Paris 31, 40, 109, 151
Patapsco 164-5
Patriot coup 123-138
Patriots 2, 11-2, 29, 109, 123-5, 128, 
130-2, 134-8, 141, 145, 155
  –Curaçao Patriots 124-5, 128-9, 
132-3, 135-6, 138
Patrulla 107
Peace of Westphalia 88
Pennsylvania 28
Perret Gentil, Abraham 157
Peru vii, 36
Pétion, Alexandre 13, 32
Philadelphia 29|  Index
178
Philips, B.H. 160, 163-4
Piar, Felipe 103 
Pickering, Timothy 160-1, 163
Picornell, Juan Bautista 101-5, 145 
Picton, Thomas 105
Pimentel, Abraham Rodriguez  143
Pirela, Francisco Javier 38, 107-8
Plaine du Nord 29
plantations
  –De Fuijk 8
  –De Knip 8
  –El Socorro 98
  –Macanillas 99
Pointe Coupée 65, 67
Pointe Coupée conspiracy 65, 67
Polanen, R.G. van 160-1
Polverel, Étienne 61
Pon, Abraham de 109 
Port Antonio 111
Port-au-Prince 107-8
Pozo, Juan Barroso del 80
Puerto Cabello 66, 101, 115-8, 120
Puerto Rico 17, 24, 32-3, 36
Quasi-War ix, 37, 159
Quast, Jan Hendrik 148-9
Raimond, Julien 149, 153
Real Compañía Guipuzcoana de 
Caracas see Caracas Company 
reales cédulas 82-3, 90
rebellions see conspiracies
Republic of the United Provinces 
9, 29, 154
revolts see conspiracies
Richmond 31
Rigaud, André 32-3, 109, 146, 162, 
165-7
Rigaud, François 165
Rigaud, Joseph 33, 116, 165-7
Rio de Janeiro 34
Río de Tocuyo 116
Rojas, Domingo 101 
Rojas, José Domingo 101
Roman Catholic Church 77-9, 87-8, 
153
Romano, José 107-8
Rosario, Andrés López del see 
Andresote
Roseau 111
Roume, Philippe 31, 146, 149, 162
Royal Audiencia of Caracas 101, 
106, 114, 117-9
Royal Decrees 80-2, 91
Saint-Domingue 6, 8-12, 14, 24-33, 
35, 37-9, 57-8, 60-2, 66-9, 92, 99, 
103-4, 106-10, 116, 141-3, 146-7, 
149, 153-4, 156-7, 159, 162, 165, 
167
San Blas conspiracy 101
San Juan de Cruz 117
San Sebastián 117
Sánchez, Domingo 110
Santa Ana 117
Santa María de la Chapa 68, 86, 
91, 100
Santo Domingo 32, 34, 37, 58, 67, 
76
Sasportas, Isaac 109, 130, 141-4, 
149-50, 158, 162, 166 
Savannah 111
Schinck, Jacobus 9, 10, 66
Schotborgh, Jan 143 
Second Maroon war 33
Seven Years’ War 66, 153Index  |
179
Ships
  –Arlequín 107
  –Bruto 107-8
  –Ceres 126, 131-2, 134, 155, 160
  –Hermione 112
  –La Pensée 136
  –Medea 126, 132, 135
  –Merrimack 164
  –Nautilus 160-3, 167
  –Nereide 13, 164
  –Patapsco 164-5
  –Patrulla 107
  –Trois Amis 160, 162-3, 167
Sint Michiel 116
Smit, Jan 166
Sojo, Francisco de 118
Sonthonax, Léger-Félicité 30, 39, 
61-2, 149
Spain 32, 35, 37, 57, 60, 64, 69, 77, 
82, 90-2, 97-8, 109-10, 117
Spanish Council of the Indies 88
Spanish Crown 76, 79-82, 89, 90-1, 
106, 110
Spanish Main ix, 3, 5, 7, 16
St. Anna Bay 76, 144, 165
St. Barthélemy 104-5
St. Croix 36, 40
St. Eustatius 3
St. George’s 111
St. John’s 111
St. Kitts 164
St. Lucia 9, 23, 30, 111
St. Michiel’s Bay 144, 164
St. Pierre 33, 40
St. Thomas 6, 67, 105, 107
St. Vincent 24, 38
Sta. María de los Negros de 
Curazao 86
Starkenborgh, Petrus Bernardus 
van 131 
Stevens, Edward 146
Suriname 3, 4, 6, 7, 17, 24, 115
Switzerland 128
Tailors’ rebellion 34, 38
Tellería, José 99 
Teylingen, P.Th. van 10, 127, 153-4
The Hague 151, 158
Thirteen Colonies 60
Tierce Cadet, Jean Baptiste 14, 103-
6, 109-14, 120-1, 129, 141-167
Tierce de Cadet see Jean Baptiste 
Tierce Cadet
Tierra Firme viii, ix, 3, 7, 9, 15, 
68, 75-92, 97, 110, 112, 114, 117, 
119-20
Tobago 29, 37
Tortola 64
Trelawny Maroons 24
Trinidad 27, 34, 67, 105, 112-3, 
119-20
Trois Amis 160, 162-3, 167
Tucacas 89
Tula 1, 9, 10, 12, 33, 35, 66
Turner, Nat 27
United States ix, 11, 23-5, 27, 31, 
36, 59, 98, 138, 141, 146, 159, 
160, 162-3, 167
Valderráin, Manuel Ramírez de 
100 
Valteau, M. 136
Veer, Johannes de 12, 66-7, 109, 
123-4, 126, 130-1, 133, 156
Vela de Coro 100|  Index
180
Venezuela ix, 7, 16, 34, 36-7, 39, 
58-9, 64, 69, 90-1, 97-121, 145, 158
Venezuelan War of Independence 
103
Veracruz 101
Vesey plot 32, 36
Vesey, Denmark 27, 37-8
Viceroyalty of New Granada 76
Viceroyalty of Santo Domingo 76
Virginia 29, 31, 33, 37
War of the South 32 
Washington, George 29
West Africa 3
West Central Africa 91
West Indian Committee 149 
West Indies 4, 25, 28-9, 124, 130, 
134
WIC see Dutch West India Company 
Wierts, F.S. 126-7, 134, 136 
Willem I 12, 126
Willem V 11, 124-5
Willemstad vii, 5, 6, 13, 67, 76-7, 
83, 90, 118, 123, 126, 129, 136-7, 
144, 152, 154, 164-5
William I see Willem I
William V see Willem V
Yaracuy Valley 89